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This dissertation reads today’s same-sex marriage debate in United Stat s in relation to 
the English debates over marriage reform in the 1850s. In particular, it focuses on the 
postmodern afterlife of the Victorian, arguing that the Victorian afterlife merges deeply 
suspicious readings with reparative ones. Starting with John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection 
of Women, it examines the manner in which today’s readings of Mill’s treatise repeat the 
responses of Mill's contemporaries. The paranoid reactions of today’s readers attempt to 
show the inadequacies and contradictions of Mill’s liberalism. At the same time, they 
highlight the paradoxical quality of Mill’s “ideal of marriage,” which involves “two 
persons of cultivated faculties, identical in opinions and purposes, between whom there 
exists that best of equality, similarity of powers and capacities with reciprocal 
superiority.” In other words, “I am superior to you at the very same time that you are 
superior to me.” So the desire for reciprocal superiority to embrace the supposedly non-
paranoid, utopic celebrations surrounding the phenomenon of same-sex marriage, while it 
also reminds us not to dispense with paranoia, since these promises are pure fantasy.  
The volatile relationship between these opposing reading practices (the paranoid 
and the reparative) helps us to identify the impossibility of true marriage equality. In 
order to highlight their dialectical relationship, subsequent chapters focus on the paranoid 
and reparative qualities of two contradictory critical readings of Charles Dickens’s David 
Copperfield; on Little Dorrit  and its same-sex couple (Miss Wade and Tattycoram); on 
Walter Pater's hagiography of Winckelmann; and, finally, on Oscar Wilde’s The 
Importance of Being Earnest and what I call Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's “reparative 
avunculate,’ that is, the alternative familial relations that flit upon the play's surface but 
get ignored by paranoid scholars focusing solely on the psychoanalytic triad of the father-
mother-child. While the "reparative avunculate" is comprised by Algernon’s cynical, 
paranoid insistence that “two is none,” it is a necessary addition to Wilde’s farcical 
portrayal of bourgeois marriage. Taken together, paranoid and reparative analyses 
demonstrate there is no such thing as an anti-hierarchical, egalitarian, non-zero-sum, two-
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Independence vs. Sharing 
 
For in marriage a little license, a little 
independence there must be between people 
living together day in day out in the same 
house; which Richard gave her, and she 
him…But with Peter everything had to be 
shared; everything gone into. (7) 
 
In the opening pages of Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway (1925), the thought of the 
eponymous heroine’s old flame, Peter Walsh, pops into her head, and with it the reader is 
presented with two distinct, alternative versions of married life: one founded on a 
modicum of independence, and another on intense sharing with “everything gone into.” 
Clarissa chose the former exactly because Peter’s demands were too intnse, for their 
marriage (she imagines) would be a test in which everything is gone into.  
I highlight this difference at the outset not to censure Clarissa for not being brave 
enough to marry Peter, for while most people are comfortable with sharing, essentially no 
one is comfortable with sharing everything – assuming that it is even possible. Sharing 
everything, however, is an ideal that is very much with us late moderns, since our idea – 
or our ideal – of marriage is, when at its most progressive, founded on perfect 
egalitarianism. We rarely admit this fact because, as each of us knows from personal 
experience, “a little license, a little independence,” a room of one’s room, etc., is a 
necessary release-valve for those who choose to cohabitate. Yet, pragmatic maneuvering 
aside, the last 150 years of marriage reform has had as its aim the abolition of 
institutional hierarchy and the establishment of perfect egalitarianism, or what John 
Stuart Mill calls “reciprocal superiority.” That regular, everyday individuals should 
shrink from this intensity, this absolutism, is not surprising; however, removing gendered 
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attributes and anatomical sex are, importantly, the last impediments to perfect 
egalitarianism, and the logical outcome of reform dedicated to reducing the two 
individuals involved simply to their right to choose. 
 The following dissertation reads today’s same-sex marriage debate in the U i ed
States through the English debates over marriage reform in the 1850s. Serious 
parliamentary-level debate about gender equality within the bonds of marriage coincided 
with the rise of Great Britain as the greatest superpower of the nineteenth century; 
similarly, constitutional debates about sexual orientation coincided with the rise of th  
U.S., one hundred years later, as the prevailing superpower of the twentieth. Specifically, 
from the mass immigrations of the late nineteenth century and the concominant rise in 
industrialization to the first U.S. imperial endeavors in places like Cuba and the 
Philippines through to the aftermath of the Second World War – that is, the Cold War and 
the McCarthy era – coincided with the transatlantic importation of the sexological 
distinction between heterosexuality and homosexuality. Unlike comparable European 
nations, however, the U.S. became a major international player with this distinction 
already intact, meaning that the modern hetero/homo definition played a unique role in 
shaping the U.S.’s post-war attitudes toward gender and sexuality. Today in the U.S. the 
desire for and the fear of same-sex marriage are exemplary, just asin Victorian England 
the reform debates over coverture (the subsuming of a woman’s legal rights by her 
husband) were exemplary. It is through the latter lens, I argue, that we should confront 
the former, and ask, What is marriage? 
To flesh out the implications of reciprocal superiority, this dissertation focuses on 
what has been called the Victorian afterlife, that is, late modernity’s relationship to – its 
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deeply invested interest in – the Victorian. In particular, I focus on manifestat ons of the 
Victorian that appear in literary, feminist, and LGBT studies. While men wrote all he 
primary Victorian texts featured in this dissertation (Mill’s The Subjection of Women 
[1869], Charles Dickens’s David Copperfield [1850] and Little Dorrit [1857], Walter 
Pater’s 1867 essay on German art historian Johann Winckelmann, and Oscar Wilde’s 
play The Importance of Being Earnest [1895]), it is not these men and their texts (with 
the exception of Mill’s essay) that draw me to focus on same-sex marriage alongside the 
Victorian afterlife. Rather, it is issues involving late modern U.S. scholarship, first from 
feminist scholarship and then from scholarship that variously employs paranoid readings 
and reparative readings of literary texts, that is, readings devoted to exposing what the 
text represses versus readings that pride themselves on being unsystematized, personal 
and, from a paranoid perspective, uncritical. The interpretive impasse between thes  two 
styles of reading reduplicates the essence of marriage reform. The dream of anti-
hierarchical, egalitarian partnerships is thwarted by marriage reform’s own goal because 
its goal is to provide the basis for a two-person partnership founded on perfect equality, 
thereby providing in the starkest terms the impossibility of authentic reform. To 
understand the most pressing civil rights issue of the early twenty-first century (and its 
latent and manifest contradictions), we should examine the interpretative strain evident in 
late modern interest in the Victorian literary material.  
 In terms of the Victorian afterlife, I would like to address the bases for the two 
historical leaps I make in the following pages. In “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” 
T. S. Eliot argues that “poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from 
emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality” (43). 
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Individual talent, according to Eliot, should not be wasted on the romantic idiosyncrasies 
of any one particular writer; instead, the writer should focus on connecting talent to the 
vast poetico-religious tradition that is humanity’s lifeblood. Eliot found it expressed in 
anthropological texts like James Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890) and Jessie Weston’s 
From Ritual to Romance (1920), and hiss The Waste Land (1922) represented the 
ultimate modernist attempt to commune with this lifeblood’s variegated yet highly 
interconnected tradition. Whatever supersedes modernism must, therefore, profoundly 
distrust the tradition the poet obsessively alludes to.  
Thinking of Septimus Smith’s suicide, Clarissa longs to connect, even if it is 
through death, for death, she thinks, “was an attempt to communicate; people feeling the 
impossibility of reaching the center which, mystically, evaded them; closenes  drew 
apart; rapture faded, one was alone. There was an embrace in death” (180). Even this 
embrace, however, is impossible. As Hamm says in Samuel Beckett’s quintessentially 
“postmodern” play, Endgame (1957), “You’re on earth. There’s no cure for that!” (53); 
that is, Eliot’s appeal to tradition and Woolf’s appeal to communion with the dead, are 
not cures, for there is no cure. Our longing for a cure remains, of course, which is why 
throughout this dissertation late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-cen ury criticism will 
be referred to as “late modern” rather than “postmodern.” Following Frederic Jameson’s 
A Singular Modernity (2002), I contend that modernity has never been superseded, that 
so-called “postmodern” thinkers like Gilles Deleuze remain thoroughly modernist, for 
they remain “committed to the eruption of the genuinely new, the radically, and dare one 
even say, the authentically New” (4). For Jameson, our inability to escape from the 
modern manifests itself in a “simple” imperative: “you talk of ‘alternate’ or ‘alternative’ 
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modernities” (12). Jameson continues: “Everyone knows the formula by now: this means 
that there can be a modernity for everybody which is different from the standard or 
hegemonic Anglo-Saxon model [such as Eliot’s ‘tradition’]. Whatever you dislike about 
the latter, including the subaltern position it leaves you in, can be effaced by the 
reassuring and ‘cultural’ notion that you can fashion your own modernity differently” 
(12). For this reason, Jameson renames the period in question “late modernism” (13). So 
here “late modern critics” and “late modern interpretations” are to be understood as 
individuals and readings that operate within a singular tradition rather than as various 
attempts to circumvent it, especially in regard to the modern hetero/homo definition.  
The second leap is a transatlantic one. Why directly connect 1850s English 
marriage reform to today’s same-sex marriage debate in the United Stas? Many 
countries have legalized same-sex marriage, in both Europe and North America, so why 
this specific connection? First, England (and Germany) led the way in creating the 
modern hetero/homo definition. When it crossed the Atlantic, it arrived in the United 
States at a formative moment in this nation’s history. In The Straight State (2009), 
Margot Canaday argues that “unlike comparable European states, which were well 
established before sexologists ‘discovered’ the homosexual in the late nineteenth century, 
the American bureaucracy matured during the same years that scientific and popular 
awareness of the pervert exploded on the American continent” (2).1 In his review of The 
                                                
1 Another key difference between Europe and the United States – and one on which, at 
this point, I do not focus enough attention – is their similar yet divergent “scientifi  
racism.” In Queering the Color Line: Race and the Invention of Homosexuality in 
American (2000), Siobhan Somerville “argue[s]…that the simultaneous efforts to shore 
up and bifurcate categories of race and sexuality in the late nineteenth and early tw ntieth 
century were deeply intertwined” (3). For Somerville, Plessey v. Ferguson (1896) and the 
US fascination (obsession) with the Alice Mitchell and Oscar Wilde trials is more than 
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Straight State, Henry Abelove asks, “Why couldn’t their shifting conception of 
homosexuality have derived rather, or primarily, from their experience of the shifting 
representations of it in the culture all around them -- from fiction, poetry, film, journalism, 
advertisement?” His criticism: “Canaday gives hardly any attention to shifts in cultural 
representations and doesn’t ask how they may have influenced or even shaped concurrent 
shifts in bureaucratic perspective” (340-41). This is a valid critique; however, instead of 
choosing between Canaday and Abelove, it is more fruitful to think of “fiction, poetry, film, 
journalism, advertisement” and bureaucracy mutually feeding off each other. Lat  modern 
LGBT studies and literary criticism, for instance, often find themselves working in between 
these two (ostensibly divergent) discourses. 
Regardless, the narrative is this: the maturation of the United States from the mass 
immigrations of the late nineteenth century to its rise to global dominance after World 
War II is colored by the fact that, unlike Europe, this country came of age with this 
definition always already colonizing every conceivable behavior. The modern 
hetero/homo definition played an integral role in the formation of the post-war zeitgeist 
in the United States, as amply documented by John D’Emilio in Sexual Politics, Sexual 
Communities (1983), so that, again, today in the United States desire for and fear of 
same-sex marriage is exemplary, just as in England in the mid-nineteenth century the 
reform debates over coverture were exemplary – and it is through the former lens, I 
argue, that we confront the latter, and ask, What is marriage? 
                                                                                                                                                 
mere coincidence. Across the Atlantic, issues of “race” also permeated the burgeoning 
discourses on sexuality; however, their central concern was the “Jewish” other rather than 
the “black” other. See, in particular, Sander Gilman’s Freud, Race, and Gender (1995) 
and Daniel Boyarin’s Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention 
of the Jewish Man (1997). Also, lest we forget, “homosexuality” and “anti-Semitism” 
were both coined in the 1860s and in German. This too is not a coincidence.      
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The Importance of Being Married 
 
At the end of The Subjection of Women (1869), John Stuart Mill, highly influenced by his 
life partner, Harriet Taylor, defines “the ideal of marriage”: “Two persons of cultivated 
faculties, identical in opinions and purposes, between whom there exists that best of 
equality, similarity of powers and capacities with reciprocal superiority in them so that 
each can enjoy the luxury of looking up to the other, and can have alternately the pleasure 
of leading and of being led in the path of development” (575; emphasis added). At first, 
reciprocal superiority may appear to conform quite easily to stereotypical Victorian, 
“separate spheres” mores, where the husband-wife relationship is predicated on “marital 
sympathy.” To borrow Rachel Ablow’s succinct formulation, for example, “the wif’s 
principle role came to be defined in terms of her ability to redeem her husband…[to] 
enable[] him to persist in those labors [in the marketplace] without being entirely 
corrupted” (4). This essentially means: partner 1 can provide X, partner 2 can provide Y; 
partner 1 needs Y, partner 2 needs X – therefore, they form a partnership. This, however, 
is not the ideal described in The Subjection: “Two persons of cultivated faculties, 
identical in opinions and purposes, between whom there exists that best of equality, 
similarity of powers and capacities.” Notice these partners are not sexed. Plus, Harriet 
Taylor (one of these “two persons”) could never be mistaken for the proverbial angel in 
the house. Finally, this passage’s use of the adverb alternately highlights an internal 
tension, of how taut this relationship must be in order to maintain “equal” superiority. 
 Reciprocal superiority identifies the fact that egalitarianism is ipossible except 
as fantasy because, here, alternately is intimately tied to egalitarianism. Our inadequate 





superiority raises, particularly when it comes to same-sex passion – where, rites Alan 
Sinfield, “confounding…the distinction between desire-to-be and desire-for is endemic” 
(40). Mill’s On Liberty (1859), published just after Taylor’s death and dedicated to her 
memory, presents this problem most explicitly. It is impossible, therefore, to maintain 
individual freedom, one’s “liberty” (one’s ability to choose), in a hierarchical 
relationship. Mill resorts, therefore, to a conception of reciprocity that, supported by 
desire’s support (fantasy), preserves one’s superiority. In other words, it preserves 
hierarchy, while at the same time it negates desire’s chief motivation: lack. To rephrase 
this supposition: You are better than me, and I am better than you, and vice versa 
In lines reminiscent of On Liberty, Mill repeats this sentiment in The Subjection: 
“freedom of individual choice is now known to be the only thing which procures the 
adoption of the best processes, and throws each operation into the hands of those best 
qualified for it” (489). Most crucial here is the emphasis on individual choice: in its 
purest form, it is “the only thing” capable of establishing an anti-hierarchical, egalitarian 
relationship. For this reason, Mill viewed England’s ever-strengthening capitalist system 
not as the end of history, but rather a moment in history that would give rise to greater 
cooperation between individuals, leading to (what we might dub) the superior reciprocity 
of market socialism. Regenia Gagnier observes that, in the final chapters of the Principles 
of Political Economy (1848), Mill stresses that “Once women are liberated to participate 
freely in market relations and thus be self-supporting…wage-labor itself ought to ease in 
favor of workers’ control of markets (what today we could call market socialism)” (31). 
The problem, however, is that market socialism is as contradictory as reciprocal 





market socialism is capitalism without capitalism. Are marriage and capitalism, we 
should ask, still marriage and capitalism if one removes inequality? The immovable 
stumbling block appears when Mill concedes that the liberty or “individual freedom of 
choice” that is the promise of all human beings must be protected by governmental 
institutions that impede capitalist expansion. In other words, can the law privilege two-
person partnerships without impeding the individual rights of one of the two parties? 
This is why this dissertation is about the number 2, its relation to marriage and 
coupledom, and how it provides a basis for today’s debate concerning same-sex marriage. 
Unlike attempts to provide the historical background of this debate,2 this dissertation 
attempts to provide its theoretical background – meaning that I am principally interested 
in what marriage is, in the essence of marriage, in being married. So while Victorian 
stands for the nineteenth-century English texts (by John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, 
by Charles Dickens, by Walter Pater and by Oscar Wilde) that are being read and 
interpreted, their afterlife (late modern critical preoccupations) is equally important, if not 
more so. These Victorian texts serve, therefore, bothas text and as pretext, since my 
emphasis on the “Victorian afterlife” focuses more on h w these texts operate today than 
on the creation of newer or better historicizations of, say, Little Dorrit (1857) or The 
Subjection of Women (1869) – unless, in a sense, these objectives are one and the same. 
 If homosexuality is a Victorian phenomenon, then it is important to always 
remind ourselves of what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick states in her essay on Wilde’s The 
                                                
2See especially George Chauncey’s Why Marriage?: The History Shaping the Debate 
over Gay Equality (2004), E.J. Graff’s What Is Marriage?: The Strange Social History of 
Our Most Intimate Institution (1999), Nancy Cott’s Public Vows: A History of Marriage 






Importance of Being Earnest (1895): “It is startling to realize that the aspect of 
‘homosexuality’ that seems in many ways so immutably fixed – its dependence on a 
defining sameness between partners – is of so recent a crystallization” (57). Ever since 
the publication of Michel Foucault’s first volume of The History of Sexuality (1976), 
scholars embraced the idea that “the sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the 
homosexual was now a species” (43). Scholars quickly absorbed what was first eagerly 
embraced, became dissatisfied with its ostensible simplicity, and dedicated their time to 
complicating, criticizing, or overturning what had become received wisdom. I highlight 
Sedgwick’s words because the shock that they express has long since passed. Two rcent 
special issues from leading academic journals attest to this fact: Social Text’s 2005 
What’s Queer about Queer Studies Now? and South Atlantic Quarterly’s 2007 After 
Sex?: On Writing since Queer Theory. Neither issue shuts down LGBT inquiry; rather, 
each issue’s goal is to expand on a parenthetical remark Sedgwick makes immediately 
after being startled: “The process,” she adds, “is also still radically incomplete and 
geoculturally partial” (57). And expand on it we have. Instead of being startled by the 
aforementioned fact, scholars have been encouraged by it and by the fact that its 
crystallization is incomplete and partial. And, without a doubt, great scholarship has 
followed;3 however, this has been at the expense, I argue, of this original “startling” fact. 
                                                
3 This scholarship has most often been part of the “transnational turn” in queer studies or 
“queer of color critique” or “transgender studies,” or a mélange of all three. For what is 
admittedly an incomplete list, see the following texts: Jose Esteban Munoz, 
Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics (1999); Samuel 
Delany, Times Square Red, Times Square Blue (1999); Roderick Ferguson, Aberrations 
in Black: Towards a Queer of Color Critique (2004); Gayatri Gopinath, Impossible 
Desires: Queer Diasporas and South Asian Public Cultures (2005); Martin Manalansan 
IV, Global Divas: Filipino Gay Men in the Diaspora (2003); Judith Halberstam, In a 





  To answer the deceptively-compact question, “Why marriage?” (Chauncey’s 
book title), we must first ask the ontological question, “What is marriage?” rather than, 
for example, the operational question, “What is marriage for?” (E.J. Graff’s book title). 
While the answer to this question, “What is marriage?,” may strike many as 
commonsensical, I claim that it is not. Beginning in the mid-Victorian period, marriage 
was being unmoored from the legal statutes dictating the disappearance of one of its two 
parties, that is, coverture. This gradual, imperfect unmooring, ranging from the id-
nineteenth century to the present day, is another way of describing this dissertation’s 
scope,4 for the manner in which these two individuals were now supposed to relate to one 
another, to conduct themselves (in public and in private), required re-imagining. If 
marriage was no longer to be a relationship “between men,” where women were no 
longer objects to be trafficked, then, in theory as well as in practice, egalitarianism must 
                                                                                                                                                 
Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007), David Valentine, 
Imagining Transgender: An Ethnography of a Category (2007), and Scott Herring’s 
Queering the Underworld: Slumming, Literature, and the Undoing of Gay and Lesbian 
History (2007). In addition, it should be noted that these texts aren’t in any way “against 
Foucault,” but that they do often show a pronounced interest in his late interviews, 
especially those with the gay press, because (as Sedgwick hoped for) these intervi ws 
begin to envision ways of obviating the modern homo/heterosexual definition and the 
influence of the repressive hypothesis. In In a Queer Time and Place, for instance, 
Halberstam opens with the following quotation from Foucault’s “Friendship as a Way of 
Life”: “How can a relational system be reached through sexual practices? Is it possible to 
create a homosexual mode of life?…To be ‘gay,’ I think, is not to identify with the 
psychological traits and the visible masks of the homosexual, but to try to define and 
develop a way of life” (138). For more on this mantra-like statement, see Leo Bersani’s 
2002 essay, “Sociability and Cruising.” 
 For important recent reevaluations of Foucault’s work, see Didier Eribon’s Insult
and the Making of the Gay Self (2004), specifically Part 3, and Lynn Huffer’s Mad for 
Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory (2009).  
 
4 See especially Mary Poovey’s “Covered but Not Bound: Caroline Norton and the 1857 
Matrimonial Causes Act,” in Uneven Developments (1988), 51-88; and Chapter 1 of 
Mary Lyndon Shanley’s Marriage, Feminism, and the Law in Victorian English (1993), 





overtake hierarchy, shifting the relationship from one of subordination to one of 
compromise, of “no subordination” – and this, indeed, is the narrative with which 
progressives are most comfortable. The problem arises, however, not because 
compromise is difficult to accomplish or that hierarchy persists (although these ar  also 
the case), but because it throws into relief the inherent contradictions at the heart of all 
two-person partnerships; because, that is, it lays bare the very structure of coupledom. 
Hence, the number 2 was (and still is) our problem. 
 My most immediate late modern interlocutors are Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, 
especially her distinction between paranoid and reparative reading, and Sharon Marcus, 
her book Between Women (2007) and her follow-up 2009 SAQ article “At Home with the 
Other Victorians.” In the latter, Marcus writes, “A historiographical emphasis on 
community, visibility, and plebeian sexual culture…[has] made it almost impossible to 
imagine gay men [of the nineteenth century] embracing the domestic values of 
coupledom, privacy, and middle-class respectability” (120). Although Alan Bray’s 
posthumously published The Friend (2004) did attempt to find relationships between men 
that seemed to resemble marriage, Marcus is certainly correct that recen scholarship (her 
own as well as Martha Vicinus’s Intimate Friends [2004]) has documented the degree to 
which marriage rhetoric dominated the lives of female homoerotic relationships, and that, 
in many important ways, their use of this rhetoric pre-dated, anticipated, and provi ed the 
stage for bourgeois marriage reform. In chapter 5 of Between Women, “The Genealogy of 
Marriage,” Marcus states, “Forced by necessity to construct ad hoc legal frameworks for 
their relationship, nineteenth-century women in female marriages not only were 





forms of marriage between men and women that were only institutionalized decades after 
their death” (206). I wholeheartedly agree. This dissertation, however, is not an attempt 
to rectify the situation, to fill this “historiographical” gap; rather, while I grant (I even 
take for granted) this precursor status, this places Marcus’s work squarely in the company 
of Graff, Cott, Chauncey, and others. Although I do not wish to neglect the historical 
exigencies that have driven these scholars working on the side of angels (and although I 
draw much inspiration from this scholarship), my path is different. Take Marcus’s 
assertion above as a case in point. Instead of focusing on “precursors,” I focus on a 
theoretical problem: the status of the number 2 has been foregrounded, thereby calling 
into question the meaning of two-person partnerships. Instead of documenting (however 
ingeniously) historical antecedents, the trouble with the number 2, I argue, is what drives 
the entire debate. 
 Elizabeth Freeman, for instance, has argued that the late modern emphasis on 
marriage’s transhistoricity may derive not so much from marriage as an institut on per se, 
but rather from the desire to construct public forms of attachment, a desire she identifies 
as “the wedding complex.” This complex, she contends, contains the possibilities of 
reimagining forms of public attachment outside the union of one man and one woman. In 
short, these would be the queer possibilities of public attachment. The first epigraph from 
Freeman’s book is drawn from Michael Warner’s The Trouble with Normal (1999), and it 
is worth examining here:  
One can easily imagine ceremonies with a difference – in which people 
might solemnize a committed household, ironize their property sharing, 
pledge care and inheritance without kinship, celebrate a whole circle of 
intimacies, or dramatize independence from state-regulated sexuality. 






Warner’s answer is that one “would need not only ceremonies,” for this is “not merely a 
theoretical question about marriage,” but a new narrative. Warner concludes:  
Although marriage has layers of meaning that are relatively resistant to 
spin, it is worth noting that the subject of same-sex marriage is so 
thoroughly mediated by public-sphere discourse that few can think about 
the topic apart from some kind of narrative about long-term social change, 
usually on the national scale. (134)  
 
This way of thinking, I argue, is dictated by what it is about marriage that resists spin, 
though it is unclear where, for Warner, this resistance would originate. As we will s e, it 
is precisely a theoretical question about what marriage is. For Mill, the concept of 
“reciprocal superiority” (as the reductio ad absurdum of marriage reform) urges us to 
comprehend the contradictions inherent to marriage as both public practice and private 
engagement, to understand why ironizations or dramatizations of it “get no press,” or 
when they do, why such performances have little effect in destabilizing that which is 
“resistant to spin.” I call this “the marriage paradox,” and I derive it, in particular, from 
the relationship between Mill and Taylor, and the place where they formulated this 
concept, The Subjection of Women; that is, the culmination of their personal, intellectual, 
and highly public collaboration, and their explicit ode to this marital paradox: the 
reformist desire to enter into a two-person partnership, an attachment in which bot 
partners are equal but both parties are free not to compromise, since they must exercise 
their individual autonomy.  
To flesh out this definition, let us contrast it to Freeman’s wedding complex. Most 
important for Freeman is the performative quality of the wedding, with all its 
unpredictability, that is, with its ability to decouple itself, so to speak, from the formal 





the wedding and the legal apparatus that is marriage cannot be reduced to one another” 
(5). It is this desire, separate from the legal institution, for which Freeman chooses the 
word complex, a psychoanalytic concept reminiscent of Freud’s Oedipus complex. In 
other words, there is something that is (ostensibly) universally desirable about the Anglo-
American stylized wedding (Freeman cites Asian co-optations of various elements of 
Western weddings which create provocative, even queer, admixtures [226n17]); as 
Freeman makes clear, however, what this intangible something is is difficult to discern; 
in other words, it is seemingly ephemeral.  
To concretize this ephemerality, Freeman turns to J. L. Austin’s How To Do 
Things with Words (1955) and to Eve Sedgwick’s critical appropriation of Austin. “I do” 
is the ultimate performative, for as an utterance it is both a saying and a doing; but, as 
Freeman asserts, “the possibility of infelicitous or unhappy performativity, of 
nullification caused by extenuating circumstances” means “the marital performance 
continually misfires” (34). Here, the potential for misfire is what provides th  marital 
performance with its allure, for it is the idea, as we will see, that the letter might not reach 
its destination that queers the deal, so to speak. Despite this potential, however, the union 
of the couple remains central. It is the presence of a third – or, as we will see, with 
Jacques Derrida, a fourth – position, which here we might designate as the “priest” and 
“audience,” respectively, that have the potential to lead to queer misfires that keep 
weddings from being subsumed by marriage. Yet, this potential is by definition limited 
because all participants are necessarily complicit in the sanctity of he couple. In this 
respect, Freeman and Sedgwick, like Derrida, are asking (Jacques Lacan), what if the 





the couple itself, in the ineluctable quality of its form. In other words, it creates a 
deadlock: one between the sacrosanct quality of an individual’s sovereign autonomy and 
the cultural imperative to cohabitate with another, to sacrifice one’s autonomy, t  
compromise for the sake of another person.          
Because of the Oedipal triangle, 3 is most often the number people associate with 
psychoanalysis; however, psychoanalysis’s main concern is the number 2. After all, its 
main concern is, first and foremost, the relationship between the analyst and the 
analysand. During Barbara Johnson’s synthetic analysis of Lacan’s and Derri a’s 
disagreement over Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined Letter” (1844), she observes that 
“[i]f the face-off between two opponents or polar opposites always simultaneously 
backfires and misfires, it can only be because 2 is an extremely ‘odd’ number” (221). 
Since this is a conditional statement, this observation begs the question: Is 
misfire/backfire unavoidable? Is this a zero-sum relation? If not, then maybe two isnot 
an extremely odd number, but rather, as commonsense would dictate, the most even, the 
most symmetrical of all numbers, therefore making it, as most couples would like to
think, a non-zero-sum relation. (Is the analyst/analysand relationship zero-sum?) Since 
this dissertation rests on the assertion that misfire/backfire is unavoidable, it behooves us 
to explain why Johnson makes this claim in the first place. In 1966, Lacan published 
Écrits, a massive 900-page tome collecting a majority of his writings. These articl s, 
which had previously appeared in obscure psychoanalytic journals, were arranged 
chronologically, with the exception of the “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’” (1956), 
which Lacan chose as the book’s introduction. That Lacan placed this text front and 





from its focus on the number 2 and this number’s relation (in Lacanian terminology) to 
the imaginary and symbolic registers. In addition, when the essay became the impetus for 
Derrida’s own (and essentially only) face-off with his near contemporary, it should come 
as little surprise that Derrida’s critique of Lacan is all about the numbers. 
 Beginning with Poe’s short story, however, one should recall the game of “even 
and odd” as it is related to the reader by C. Auguste Dupin, the amateur detective in Poe’s 
story. The game consists of holding marbles in one’s closed hand and asking another 
whether the amount is even or odd. Dupin, possibly speaking of himself, relates the story 
of an eight-year-old schoolboy who won all the marbles at his school, and when asked 
how he had accomplished this feat, replied: 
‘When I wish to find out how wise, or how stupid, or how good, or how 
wicked is any one, or what are his thoughts at the moment, I fashion the 
expression of my face, as accurately as possible, in accordance with the 
expression of his, and then wait to see what thoughts or sentiments arise in 
my mind or heart, as if to match or correspond with the expression.’ (16) 
 
Here, identification is the key to the face-off; but, for Lacan, the game is more 
complicated. Identifications of this sort, while it helps Dupin retrieve the Queen’s letter 
from the Minister D— (the Prefect of the Paris police could not identify with the 
Minister, which is why he could not retrieve the letter for the Queen), does not explain 
the importance of the letter’s symbolic role, which Lacan illustrates with the story of the 
three ostriches. Here is how Lacan explains the analogy: 
In order to grasp in its unity the intersubjective complex thus described 
[between King, Queen, and Minister], we would willingly seek a model in 
the technique legendarily attributed to the ostrich’s attempt to shield itself 
from danger, for that technique might ultimately be qualified as political, 
divided as it here is between three partners: the second believing itself 
invisible because the first has its head stuck in the ground, and all the 





proverbial denomination by a letter, producing la politique de l’autruiche, 
for the ostrich itself to take on forever a new meaning. (32) 
 
The problem, however, as I identify it, is that this is not a situation involving three 
ostriches, but rather two, for the third ostrich always fails to remain in the position of the 
third, just as Dupin fails when he leaves a note for the Minister that identifies Dupin as 
the retriever of the purloined letter; instead, the third ostrich (now Dupin) sees the 
second, oblivious to its presence, and therefore assumes the role of the second ostrich 
who believes the first is oblivious to its presence. The point here is that, essentially, there 
is no third position: once the third, thinking it has the perfect opportunity, pounces, it 
necessarily assumes the position of the second: Dupin’s actions prove that this pull is 
irresistible. In short, the third position always slips into the second – or, again, there is no 
third position, although this does not mean that the third position is not always seemingly 
looming on the horizon of the possible. 
 If we have only two, as I assert, then this is how we ought to interpret the most 
famous assertion from Lacan’s seminar: “a letter always arrives at its destination” (53). 
This assertion may sound deterministic and hopelessly teleological, which is what led 
Derrida to ask, what if the letter doesn’t arrive? This, however, misses the point of the 
assertion on two levels: first, in terms of imaginary misrecognition; the second, in terms 
of symbolic recognition. Johnson sums up the first as follows: “The letter’s destination is 
thus wherever it is read: the place it assigns to its reader as his own partiality” (248). As 
Slavoj Žižek observed in Enjoy Your Symptom (1992), this phenomenon is similar to 
Althusserian ideological interpellation, where an individual misrecognizes herself as the 
subject of address (10). That the individual believes this to be the case has nothing to do 





irrelevant), but with the “fact” that the individual believes she is the addressee. This 
misrecognition, however contingent the circumstances, attests to the fact that from the 
individual’s perspective – but from that perspective alone – this is the only way to 
interpret the situation. Symbolic recognition enters the fray when, as Žižek phrases it, 
“the concealed truth [of the imaginary misrecognition]…emerges in the ‘blind spots’ and 
flaws of the imaginary circle” (18). The difference between the two is minimal, but 
significant. The second explanation refutes the first (the recognition is false; the “facts” 
were merely contingent, accidental, and incidental), but instead of providing a better 
alternative, say, the correct recognition, it reveals that the contingent factors speak to the 
truth of the situation, which is, in sum, the arbitrariness of the signifier. 
 As I have said, Derrida’s critique of Lacan is all about the numbers, and I am now 
in a position to say why that critique has been rendered moot. According to Derrida, 
Lacan sees the number 3 everywhere, as in the Oedipal triangle, while Derrida asserts 
that there is always a fourth, that the triangle is actually a quadrilateral. For Derrida, this 
fourth position is occupied by Poe’s narrator, something Lacan, according to Derrida, 
fails to take into account. The point is moot, however, because, as ostrich politics makes 
clear, the third position is unsustainable, impossible. 2 is Lacan’s concern, not 3. This 
means that we are always left with a couple, with a face-off, an even number that’s odd.5 
                                                
5 I do not wish, however, to imply that Derrida’s contribution to this debate – or, more 
generally, to his contribution to contemporary philosophy – is irrelevant to this 
dissertation, for, especially relevant here, are his pieces Politics of Friendship (1994) and 
Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1997). Rather, like Andrea Hurst’s argument in Derrida 
Vis-à-vis Lacan (2008), I seek compromise, but not over this philosophical-
psychoanalytic tête-à-tête over Poe’s short story. Instead, it is Derrida’s interrogation of 
Levinas’s ethics as first philosophy, with one’s being always-already responsible for the 
Other, and with, as Derrida writes of Levinas, “the third arrives without waiting. Without 





Highlighting this point, Adam Philips asserts that psychoanalysis “is about what t o 
people can say to each other if they agree not to have sex.” Leo Bersani opens their co-
authored book, Intimacies (2008), with this quotation, and at first blush, Phillips’s 
statement would seem to be patently false. As Bersani observes, nothing here conforms to 
what we commonly understand to be the psychoanalytic setting. As just noted, 
psychoanalysis’s main concern is that between the analyst and the analysand, and this 
relationship is defined by its inequality. It is precisely this type of provocation that 
animates Phillips’s writing, however, and, as we will see in the next chapter, makes it so 
very useful, for the reason why John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor are this dissertation’s 
exemplary couple is that what they produced, reciprocal superiority, is a direct result of 
what two people can say to each other if they agree not to have sex. 
 To conclude, Lacan’s most-cited illustration (besides the mirror stage) is one 
found in “The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason since Freud.” Two 
children, brother and sister, are riding on a train. As it pulls into a station, they bick r: 
“‘Look,’ says the brother, ‘we’re at the Ladies!’; ‘Idiot!’ replies the sister, “can’t you see 
we’re at Gentlemen.’” This amusing anecdote, where the children confuse the name of 
their location with the signs above the lavatory entrances, creates for Lacan an 
                                                                                                                                                 
where Derrida enters this meditation on the face-off between 2. “Oh my friends, there are 
no friends,” writes Aristotle, and this paradoxical phrase becomes the impetus for 
Derrida’s investigation into how, politically, one can – and cannot – relate to another. 
This is all to say that, while Johnson is right (because Derrida is “consistent[ly] forcing 
Lacan’s statements into systems and patterns from which they are actually trying to 
escape” [227]), Derrida, along with Lacan, is vital to answering the question: Why is 2 an 
extremely ‘odd’ number? Or, to rephrase this question: What about the apparent 
insistence of the third? Is this always a face-off or might we be always-already in the 
middle of a ménage à trois? As Algernon says in Wilde’s The Importance of Being 






antagonism illustrative of Johnson’s emphasis on 2’s oddness and Mill and Taylor’s 
paradoxical concept of reciprocal superiority. Lacan concludes: 
For these children, Ladies and Gentlemen will be henceforth two countries 
towards which each of their souls will strive on divergent wings, and 
between which a truce will be the more impossible since they are actually 
the country and neither can compromise on its own superiority without 
detracting from the glory of the other. (116)6 
 
Truce is impossible because a compromise would diminish both parties’ superiority, and 
as Gayle Salamon reminds us, it is no accident that these signifiers are gendered; 
however, the example is “inverted,” for the brother declares LADIES, the sister
GENTLEMEN. “The doors,” Salamon concludes, “are not gender itself, yet they are 
enacting proper gendering through their specificity” (187). Their specificity, however, is 
precisely what is undermined. Lacan instead illustrates the taut, maddening quality of 
reciprocal superiority, of 2’s oddness, by withdrawing gender from the equation, even as 
he makes it central to his example.   
If the HIV/AIDS crisis helped to fuel the paranoid, deeply suspicious readings 
that became the hallmark of queer theory, then we should consider the possibility 
that queer theory’s interest in the reparative or in “just reading” is its attemp  to find 
relevance in the wake of the supposedly non-paranoid, utopic celebrations surrounding 
the phenomenon of same-sex marriage. The reparative, writes Sedgwick, “will leave us in 
a vastly better position to do justice to a wealth of characteristic, culturally central 
practices...that emerge from queer experience but become invisible or illegible under a 
                                                
 
6 I have used here Alan Sheridan’s earlier 1977 translation for he uses the word 
“superiority,” while Bruce Fink’s 2006 translation uses the bulkier “unsurpassed 
excellence” (417). Lacan’s own word is précellence, which functions similarly in French 






paranoid optic” (147). Sedgwick’s own Between Men (she later admits) is a perfect 
example of the operations of the paranoid optic. Through readings of (mostly Victorian) 
literary texts, Sedgwick calls our attention to the embedded structure she call  “male 
homosociality,” which is a form of male bonding within a triangular relationship, where a 
woman’s presence facilitates the bonds between men. This facilitation, however, 
disguises the fact that what may appear to be two men competing for one woman’s 
affections is in fact a display of the two men’s attraction for one another. Under the 
(direct or indirect) influence of Sedgwick, late modern scholars spent the latter h lf of the 
1980s and early 1990s disinterring homoerotic relations in canonical literary texts, 
suggesting that the homophobia accompanying the HIV/AIDS crisis is similar n kind to 
dominant, hetero readings of the canon.  
As the political situation worsened, ACT UP or other groups radicalized, as did 
their academic counterparts. Queer theory sought not just to disinter but also to disturb if 
not to demolish the foundations that support homophobia. As David Halperin states in 
hagiography of Foucault, “Queer is by definition whatever is at odds with the normal, the 
legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers. It is 
an identity without an essence. ‘Queer’ then, demarcates not a positivity but a 
positionality vis-à-vis the normative” (62). In other words, queer theory is a full-frontal 
attack on “heteronormativity,” which Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner define as “the 
institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make 
heterosexuality seem not only coherent – that is, organized as a sexuality – but also 
privileged.” Moreover, “Heteronormativity is thus a concept distinct from 





heterosexuality, which organizes homosexuality as its opposite. Because homosexuality 
can never have the invisible, tacit, society-founding rightness that heterosexuality has, it 
would not be possible to speak of ‘homonormativity’ in the same sense” (548n2).  
By the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, the political situation had 
drastically changed. Marriage equality replaced HIV/AIDS as the driving force behind 
political activism, leading Lisa Duggan to claim that such a thing as “homonormativity” 
did indeed exist as “a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative 
assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the 
possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture 
anchored in domesticity and consumption” (50). The goal, therefore, is (as Sedgwick 
indicates) “to do justice to a wealth of characteristic, culturally central practices, many of 
which can well be called reparative, that emerge from queer experience”; that is, to focus 
on what becomes “invisible or illegible” when so much political capital is spent on 
homonormativity’s central concern: marriage equality.  
For Sedgwick, the paranoid optic is no longer adequate to the task in an age of 
homonormativity. In “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,” Sedgwick says that, 
up to a point, paranoid reading has served LGBT political causes, but that its 
characteristics tend now to limit its conclusions, if not (at times) to undermine them.
Paranoid reading, she asserts, has five characteristics: (1) it is anticpatory (“There must 
be no surprises” [130]), (2) it is reflexive and mimetic (“Anything you can do (to me) I 
can do first – to myself” [131], (3) it possesses a “strong theory” (that is, “a strong 
insistence on seeing everything in terms of its central suspicions” [Warner 17]), (4) it 





infinite reservoir of naïveté in those who make up the audience for these unveilings 
[141]). In lieu of exposure and demystification, Sedgwick proposes the reparative, which 
is characterized as a weak rather a strong theory. Its emphasis is on “attachment, 
investment, and fantasy” with stress placed on the “local, detailed, and unsystematized” 
(Warner 17). To further explain the reparative as a political tactic, Ann Cvetkovich has 
recently meditated on the Public Feelings project, an informal group of academi s 
(including Duggan) “explor[ing] the role of feelings in public life” (169). For instace, 
one group, Feel Tank Chicago, has focused on depression with the goal of 
“depathologiz[ing] negative affects so that they can be seen as a possible resource for 
political action rather than as its antithesis” (170). For Cvetkovich herself, emphasis on 
public feelings has helped to recast her earlier work on trauma:  
My work with the category of public feelings builds on my efforts…to 
create an approach to trauma that focuses on the everyday and the 
insidious rather than the catastrophic and that depathologizes trauma and 
situates it in a social and cultural frame rather than a medical 
one…Situating trauma within the larger context of public feelings offers a 
more flexible approach to the unpredictable linkages among violence, 
affective experience, and social and political change. (174-75) 
 
In addition, the Public Feelings project has become an important outlet and resource for 
veteran AIDS activists who “feel politically depressed when confronted with a 
mainstream gay and lesbian political agenda that consists of gay marriage nd civil 
rights” (171). Hence, the subtitle of the After Sex? collection in which Cvetkovich’s essay 
appears: “on writing since queer theory.” In sum, while queer theory’s paranoid optic is a 
full-frontal attack on “heteronormativity,” the reparative proposes to be an indirect, 





I have traced this shift from paranoia to the reparative because the historical 
phenomenon known as the Victorian afterlife merges paranoid readings with reparativ  
ones. The Victorian afterlife, that is, seeks to unearth the perverse concealed within the 
ostensibly prudish while, at the same time, it hopes to sympathize with this Victoriana, to 
touch without suspicion, without the belief that what is most important is repressed or 
hidden inside. I flesh out the implications of reciprocal superiority by focusing on our 
contemporary interest in the Victorian, claiming that to understand this pressing civil 
rights issue, we should examine paranoid and reparative analyses of the Victorian period. 
For instance, the paranoid reactions of today’s readers of The Subjection of Women set 
out to show the inadequacies and contradictions of Mill’s liberalism, but instead they 
highlight the potency of Mill’s concept of reciprocal superiority: that is, the desire for 
reciprocal superiority encourages us to seek out the reparative, to embrace the utopic, 
non-zero-sum promises of same-sex marriage and perfect equality, but it simultaneously 
reminds us not to dispense with the paranoid, since these promises are (and will always 
be) pure fantasy. By calling this “pure fantasy,” I am not denigrating the desire for 
reciprocal superiority, nor am I claiming that those who indulge in it are the dupes of 
false consciousness. Jacques Lacan said, “Fantasy is the support of desire,” that we 
cannot desire without fantasy; however, it is important to understand that, when we 
embrace fantasy, we remain paranoid.  
Stressing the dialectical relationship between paranoid and reparative analyses, I 
focus first on two seminal readings of Charles Dickens’s David Copperfield. One of the 
most important texts in LGBT literary studies, D.A. Miller’s “Secret Subjects, Open 





create an incurable paranoia, while Rachel Ablow’s “wifely” reading of Dickens’s novel 
argues (contra Miller) that David Copperfield functions as an ideal wife for its male 
reader. Taken together, these two late modern literary analyses demonstrate tha  marriage 
and homosexuality are intimately linked by a common ideal: the creation of anti-
hierarchical, egalitarian relationships. The impossibility of actualizing this ideal leads us 
to a central epistemological problem: our inability to understand the number 2. The open 
secret of the wifely text is that, while the wifely text coddles its reader like a dutiful 
Victorian wife, it simultaneously undoes its own ability to produce the ideal partner, for 
the ideal partner vis-à-vis the text is everywhere and nowhere, nothing but a specer, a 
fetish substituting for something that, in fact, does not exist. 
Next, I turn my attention to Miss Wade, a minor character in Dickens’s Little
Dorrit  who in recent years has garnered more critical attention than any other of 
Dickens’s memorable minor creations. Centering on Miss Wade’s (lesbian) sexuality, 
these nuanced articles employ Victorian political economics, sociology and psychology, 
narrative theory, and LGBT studies; however, each misses the significance of Miss 
Wade’s relationship with the servant, Tattycoram. When Tattycoram flees from Miss 
Wade and returns to the Meagleses, she is actually fleeing from the intensity of her own 
reflection, from Miss Wade as “an analogous case,” in order to return to the safety of 
hierarchy and servitude. Their alternative domesticity is the antithesis of what is 
imagined by a separate-spheres ideology. When Tattycoram tells Miss Wade, “You seem 
to come like my own anger, my own malice, my own – whatever it is – I don’t know 
what it is,” she is describing reciprocal superiority, but (like Mr. Meagles who asks, 





anything other than what Sharon Marcus calls “a pathological female household.” For 
this reason, Miss Wade’s story, what Dickens calls “the history of a self-tormentor,” 
repels reparative embraces. 
Similarly, Walter Pater’s early essay “Winckelmann” repels repa ative embraces 
because his meditation on love between men smuggles in a modicum of egalitarianism 
into what is supposed to be a hierarchical relation. Manifesting itself in a peculiar 
scholarly omission, no one has observed either that Pater’s description of Winckelmann’s 
murder, while it contains a surprising amount of forensic detail, omits the stabbing or that
(with one exception) Pater invents a child who discovers the mortally wounded 
Winckelmann and calls for help. Pater’s construction of the murder scene complicates 
each and every attempt to incorporate it into LGBT history. Ostensibly a champion of 
pederastic love, Pater gestures toward a reproductive future incompatible with this type 
of love; at the same time, however, Pater undermines this reparative hope by inserting it 
into a scene where one man murders another. The celebration of anti-hierarchical, 
egalitarian relationships is subtended by a primal scene that cannot be realized, which is 
why today’s scholars have missed Pater’s own omission.     
Finally, in Oscar Wilde’s The Importance of Being Earnest, Algernon explains to 
Jack, “You don’t seem to realize that in married life three is company and two isnone.” 
On the one hand, Algernon wants Jack to understand that, if a couple does not look 
outside itself for sexual titillation (if not for actual sexual affairs), then they are not 
worthy of our attention. On the other hand, if we take Algernon’s statement more 
literally, we see that without the introduction of a third person, two really is none because 





number of LGBT readings of Wilde’s play, Eve Sedgwick’s is the most germane because 
she focuses on the alternative familial relations that flit upon the play’s surface. While 
her “reparative avunculate” is comprised by Algernon’s cynical, paranoid insiste ce hat 
“two is none,” a line Sedgwick does not analyze, it is a necessary addition to this farcical 
portrayal of bourgeois marriage. Taken together, paranoid and reparative analyses 
demonstrate that à la reciprocal superiority there is no such thing as an anti-hierarchical, 
egalitarian, non-zero-sum, two-person partnership, which is why 2 is, indeed, the oddest 
number. Nevertheless, we continue to desire such partnerships. 
To be clear, however, I am also not asserting that the Victorian term 
homosexuality is the “hidden kernel” of marriage reform; rather, homosexuality turns our 
attention to the form of marriage and the couple; that is, the Victorian afterlife is defined 
by its central concern: interpretation. See, for instance, the subtitle of John Kucich and 
Dianne F. Sadoff’s collection Victorian Afterlife (2000), “postmodern culture rewrites the 
nineteenth century,” and then turn to the subtitle of Jay Clayton’s Charles Dickens in 
Cyberspace (2003), “the afterlife of the nineteenth century in postmodern culture.” Even 
though Clayton is a contributor to Victorian Afterlife, these subtitles do not say the same 
thing. In fact, they seem to work against each other. Rewriting the nineteenth century is 
certainly different than the persistence of the Victorian in later modern culture, which is 
not to say that we must choose between these two definitions, but rather, 
methodologically, to see them operating in tandem. Nancy Armstrong highlights this 
operation in her afterword to the Victorian Afterlife collection. She stresses that 
“postmodern culture” is both “not at all Victorian” and “very Victorian,” by which 





were every bit as enchanted with alluring surface of commodities as modernism cla med” 
(315). They were not. In fact, the world-view of “Victorian realism” remained obsessed 
with the fact that objects in the world were primary and not constituted by their 
representation. In other words, Victorians were not the superficial dullards modernists 
claimed them to be. Second, however, “very Victorian,” because, despite their emphasis 
on primacy, the vast expansion of consumer culture threatened to reveal that society was 
founded on nothing but itself, that representation is all there is. “In this respect,” 
Armstrong concludes, “postmodernism is perhaps more Victorian than even the 
Victorians were” (319). 
 This, however, is not to imply that there is a symbiotic relationship between the 
Victorian and “the postmodern,” or what I’ve called the late modern. In his recent book 
Embodied: Victorian Literature and the Senses (2008), William A. Cohen argues that he 
is not simply applying the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, and George Bataille (along with queer theory) to his literary anal ses; “rather,” 
he says, “I rely on them in combination, as they bear affinities with, help to explicate, or 
are illuminated by nineteenth-century texts” (23). This is an effective methodology; 
however, I draw attention to it to contrast it with my own. Cohen says that Victorian 
literature and French theory can have a productive relationship, and his book is a 
testament to this fact. By contrast, my focus is on the contradictions within late modern 
literary analyses of Victorian texts. Armstrong’s argument is indicative of these 
contradictions.7 That “postmodern culture” is both “not at all Victorian” and “very 
                                                
7 John McGowan’s contribution to Victorian Afterlife, “Modernity and Culture, the 
Victorians and Cultural Studies,” is the collection’s more reflective and most pr vocative 





Victorian” is a problem with our own critical methodologies, even if it is our inheritance. 
In particular, this both/and logic underlies the recent trend preoccupying Victorianists and 
queer scholars, and most often queer Victorianists.8  
Exemplary here is the logic at work in Marcus’s Between Women: Friendship, 
Desire, and Marriage in Victorian England (2007), where she proposes an alternative to 
current textual interpretation she calls “just reading,” one that she defines in opposition to 
symptomatic reading as exemplified by Frederic Jameson. For Marcus, “just reading” 
seeks to side-step the depth-model inherent in symptomatic readings. “Interpretation 
proper,” writes Jameson in The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic 
Act (1981), “always presupposes, if not a conception of the unconscious itself, then at 
least some mechanism of mystification or repression in terms of which it would make 
sense to seek a latent meaning behind the manifest one, or to rewrite the surface 
                                                                                                                                                 
Liu. In his essay, McGowan identifies “zeitgeist thinking” as essentially a Victorian 
enterprise, and one that “marks our own Victorianism” (3). He focuses particular 
attention on Mary Poovey’s reading David Copperfield. I would here like to distinguish 
myself from McGowan, since I too focus on Dickens’s novel. McGowan highlights 
Poovey’s reading because he finds her both/and logic to be exemplary; in other words, 
she posits David Copperfield as both the product of its historical moment and as 
exceeding it, that is, as exposing the ideological structures that produced it. I find nothing 
to fault with this reading; however, I am completely uninterested, at least as my present 
argument is concerned, in bestowing “Literature” with this sort of power and with 
criticizing those who do or do not. Instead, I am interested in placing seemingly 
contradictory late modern readings of, say, David Copperfield in conversation with one 
another with the goal of demonstrating the power of the Victorian afterlife, which 
McGowan defines as the “aim[] to intervene in…society by explaining the age to itself” 
(3). In addition, I should mention that McGowan is also skeptical of critique qua 
exposure: “Must exposure always threaten ideology? Is an ideology consciously held 
always more vulnerable than one that is unexposed?” (5).      
 
8 For a related example of this both/and logic, but from a non-Victorianist, see Scott 
Herring’s Queering the Underworld (2007), where Herring combines slumming 
literature’s desire to expose (what he calls “the hermeneutics of sexual uspicion”) with a 
method of queering this desire, that is, with a refusal to endorse exposure (what he calls






categories of a text in the stronger language of a more fundamental interpretaive code” 
(60).9 Marcus cites this passage, stating that, while “this method for excavating what 
societies refuse to acknowledge” helps when “the twentieth century…define[d] gay and 
lesbian existence through repression and the resistance to it,” it is not always the best 
method to interpret nineteenth-century novels (75). Marcus employs just in two 
complementary ways: just meaning simply, or straightforward, as in “just the facts”; and 
just as in doing justice to the text, not treating it simply as a symptom of the society that 
produced it. Marcus does not deny the utility of symptomatic readings, however, because 
“just readings…depend on a symptomatic reading of novel theory, since only by 
attending to what other critics have been unable to explain can subsequent critics build a 
more capacious interpretive framework” (76). Why this admission concerning the 
supplemental quality of just reading? In order to guard against an accusation that Marcus 
clearly anticipates (“To pursue just reading is…not to make an inevitably disingenuous 
claim to transparently reproduce a text’s unitary meaning” [75]), she admits that she is 
engaging, in part, in a symptomatic reading of those who engage in symptomatic 
interpretations of Victorian novels. While, at first glance, Marcus is avoiding the act of 
“plumbing the depths” of the texts being interpreted, her admission demonstrates why 
                                                
9 In “Reading on the Left,” Christopher Nealon takes issue with Marcus’s 
characterization of symptomatic reading à la Jameson. While Jameson is famous mong 
literary critics for his “Always historicize!” mantra, Nealon argues that these critics 
usually ignore his Marxist motivations. “Jameson’s great obsession,” writes Nealon, “the 
problem of the nonrevolutionary character of the twentieth century (or of the 
nonliberatory character of its revolutions), is easily set aside when” his Marxism is 
ignored (23). Nealon concludes that, if understood within this context, Jameson is not as 
antagonistic towards texts as some seem to think. I would add, however, that even though 






one cannot avoid the surface/depth model when it comes to textual interpretations 
themselves, that the reparative should not dispense with paranoid. 
This is the critical legacy that constitutes the Victorian afterlife. Attempting to 
avoid a paranoid optic, Marcus just reads Victorian texts in order to demonstrate that in 
Victorian England relations between women were openly erotic. Her exigency is the 
current political movement surrounding same-sex marriage, but Marcus does not offer 
her book as support for this movement; rather, she hopes that readers will see the 
institution of marriage in genealogical terms that focus their attention on the affective 
relations it has created. In short, Marcus offers a reparative reading of marriage as a non-
zero-sum relation, where “Victorian marriage plots depend on maintaining bonds of 
friendship between women [that were]…neither repressed…nor policed…as rigorously 
as…heterosexual relations” (75); but, all the same, it is an offering plagued by the threat 
of repression, paranoia, and the inequality inherent in marriage because “the twenti th 
century…define[d] gay and lesbian existence through repression and the resistance to it.” 
But, I ask, what about the twenty-first century? 
The narrative providing the exigency for reparative/just readings, however, should 
consider, for example another LGBT political phenomenon of the early twenty-first 
century, one many wish did not exist: barebacking. Placing side-by-side what should be 
the polar extremes of the LGBT political movement (same-sex marriage and the 
subculture of gay male barebacking), I place the phenomenon of bareback sex squarely in 
the realm of the Victorian afterlife. In Unlimited Intimacy (2009), Tim Dean writes, 
The emergence of a subculture of bareback sex is not 
merely coincident with but directly related to the campaign 
for same-sex marriage that has occupied so much attention 





of viral transmission they can form relations and networks 
understood in terms of kinship – networks that represent an 
alternative to, even as they often resemble, normative 
heterosexual kinship. (ix)   
 
Before continuing, permit me to add three more intimately related quotations. In 1970, 
Mike McConnell and Jack Baker applied for a marriage license in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. Asked by a reporter about who was the wife in their relationship, their reply 
was “We don’t play those kinds of roles” (qtd. Chauncey 90). In 1997, in POZ magazine, 
porn-actor Scott O’Hara claims, “I believe in exchanging bodily fluids, not wedding 
rings” (67; qtd. Dean, “Breeding Culture” 82). The last, from Warner’s The Trouble with 
Normal, was quoted above, but it’s worth repeating: “One can easily imagine ceremonies 
with a difference – in which people might solemnize a committed household, ironize their 
property sharing, pledge care and inheritance without kinship, celebrate a whole circle of 
intimacies, or dramatize independence from state-regulated sexuality.” I bring these four 
quotations together because they collectively express an issue that resides b neath the 
surface of the same-sex marriage debate: alternative kinship formations. Same-sex 
marriage purports not to be an alternative, but immediately we see that this assertion 
conceals the myriad attempts that would subvert same-sex marriage’s political viability 
such as an affirmative focus on bodily fluids and viral transmission, on ungendering roles 
and rethinking the household outside of state regulation. 
 The refusal of gender roles and the substitution of blood, semen and saliva for 
wedding bands might seem wholly “postmodern” and completely divorced from 
bourgeois marriage reform, but in fact they highlight how, in retrospect, bourgeois 
marriage reform provides the foundation for same-sex marriage and for barebacking. 





resemble, normative heterosexual kinship.” While barebacking may be an alternative to 
the current emphasis on same-sex marriage (Dean says it is “directly related to” it), its 
resemblance to marriage is unavoidable. O’Hara’s proud declaration implies that 
exchanging bodily fluids is more like marriage, more intimate (two truly becoming one 
vis-à-vis fluids and, potentially, a virus), than the exchange of jewelry could ever be. At 
stake is marriage’s ontological status, the uniting of two individuals, who do not play 
those kinds of roles, one new role being the moment of viral transmission. If Armstrong 
is right, that “postmodernism is perhaps more Victorian than even the Victorians were,” 
then our best understanding of this fact is through the analysis of the Victorian qualityof 







The Subjection of Women: Reciprocal Superiority and the Ideal of Marriage 
 
What marriage may be in the case of two persons of 
cultivated faculties, identical in opinions and 
purposes, between whom there exists that best kind 
of equality, similarity of powers and capacities with 
reciprocal superiority in them – so that each can 
enjoy the luxury of looking up to the other, and can 
have alternately the pleasure of leading and of 
being led in the path of development – I will not 
attempt to describe. To those who can conceive it, 
there is no need; to those who cannot, it would 
appear the dream of an enthusiast. But I maintain, 
with the profoundest conviction, that this, and this 
only, is the ideal of marriage. (Mill, The Subjection 
of Women, 575; emphasis added) 
 
Based on a few genealogical facts that, in the end, turn out to be wrong, Hilary Fraser has 
recently fantasized about the possible existence of a Mill-Taylor lovechild that was put 
up for adoption. Visiting their graves in Avignon, France, she stumbled upon a note 
ostensibly written by the couple’s 73-year-old great grandson. In part, the note reads: “I, 
Simon Michael Mill of Masterton, N.Z., Great Grandson of John Mill of Fifeshire (?) 
(who was the lovechild of John Stuart Mill and Mrs. Harriet Taylor – brought up by Dr. 
Lang of Tayport as ‘an orphan’ & emigrated to Dunedin at 18 years of age) regr t the 
crass refurbishment of this grave” (123). When reading Fraser’s article, however, one 
suspects that this fascination is propelled by a desire to normalize the Mill-Taylor 
relationship, to resituate one that, in her own words, “was notoriously chaste – even, it is 
speculated, after their marriage” (115). This speculation runs both ways: during their 
lifetimes, their notoriety was based on speculations that their friendship was a cover for 
infidelity and adultery; for today’s critics, like Susan Mendus and Nadia Urbinati, their 





or abnormally – sexless. This inversion, we will see, is vital to understanding Mill-
Taylor’s conceptualization of “reciprocal superiority.” While it is the expr ss purpose of 
this chapter to demonstrate how they queer marriage, or rather how they themselves 
reveal marriage’s essential oddness (especially – or especially – when view d through 
reformist eyes), it is also interested in explaining why today’s critics inherit and maintain 
this odd image of Mill and Taylor from Victorian critics who professed to have 
diametrically opposed agendas.  
 A child, of course, would silence such modern day critics as Mendus and 
Urbinati, who, respectively, see Mill-Taylor as either eschewing sex altogether or 
creating some sort of androgynous ideal. Despite endorsing scholars such as Alice S.
Rossi and J. Ellen Jacobs who place Mill and Taylor on a level, non-gendered – even 
queer – playing field, Fraser “could not resist the puzzle that had presented itself to m , 
and I set out to unravel the scholarly but also personal mystery that I had stumbled upon 
in the graveyard in Avignon” (123). Fraser, however inadvertently (though, again, she 
admits that this is “personal”), attempts to redeem Mill and Taylor from today’s 
criticisms of their liberal feminism, bringing them into the heteronormative fold by 
normalizing their complementariness, and letting the world know that they had flesh-and-
blood progeny, and that their relationship was not sterility personified. 
 At the heart of this controversy is the status of The Subjection of Women. For 
today’s scholars, the problem of interpreting Mill’s feminist treatise begins with Kate 
Millet’s Sexual Politics (1970), where Millet pits the “rational” Mill against the 
“chivalrous” John Ruskin (88). Today, no scholar is comfortable with this distinction. 





may have obscured for her the ways in which he romanticized companionate relations 
between the sexes and celebrated the notion of sexual complementarity…[while] she also 
missed…that Ruskin’s views…propelled many young women out of the sphere of family 
and into the wider world and gave them the necessary rationale for extending their 
duties” (xvi-xvii). While re-examinations of Ruskin’s “Of Queens’ Gardens” (1865) will 
be addressed at the end of this chapter, my initial focus is on feminist scholars such a
Zillah Eisenstein and Susan Moller Okin, who have been particularly alert to Mill (and 
Millet’s) masculinist blind-spots. Mill’s essay begins: “The principle which regulates the 
existing social relations between the two sexes – the legal subordination of one sex to the 
other – is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; 
and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or 
privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other” (471). So why, after such a 
promising start, does the essay fail so miserably to support these claims? Today’s critical 
responses are split between two separate yet related answers to this question – related 
because both are, in essence, predicated on methodological limitations. The first focuses 
on the limits of liberal feminism, that is, on liberalism’s assumptions concerning the 
public and private spheres (liberalism’s implicit gender politics), while the second 
focuses on the limits of Mill’s empiricist precepts (rights cannot be simply given, a 
priori). Between these two poles fall all other scholars, creating a spectrum of 
discontents. I have sympathy with both positions; however, here I am more interested in 
interrogating interpretative limits themselves. I begin, therefore, with the reactions of 
Mill’s contemporaries because, despite certain striking differences, a common thread runs 





when approaching The Subjection of Women. I claim that this discontentment or 
uneasiness – captured by the concept of reciprocal superiority – results from he fact that 
ungendering power relations, even if it is ultimately impossible, remains the only way to 
achieve “perfect equality” because g ndered power will always produce inequality.  
Composed (in the strictest sense) in France in 1861, The Subjection of Women is 
Mill and Taylor’s response to contemporary debates on marriage reform. Mill waited 
eight years to publish the essay, possibly modifying it in ways that Taylor, deceased since 
1858 and buried on the site of the essay’s (formal) composition, would have countered, 
but these differences tend to be exaggerated. For this reason, it is important to situate the 
essay’s argument within these reform debates. According to Mill, he did not publish it 
immediately because he wanted “to publish it at the time when it should seem likely to b  
most useful.” This time arrived after he had served three years (1865-68) in the House of 
Commons, where Mill’s most significant piece of legislation was to give women the right 
to vote. The measure lost, which is why, when he says “most useful,” Mill, as Alice Rossi 
points out, “meant politically expedient” (4). 
 The genesis of The Subjection of Women is the early 1830s, when (at the 
beginning of their prolific partnership) Mill and Taylor exchanged in written form their 
ideas on marriage, culminating in Taylor’s 1851 publication, “The Enfranchisement of 
Women.” Jo Ellen Jacobs, editor of The Collected Works of Harriet Taylor Mill (1998), 
writes that her goal in collecting Taylor’s writing is “not [to] replace the myth of ‘the 
overbearing shrew who bewitched poor John Stuart Mill’ with a myth of ‘the martyr 
genius woman’ who was the source of all the importantt ideas John published as his 





not satisfied with this image, however, for our confusion, our inability to see through the 
murky waters is our problem, epistemologically speaking. Mill and Taylor introduced the 
concept of reciprocal superiority as an explanation for why the number 2 is the queer st 
or oddest number. They anticipated our confusion by grappling with philosophical and 
social problems that have only recently begun to be perceived as such. 
 Scholarship’s problem, here, begins with the inconsistencies in Mill and Taylor’s 
work. French feminist philosopher Michele Le Doeuff strenuously argues for the 
existence of two John Stuart Mills, but only one Harriet Taylor. By this Le Doeuff means 
that Mill harbored two conflicting sentiments at once: first, the belief that male privilege 
was the result of cultural – and not natural – forces; second, his habit of letting this 
cultural privilege, which he himself benefited from, be sometimes described in natural 
terms. This conflict, we will see below, may explain many of the contradictory 
conclusions reached in The Subjection. Although Taylor too often blurred this distinction, 
Le Doeuff argues that, while Mill remain conflicted for his entire life, “By 1851 [when 
“The Enfranchisement of Women” by published] she had already rejected definitions of 
peculiarly feminine attributes” (205). The conclusion is that, unlike Mill, Taylor had 
evolving, progressive attitudes; but this difference only becomes truly distinct if one has 
decided to privilege one figure over the other; however, emphases like this – conflicted 
vs. evolving – keep the water murky. 
 There is no reason, though, to dismiss this distinction out of hand; rather, we 
should embrace it, for it is more helpful to see Mill and Taylor possessing both conflicted 
and evolving attitudes toward sexual difference. Penelope Deutscher, for instance, cites 





supposedly disappeared from Taylor’s writing. Her 1851 essay, writes Le Doueff, “do s 
not make a single allusion to sexual duality. The concepts it uses are valid for both sexes 
– people, persons, character, individuals, we, ev ryone, the universal you, every mind, 
and so on” (203; emphasis in original). The absence of sexual duality, however, does not 
mean the absence of difference. “Taylor…only looks like the less ‘differentialist’ 
thinker,” writes Deutscher, “if one looks away from every sense in which she was 
committed to differentialism – of knowledge versus ignorance, of class, of blood, of type, 
of race, of breeding, of quality, of development – on perhaps every one point except 
sexual difference” (146). In a sense, what is murky is everything else, and the same goes 
for Mill, since every time in The Subjection sexual duality makes an appearance, Mill’s 
argument comes in contact with these other differences. Deutscher concludes, quite 
rightly, that “Feminist history should be committed to reading for feminism’s blind 
spots” (147); in the process, however, we should not dismiss the enormous effort Mill 
and Taylor made to except sexual difference because, I would argue, liberal – and, later, 
neoliberal – change is predicated on this exception.   
Their friendship is a biographical illustration of this fact. Beginning around 1833, 
the first topic they dilated on was the nature of marriage; meaning in a sense that th ir 
friendship was founded on debating what marriage s, in that theorizing on marriage 
became the basis of their friendship. Mill writes to Taylor: “How easy would it be for 
either me or you, to resolve this question for ourselves alone. Its difficulties…are such as 
to obstruct the avenues of all great questions which are to be decided for mankind at 
large” (68). Mill and Taylor know this cannot be, not so much because it would be selfish 





private affair. From the beginning, it is apparent that their personal struggle will be a 
public one. In the same correspondence, Mill writes: “There is no natural inequality 
between the sexes; except perhaps in body; even that admits of doubt: and if bodily 
strength is to be the measure of superiority, mankind are no better than savages” (73; 
emphasis added). So if marriage is to exist after we take for granted the idea that there is 
no natural inequality between the sexes, then it was up to Mill and Taylor to show us 
what marriage is once we have excepted sexual difference. 
Resistance to this idea was fierce. In 1857, MP Alexander James Beresford-Hope 
stated, “Let them [that is, those advocating marriage reform] amend the law, but at the 
same time steadfastly resist the breaking down of the distinguishing characteristics of 
Englishmen – the love of home, the purity of husband and wife, and the union of one 
family” (qtd. in Poovey 73). The “distinguishing characteristics” Beresford-Hope has in 
mind were also on the minds of those reviewing TheSubjection of Women. Most 
representative among the essay’s many contemporary critics is conservative essayist 
Margaret Oliphant. What embarrasses Mill (and Taylor), according to Oliphant, is that 
the majority of actual women, the ones the essay proposes to liberate by law, do not see 
any similarity between its description of their subjection and the realities of their married 
lives. The “gloomy image conjured up in the philosopher’s study” (113-14) must not 
simply disregard the majority’s opinion, but must in fact portray them as deluded, as the 
very product of women’s subjection, therefore begging the question: if proof of women’s 
subjection resides in the fact that most women do not regard their subjection as 





 Oliphant, fully aware of the “vocal few,” views these women as part of a 
minority, who, for one idiosyncratic reason or another, deride the current conditions that 
women face. On this other side of the Atlantic, for example, the 1848 Seneca Falls 
Convention in Seneca Falls, New York, culminated in Elizabeth Cady Stanton penning 
The Declaration of Rights and Sentiments. Modeled explicitly on The Declaration of 
Independence, the opening sentence reads:  
When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one 
portion of the family of man to assume among the people of the earth a 
position different from that which they have hitherto occupied, but one to 
which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect 
to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes 
that impel them to such a course. (52) 
 
Likewise, Taylor’s (and Mill’s) explicitly transatlantic document, “The Enfranchisement 
of Women,” opens by calling British attention to the women’s rallies taking place in th  
United States, as evidence of the fact that this “is a movement not merely for women, but 
by women” (11). For Oliphant, however, the actual state of things is nothing like what 
Mill, Taylor, and other feminist contemporaries describe. “[W]e agree,” writes Oliphant, 
“to a great extent as to the injustice of some existing laws which press very hardly upon 
women; and are perfectly disposed to accept the alterations he suggests, believing that 
they would furnish a real remedy for a distinct grievance”; however, Oliphant concludes, 
“[t]o say that a woman loses all rights, all property, all identity, as soon as she is married 
– although it is the merest legal fiction and idle breath – is in its actual words an in ult to 
every woman” (116). If one removes the sarcastic tone (which is not without its own 
significance), Oliphant’s argument differs little from Beresford-Hope’s; however, 
Oliphant makes an important qualification to her essay’s argument when she states that 





Fundamental change, though, would be not only unwarranted, but also catastrophic. It is 
here where the contradiction in Oliphant’s argument lies, for she strips the law of its 
power by saying that the law provides men with only a “virtual authority” (117) over 
women that is not represented in actual marriages, since these actually “nullify the law” 
(116). At the same time, she resists overhauling what she has already called “the merest 
legal fiction.” The law, she insists, “cannot enter into the privacy which secludes husband 
and wife from the world” (117), for “[t]he bond of marriage is too intimate, and the 
parties are left too completely at each other’s mercy, to make any external code 
absolutely supreme between them” (118). What Oliphant appears to be unwilling to 
consider is that the marriage’s distinguishing characteristics (its privacy, its intimacy) 
might actually be – and, in fact, are – legal byproducts.  
While Oliphant certainly backs herself into a corner, it is not without reason. She 
raises – and implicitly answers – a question that Mill acknowledges but hopes, however 
wistfully, to answer in the affirmative. “Is there such a thing as equality,” Oliphant asks, 
“not only between men and women, but between two creatures in the whole world 
round?” (114). The Subjection implicitly answers this question by stating that the 
abolition of various sorts of slavery has overlooked one that casts a pall over all other 
expressions of liberty; that is, it holds out hope that there is such a thing as equality. By 
asserting that the answer is and will always be “no,” however, Oliphant’s coservative, 
pessimistic objection is that it is not possible to achieve “perfect equality” within not just 
marriages, but also within all types of two-party relationships. As we will see, this 
pessimism returns as a critique of liberalism’s shortcomings, in its overemphasis on the 





Another of Mill’s contemporaries, James Fitzjames Stephen, who called The 
Subjection “a work from which I dissent from the first sentence to the last” (243), argues 
that no law should impose equality on individuals, since nowhere can it be proven that 
individuals are in fact equal. It would be detrimental, for example, for many individuals if 
minors were considered the same in every way as adults. Mill’s essay, Stephen is quick to 
point out, agrees; but Stephen finds it absurd that the same goes for women. “This 
general truth,” that men “have greater muscular and nervous force, greater intell ctual 
force, greater vigor of character” (249), is something the essay denies. This denial 
becomes particularly significant when the topic turns to marriage. Of special concern is 
divorce, for, Stephen asserts, “if the parties to a contract of marriage are tr ated as equals, 
it is impossible to avoid the inference that marriage, like other partnerships, may be 
dissolved at pleasure” (250). Stephen fears this because men and women are simply 
unequal. Like Oliphant, he does not believe that partnerships of any type are truly equal, 
and this is what is so irritating about The Subjection: it assumes that, despite no 
supporting evidence, a good empiricist could argue for something that is experientially 
wrong. Here, Mill has committed a sin against his father, James, and against England 
“herself”: “Whoever first gave the command or uttered the maxim, ‘Honour thy faer 
and they mother, that their days may be long in the land,’ had a far better conception of 
the essential conditions of permanent national existence and prosperity than the author of 
the motto Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” (248).  
Oliphant’s and Stephen’s objections remain important because, despite a shift in 
focus, they remain integral to today’s critics. This shift is not about the fact th t nature 





The concentration on the legal mechanisms that subjugate women, writes Eisenstein, 
“reflects Mill’s inadequate understanding of how women’s inequality exists within the 
patriarchal institutionalization of public and private life through her role as mother” 
(137). The public/private divide is so entrenched in Mill’s thinking (and in the tenets of 
liberalism) that he is ignorant to the ways in which enfranchisement fails o address fully 
women’s plight. Like Oliphant (but for different reasons), Eisenstein asserts that one 
must recognize “not only the legal but the extralegal patriarchal privileges men enjoy 
through the sexual division of labor” (138). We must therefore recognize, Eisenstein 
asserts, that the individual’s autonomy, that is, one’s ability to choose freely (the basic 
tenet of classical liberalism), rests upon what Elizabeth Maddock Dillon calls “the gender 
of freedom.” In this sense, the failures of The Subjection can be summarized as follows: 
first, it supports a division of labor based on anatomical sexual difference; second, its 
adherence to the tenets of empiricism make it impossible to envisage women as different 
than what they appear to be; and third, it has a class bias.    
First, Mill (in his Autobiography [1873]) reduces liberalism to “the freedom of 
production and exchange,” where the economic sphere is “the dernier mot of social 
improvement” (117). For this reason, Mill was sympathetic to socialist critiques of 
liberalism; yet Mill never wished to sacrifice the individual autonomy (liberalism’s 
defining tenet) that he championed most emphatically and most eloquently in On Liberty 
(1859). (And neither did Taylor. Already in 1831, she writes, “Every human being has a 
right to all personal freedom which does not interfere with the happiness of others,” 
which is something she explicitly connects to marriage as “the only contract…of which a 





the nature and terms of the contract” [19]). Dillon argues that “[t]he notion that a 
woman’s reproductive system is an undue burden for citizenship indicates, most 
obviously, that the male body is taken as normative for citizenship” (14), and, therefore, 
it is the male body’s right to choose freely. From this, Dillon concludes that, for 
liberalism, women represent (both in theory and in practice) pre-political subjects 
incapable of exercising the autonomy that defines liberal capitalism’s autonomous 
individual. This autonomy, moreover, cannot be established without relegating women, 
along with people of color, the poor and the majority of working-class white men, to the 
realm of the pre-political. It is important to note, however, that Mill might ident fy 
autonomy with the masculine, but he does not confine it to the male body per se. 
Eisenstein sums up Mill’s “elitist” position as follows: “Mill pleads in defens  of the 
extraordinary woman. Those few exceptional women who…in another life should have 
the liberty to [exercise their freedom]” (137). For Mill, the freedom to choose might be 
perceived, culturally, as a masculine attribute, but he divorces it from the sexed body, and 
this is a separation that makes all the difference.  
The solution, therefore, is to transfer marriage wholly to the public sphere. Mill 
freely admits that, in the marriage partnership, the wife unfortunately garners “the larger 
share of the bodily and mental exertion by their joint existence” (522). Plus, the duties of 
a responsible wife (“the physical suffering of bearing children, and the whole 
responsibility of their care and education in early years…[and] the careful nd 
economical management of the husband’s earnings to the general comfort of the family”) 
are, if the proper conditions are met (“in an otherwise just state of things”), simply those 





damage is apparently already done. First, as Dillon suggests, this admission irrev cably 
ties women’s duties within marriage to the “mere physical fact” of parturition. Used 
earlier to describe “her inferiority in muscular strength” (475), however, Mill also 
downsizes the importance of this sexual difference, one to which, for example, Thomas 
Paine and Karl Marx, before Mill and Taylor, remain completely devoted. The former 
states in no uncertain terms: “It is wrong to say that God made Rich and Poor: He made 
only Male and Female” (474), while the latter emphasizes in The German Ideology 
(1845) that “there develops the division of labor in the sexual act” (72). By contrast, The 
Subjection goes so far as later (in reference to Greeks, Amazons, and Spartan women 
[484]) to completely trivialize this difference. To drive the point home, Mill directly 
addresses the “anatomical evidence of the superior mental capacity of men co pared 
with women” (540), dismissing it not only because “the precise relation which exists
between the brain and the intellectual power is not yet well understood,” but also because 
much depends on the naïve assumption that the brain “exercised influence by magnitude 
only” (541). Despite Mill’s being (ostensibly) the largest Victorian brain, the essay 
couldn’t be clearer: size doesn’t matter. 
In short, Mill not only trivializes sexual dimorphism, but also – and more 
crucially – he erases it altogether, at least hypothetically. This qualification is the point: 
“I repeat that this speculation is entirely hypothetical” (542). If certain conditions were 
met and “given to both sexes alike,” there is no reason, according to Mill, to assume that 
“there would be any material difference, or perhaps any difference at all, in the character 
and capacities which would unfold themselves” (532). In Epistemology of the Closet 





deal depends – for all women, for lesbians, for gay men, and possibly for all men – on the 
fostering of our ability to arrive at an understanding of sexuality that will respect a certain 
irreducibility in it to the terms and relations of gender” (16). By contrast, Mill disrespects 
the irreducible nature of gendered difference, disrespects those characteristics that, for 
better or for ill, are the effect of sexual dimorphism; he respects his empiricist method, 
however, which is to say that he reserves irreducibility for something other than gender. 
This reservation is liberalism’s central tenet: the right to choose freely. 
The second, and perhaps more devastating, failure occurs when, by way of a 
conclusion to the essay’s second section, Mill states why “it is not, therefore, I think, a 
desirable custom, that the wife should contribute by her labor to the income of the 
family,” even when it is a “just state of things” (540). This is based on a series of 
conditional statements, ones that define what a “just state of things” is: “if marriage were 
an equal contract, not implying the obligation of obedience; if the connection were no 
longer enforced to the oppression of those to whom it is purely a mischief, but a 
separation, on just terms…could be obtained by any woman who was morally entitled to 
it; and if she would then find all honorable employments as freely open to her as to men” 
(541; emphasis added). If all these conditions were met, then we could, presumably, state 
that, like any man’s profession, a woman (ideally) chooses marriage and accepts its 
obligations, accepts that which is necessary, if it is defined by this just state of things, to 
follow it to its logical end. Recall Beresford-Hope: “Let them amend the law, but at the 
same time steadfastly resist the breaking down of the distinguishing characteristics of 
Englishmen – the love of home, the purity of husband and wife, and the union of one 





taking Beresford-Hope’s concession, “Let them amend the law,” far more seriously than 
Beresford-Hope did; but this concept actually concludes The Subjection, so it is this 
incongruence that we must grapple with. Why would Mill still be content with woman, 
hearth and home, when he is at the same time writing such things as: first, “I deny that 
any one knows, or can know, the nature of the two sexes”; second, “what is now called 
the nature of women is an eminently artificial thing”; and third, “no other classof 
dependents have had their character so entirely distorted from its natural proportions by 
their relation to their masters” (493)?  
To reconcile the ostensibly irreconcilable, we should turn to Mill’s Logic (1843) 
because Mill’s empiricist methodology is at odds with Jeremy Bentham’s. At the other 
end of our spectrum, we find not the limits of liberal feminism, but rather the inability of 
empiricism to address the question of sexual difference. The problem is that, if all 
knowledge is based on the experience of phenomena, and all concepts are the temporary, 
merely useful coalescing of these experiences, then “the uniformity of nature,” as a 
fundamental principle or general axiom, undermines the tenets of “Induction” or pure 
inductionism. Mill, however, claims not to accept this conclusion, basing this uniformity 
of nature on “the inverse deductive method,” that is, on the fact that all deductions are 
derived from inductive experience, and that our knowledge of nature’s uniformity, its 
ability to correspond to a principle or axiom, is founded on laborious inductions. While 
Mill’s argument for induction has at this point “clearly collapsed,” Jennifer Ring 
observes that “Mill recognizes the difficulty but believes he has solved the problem with 
his new terminology” (34); it is this invention, this new terminology, that will be returned 





Like inverse deduction, reciprocal superiority is meant to highlight an 
inconsistency. When one attempts to balance empiricism and rights, these infamous 
words of Jeremy Bentham should never be far from our minds: “Natural rights is simple 
nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts.” 
Mill never argues in the Subjection for the “natural rights” of women because, as an 
empiricist (or, perhaps, as an inverse deductionist), he lacks the data on which to build his 
case. If women’s nature, her character, has been “entirely distorted,” if it is “an entirely 
artificial thing,” then on what basis are we to argue for replacing the subjugation of 
women with a principle of perfect equality? While Mill states that existing social 
relations are inherently wrong, he knows that, given his own presuppositions, this cannot 
be the basis of his argument. (This is Oliphant’s complaint.) The novelty of Mill’s
argument lies in his attempt to sidestep the temptation to focus on women’s “intrinsic 
qualities” and focus instead on her “slantwise position” within society. Mill ultimately 
succumbs to this temptation and speaks, at least implicitly, of women’s characteristics as 
if they were intrinsic, but this is not ruinous for The Subjection. This formulation is 
borrowed from Michel Foucault’s late interview, “Friendship as a Way of Life,” where 
he states that “Homosexuality is a historic occasion to reopen affective and rl tional 
virtualities, not so much through the intrinsic qualities of the homosexual but because the 
'slantwise' position of the latter, as it were, the diagonal lines he can lay out in the social 
fabric allow these virtualities to come to light” (138). Analogously, I contend that, like 
Mill with women, Foucault succumbs to the temptation to ascribe characteristics to male 





Foucault’s) because its shortcomings aided him in reaching his essay’s conclusi , that 
is, the concept of reciprocal superiority.    
 The third failure returns us to what Eisenstein calls Mill’s “defense of the 
extraordinary woman.” “Hardly anything can be of greater value to a man of theory and 
speculation,” writes Mill, than “the criticism of a really superior woman.” Why? Because 
“a woman seldom runs wild after abstraction”; that is, she has a sobering effect on men: 
“there is nothing comparable to it for keeping his thoughts within the limits of real things, 
and the facts of nature” (534). How, one might ask, can Mill even pretend to make this 
argument? Even if it is empirically true, that is, experientially verifiable, that women do 
not run wild after abstraction and that they keep the men who do in check, why should we 
conclude that this is anything but the effect of distortion, that this complementary benefit 
is not simply one of her artificial characteristics? While Mill’s point seems to be that a 
superior woman’s criticism is supposedly beneficial to a good empiricist, a good 
empiricist cannot claim from this that “he” observes the real essence of woman. On the 
surface, this is a methodological problem: an empirically based liberalism cannot justify 
its claims about equality because eventually one needs a non-empirical, rationalistic 
justification, that is, recourse to abstract rights. Mill’s refusal to succumb to this 
temptation, however, is what makes his rhetorical performance so intriguing.  
 As Elizabeth Smith notes, Mill’s concentration on the past and present behavior 
of women only lends to “possible” not “necessarily” predictive models of what future 
reform would bring about (187); nevertheless, the behaviors that do catch Mill’s eye are 
particularly significant: “What [women] have done,” writes Mill, “that at least, if nothing 





what women have done and continue to do; however, the abstractness of many of his 
observations suggest that he is speaking about essential attributes, even though he is not. 
In particular, he calls his reader’s attention to acts of “intuitive perception” (532) and 
“quickness of apprehension” (535); yet, Mill states that, because women are deprive  of 
almost all forms of proper education, these attributes are essentially the same a  those of 
“a clever self-educated man” (533), thereby once again trivializing sexual difference. In 
Tainted Souls and Painted Faces (1993), Amanda Anderson says of The Subjection: “The 
more telling point of Mill’s remarks about Victorian feminine character is a not fully 
examined assumption of women’s greater susceptibility, malleability, and artifici lity: 
less that they need to recover their nature than that they are too easily manufactured” 
(38). While we are all certainly easy prey when caught unawares, this description of the 
feminine subjection-position is unwarranted given Mill’s own precepts. Anderson leaps
from the fact that women’s nature is distorted to the pr supposition that women’s nature 
is easily distorted. Mill, however, emphasizes the former in order not to imply the latter. 
This is necessary, for Mill, so that he can maintain his agnosticism concerning sexual 
difference.       
 This continued trivialization of sexual difference amounts to a refusal of nature 
itself, so permit me to quote from the following passage at length.   
It may be remarked by the way, that Englishmen are in peculiarly 
unfavourable circumstances for attempting to judge what is or is not 
natural, not merely to women, but to men, or to human beings altogether, 
at least if they have only English experience to go upon: because there is 
no place where human nature shows so little of its original lineaments. 
Both in a good and a bad sense, the English are farther from a state of 
nature than any other modern people. They are, more than any other 
people, a product of civilization and discipline. England is the country in 
which social discipline has most succeeded, not so much in conquering, as 





than any other people, not only act but feel according to rule. In other 
countries, the taught opinion, or the requirement of society, may be the 
stronger power, but the promptings of the individual nature are always 
visible under it, and often resisting it: rule may be stronger than nature, but 
nature is still there. In England, rule has to a great degree substituted itself 
for nature. (543) 
       
This Anglo-centric observation, I contend, is sexual difference’s death knell;it extends 
Mill’s agnosticism to humanity’s “original lineaments.” In its place, and even in lieu of 
feelings, we instead find rules, social discipline, and civilization. While a rueful tone 
certainly permeates the passage, it also – and most crucially – reminds us of the legalistic 
paradox the 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act failed to resolve. When Mill states that 
“Englishmen are in peculiarly unfavorable circumstances for attempting to judge what is 
or is not natural,” it is precisely this distance from “the natural” that puts Mill in a 
favorable position from which to judge this situation. Since Mill’s argument is predicat  
on the fact that nothing can be known about the true nature of the sexes, this makes 
nineteenth-century England (and London, in particular, the capital of nineteenth-century 
capitalism) the place where the legal trumps what is ostensibly extralegal, and where the 
market and the law penetrate all sectors of everyday life. 
 The 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act meant to address the following paradox: the 
law was being viewed as both the ultimate arbiter of rational decision-making and as 
incapable of expunging from itself the irrational prejudices derived (supposedly) from 
nature. Therefore, the goal was to remove nature from the equation, and Mill 
accomplishes this (at least in theory) with his radical claim: again, no one knows, or can 
know, the nature of the two sexes. This claim cannot be proven, but it has the benefit of 
de-naturalizing sexual difference; that is, sexual difference cannot be reduced to 





dictum, the sexual relation would exist; however, Lacan’s point is that focus on such data 
misses the crux of the issue: we are dealing with a structural phenomenon because the 
subject’s presence is caught within, and produced by, language.) Reducing marriage to a 
profession; de-naturalizing “female” attributes; construing women as distortions – these 
are the accomplishments of The Subjection of Women. I stead of fixing woman’s nature, 
as Eisenstein contends, Mill converts women into the autonomous individuals of liberal 
capitalism. This recognition entails understanding what makes freedom of choice so 
alluring, and so alluringly axiomatic. Government’s role, according to On Liberty, is to 
promote this freedom and not to interfere except “to prevent harm to others” (14), which 
is where On Liberty and The Subjection of Women come into conflict. One might ask: 
Does not an egalitarian relationship require the sacrifice of at least a modicu  of 
autonomy? In On Liberty, Mill is quite explicit: “To justify [deterrence], the conduct of 
which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The 
only part of the conduct of any one, which he is amenable to society, is that which 
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right
absolute. Over himself, over his body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (14). While 
the male pronouns may lead the reader to believe that Mill is only considering the actions
of men, he makes it clear in the next paragraph that he is “not speaking of child, or of 
young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood” 
(14; emphasis added). (Recall Stephen’s criticism above.) In other words, the sovereign 
individual is unsexed. Furthermore, the sacrifice of one’s absolute independence is only 
warranted if one’s actions were “to produce evil to some else,” which means that for an 





As any good communitarian would remark, it is precisely this emphasis on the 
absoluteness of an individual’s sovereignty or autonomy that makes this individual 
unsuitable for communal existence because it ignores all the little sacrifices individuals 
must make when living with others, and this is especially true in two-person partnerships. 
Choice, it would seem, must be curtailed, delimited in some way; otherwise, an 
overabundance of choice would deprive choice of its allure, for choice only functions as 
choice when something is excluded, when something cannot be chosen – and this 
something is the self’s destruction, its self-annihilation. One cannot freely choose to 
degrade either oneself or another’s self, and it is the government’s duty, according t  
Mill, to intervene in this two-party relation if self-degradation occurs.  
Whereas people may well invest in values such as 
equality and reciprocity in their political lives, they 
may not want those same values to dominate their 
sexual lives. (113) 
 
Judith Halberstam, Female Masculinity 
How, then, can two people enter into a relationship of “perfect equality”? Mill’s answer, 
as I have been arguing, is to embrace the concept of reciprocal superiority. T  sharpen 
our focus on this concept, I will now situate it in what should at first appear to be a 
foreign debate. I insert here into this chapter a discussion of Michael Foucault and 
sadomasochistic sexual practices, which may strike the reader as incongruent or simply 
perverse; to a degree, however, there is not only scholarly precedent, but also very good 
reason to do so. Lauren Goodlad, for instance, has been foremost in turning Mill and 
Foucault into intellectual bedfellows, though her focus tends to be governmentality and 
so while she stresses some of Foucault’s late essays, she does not, unfortunately, conn ct 





The trajectory of Foucault’s oeuvre, it has been said, consists in a dramatic 
revision of his earlier work; Foucault made a return to subjectivity, as evidenced in the 
second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality, and especially in late essays like 
“Power and the Subject” and “What Is Enlightenment?” Unlike Jeffrey Nealon’s 
masterful study, Foucault beyond Foucault (2007), I do not wish to question this critical 
consensus, but to use it to my advantage. In terms of “a new subjectivism,” Amanda 
Anderson in The Way We Argue Now (2006) summarizes this position as follows: “While 
Foucault’s previous work has been interested in the forms of subjectivity engendered by 
modern disciplinary power, the later Foucault was interested in the manner in which 
individuals understood, conducted, and therefore in a sense owned, their moral, social, 
and physical lives” (4). If this is true, Nealon observes, then “the later Foucault” h s 
nothing to offer us because “if in the end Foucault is a thinker of artistic self-fahioning 
as ethical resistance, then Foucault would seem to have very little to say about the 
present, especially the economic present, as it seems supersaturated with these practices 
of endless, fetishized self-creation” (11). This is not the case, however, because what 
follows is not so much the formulation of a new subjectivism than a radicalization of the
liberal subject Mill describes in On Liberty – and the texts that make the most vital 
contribution to this radicalization are Foucault’s late interviews with the gay press. Mill 
and Foucault certainly make for unexpected bedfellows, but if the neoliberal subject is a 
quantitative intensification of the classical liberal subject (and not some fundame t l 
break with it), then Mill and Foucault should be able to function as synecdoches for these 
two subject-positions, respectively. For Mill, the marriage of two persons requires that 





the pleasure of leading and of being led in the path of development.” By keeping 
superiority in the equation, Mill retains lack; that is, he retains the erotic dimension of 
hierarchy while, in a sense, doing away with it. The pastoral element here is the implicit 
belief that one can have both perfect equality and superiority at the same time. And while 
Mill does speak of alternation (similar, as we will see, to the master-slave dialectic of 
S&M sex practices), what makes 2 such an odd number is that, by definition, the 
alternation is never quick enough. Each second one is led – rather than leading – is one 
second too long. Marriage without marriage indicates the desire to retain an institution 
and a social practice, yet to deprive it of its defining feature: inequality. 
 Before Mill and Taylor married, Mill penned the following declaration: 
The whole character of the marriage relation as constituted by law such 
that both she and I entirely and conscientiously disapprove, for among 
other reasons, that it confers on one of the parties to the contract, legal 
power and control over the person, property, and freedom of action of the 
other party, independent of her own wishes and will; I, having no means 
of legally divesting myself these odious powers…feel it my duty to put on 
record a formal protest against the existing law of marriage, in so far as 
conferring such powers; and a solemn promise never in any case or under 
any circumstances to use them. (168) 
 
While they were certainly not the only ones who disapproved of Victorian marriage law, 
Mill’s exceedingly formal declaration is nothing short of extraordinary. For these two to 
marry, both formally and legally, Mill (as the party with the legal power) rescinds, just 
prior to the marriage itself, the authority this social institution is supposed to confer on 
him. In marrying one another, Mill and Taylor together deprive marriage of its essential 
characteristic by using their union as a “formal protest against the existing laws.” For this 
reason, it is not a coincidence that reciprocal superiority anticipates sex-same marriage, 





egalitarian relationship. “Homosexual relations,” David M. Halperin argues, “[have] 
cease[d] to be compulsorily structured by a polarization of identities and roles…[and] 
Exclusive, companionate, romantic, and mutual homosexual love becomes possible for 
both partners” (112). For Alan Sinfield, Halperin’s characterization should not be 
confused with “monochromatic sameness” (132); however, difference, by definition, is a 
contagion from which the subject cannot be inoculated or against which it can be 
indemnified. When differences appear (as they inevitably, invariably do), “these 
differences,” Sinfield observes, “are usually – and not by accident – hierarchies” (132). 
Sinfield, expanding his argument in On Sexuality and Power (2004), demonstrates that 
these differences manifest themselves as differences of age, class or rce , more 
usually, as complex combinations of these symbolic differences. But most imporant is 
Sinfield’s caveat: the appearance of these hierarchical differences is not accidental. 
Hierarchy always already reappears because “perfect equality” is impossible in reality, 
which does not mean it is not worth attempting.  
 As noted at the opening of this chapter, Susan Mendus reasons that Mill’s 
emphasis on such concepts as reciprocal superiority are indicative of his avers on to sex 
and the physical, while Nadia Urbinati suggests that such conceptions are indicative of 
Mill’s androgynous view of sexual difference. In a recent collection of critical essays 
devoted to Mill’s essay, editor Maria Morales pairs Mendus and Urbinati so that the 
reader can bear witness to these contrasting points of view. Instead, I would suggest that 
not only do these two positions not contradict one another, they are in fact quite 
complementary: both, although possibly for differing reasons, see Mill dissolving – or, at 





noble or foolhardy is beside the point (it is probably both); more importantly, it is 
difficult to argue that this was not Mill’s goal.  
 This leads us to sadomasochistic sex, that is, to connecting it to Mill’s On Liberty. 
In “Sexual Choice, Sexual Act,” Foucault speaks of the usefulness of S&M practices. 
“Today homosexuals still have this problem,” he tells his interlocutors. “Most 
homosexuals feel that the passive role is in some way demeaning. S&M has actually
helped alleviate this problem somewhat” (152). This does not disprove the initial 
assertion; rather, it underscores the difficulty of adhering to it. Of particular interest, as 
noted above, is that Foucault oscillates between the meaning-effects of the homosexual 
and the homosexual as person. Moreover, this occurs during a discussion of “the question 
of freedom of sexual choice” and “the liberty to manifest that choice or not to manifest 
it.” The limitation Foucault puts on “absolute freedom or total liberty of sexual action” is, 
of course, self-protection: coercion, rape, and the violation of another person’s integrity 
(143). The 2003 ruling in the US Supreme Court case of Lawrence v. Texas upports this 
analogue between Mill and Foucault, between marriage and homosexuality. In order to 
overturn Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the ruling focuses not on sodomy or sodomitical 
acts (as Hardwick did), but on intimacy. (By Teemu Ruskola’s count, “In terms of its 
relative emphasis on sodomy, rather than intimacy, the majority opinion in Hardwick 
finds occasion to use the term sodomy a total of thirty-three times, whereas it resorts to 
the word intimacy only once. In contrast, the Lawrence majority opinion uses the words 
intimate or intimacy a total of twelve times” [246n12]). This shift is all-important. 
Homosexuality is no longer a forensic issue. Now it is officially, legally what it is always 





engage in reciprocal superiority. So what’s wrong with that? Maria Morales, in her aptly 
titled Perfect Equality (1996), challenges attacks on liberalism, especially those affiliated 
with Mill. Her introduction brings together liberalism’s most vocal, feminist critics in 
order to pin down why exactly liberalism falls short of other’s expectations. All criticisms 
are essentially variations on the one voiced by communitarian Michael Sandel; that is, 
“What is denied to the unencumbered self is the possibility of membership in any 
community bound by moral ties antecedent to choice; he cannot belong to any 
community where the self itself could be at stake. Such a community -- call it constitutive 
as against merely cooperative -- would engage the identity as well as the interests of the 
participants, and so implicate its members in a citizenship more thorough going than the 
unencumbered self can know” (87). Representative critics here are Catherine MacKinnon 
and Susan Okin. For example, the former states that liberal feminism reduces womn to 
“abstract persons with abstract rights, without scrutinizing the content and limitations of 
these notions in terms of gender” (160), while the latter stresses that, for liberalism, the 
family is “beyond justice” (25), meaning that the gendered roles family-structures create 
and preserve remain beyond the scope of the abstract, legalistic theories that es entially 
relegate questions of gender to the private sphere. In opposition, Morales responds by 
reminding her readers that “this liberal approach is far more promising than the 
communitarian focus on membership in families, households, clans, tribes, cities, nations, 
and kingdoms” (7). Instead of leaving these untouched, liberalism focuses on bringing 
these “natural” kinship relations into the light of day, and demands that they justify





That this system is imperfect and biased is not a reason to throw the baby out with the
bathwater; it is to persevere, to continue to de-fetishize murky kinship relations. 
 Returning to S&M practices, Pat Califia, who is, in Leo Bersani’s words, “one of 
the most intelligent writers” on the subject, claims that “the uniforms and roles and 
dialogue become a parody of authority, a challenge to it, a recognition of its secret sexual 
nature.” Yet, in a direct response, Bersani asks if “any of this suggest[s] much ore than 
a nonhypocritical acceptance of power as it is already structured?” (84-85). Bersani’s 
argument in Homos (1995) is that not only is there no way to transcend hierarchical 
power-structures, but that “nonhypocritical acceptance” provides no relief. The 
antagonism remains alive and well, for the real alternative is to expose hierarc cal 
power-structures that adhere to two-person relationships, while showing us there is no 
“safe word” that can allow us to escape this fact. It is here, strangely enough, where 
Bersani, the originator of the “anti-social thesis of queer theory,” meets Mill, where Mill 
becomes a theorist of reciprocal superiority rather than of reciprocal tolerance. Perfect 
equality is not a solution but a problem; it is reciprocal superiority’s shadow, the ghost 
haunting marriage, its paradoxical characteristic. 
To come full circle, Millet pitted the “rational” Mill against the “chivalrous” John 
Ruskin, and (representative of many others) Nord disagreed with this oversimplification. 
In this final section, I embrace Millet’s position, despite the change in the critical t de. 
Nord (like Eisenstein and his other late modern detractors) says Mill is guilty of 
“romanticiz[ing] companionate relations between the sexes and celebrat[ing] the notion 
of sexual complementary.” This is not true, and I will finish proving this by briefly 





full compliance with Millet, that “We are foolish, and without excuse foolish, in speaking 
of the ‘superiority’ of one sex to the other, as if they could be compared in similar things. 
Each has what the other has not: each completes the other, and is completed by the other: 
they are in nothing alike (§ 67; emphasis added). 
 What tends to get lost in this conversation is not that Millet was wrong, but rather 
that she was wrong about Ruskin. As Francis O’Gorman has convincingly argued, 
Millet’s opinion of Ruskin is an inverse reaction to a public-relations campaign started 
near the end of Ruskin’s life – namely, to turn this particularly unconventional man into a 
model of Victorian masculinity. Painter, antiquarian and professor of fine arts, W.G. 
Collingwood, is, according to O’Gorman, “the villain” of this campaign (11), and for 
Millet, Ruskin “was, as Collingwood had tried to suggest, a sure representative of the 
middle-class male…the spokesman of patriarchy par excellence” (23). Much work has 
been done to save Ruskin from Collingwood, Millet, and many others, and such work is 
certainly necessary and full of merit. Doing justice to “Of Queens’ Gardens” is obviously 
important for our understanding of Victorian gender politics, especially after over a 
hundred years of trying to understand this prominent Victorian’s ostensible eccentriciti s. 
The problem, however, is that this delicate reclamation campaign is (and largelybecause 
of the initial success of Millet’s argument) at the expense of Mill.  
 As O’Gorman admits in Late Ruskin (2001), “Many Ruskinians may well wish 
this lecture had never been written” (31), if only because so much time would not have 
been spent defending him against Millet’s angry accusations such as “a concoction of 
nostalgic mirage, regressive, infantile, or narcissistic sexuality, religious ambition, and 





Koven stresses that, however paradoxical it may now seem, many Victorian readers saw 
Mill’s essay and Ruskin’s lecture not as antithetical but as companion pieces. Koven 
elaborates: “The Women’s Herald [in 1888] saw no contradiction or editorial 
inconsistency in alerting its readers that a new edition of Mill’s Subjection of Women 
would soon be available at low cost while devoting an entire column of the same page to 
what it called ‘Gems from Ruskins.’” Koven concludes: “No reader of these ‘gems’ could 
imagine for a moment that Sesame and Lilies even hinted that women should subordinate 
themselves to men in any aspect of public or private life” (174).  
 That readers of Women’s Herald didn’t find this contradictory does not, however, 
mean Mill and Ruskin weren’t actually contradicting one another. While the latter ass rts 
that men and women are “in nothing alike,” the former could not disagree more. “Each 
has what the other has not,” writes Ruskin; but this is precisely what reciprocal 
superiority is not. Ruskin argued for the expansion of women’s responsibilities, yet he 
argued for them as women – that The Subjection of Women sometimes seems to say the 
same is to miss completely the essay’s import. Thomas Laqueur describes in m ticulous 
detail the slow, laborious, and often contradictory paradigm-shift in European thinking 
(completed, roughly, by the early nineteenth century) from sexual hierarchy to sexual 
dimorphism. The problem is not with the details; it is with this deceptively simple fact 
(and one with which I do not think Laqueur would necessarily disagree): sexual 
dimorphism never overtakes sexual hierarchy. There is no sexual dimorphism, in fact, for 
sexual difference always remains a question of hierarchy, and is always outside of 
meaning. This, therefore, is the difference between Mill and Ruskin. Ruskin believes in 





celebrates reciprocal tolerance. Conversely, Mill stresses the paradoxic l fact that perfect 
equality retains hierarchy but, simultaneously, refuses – or must also refuse – 
subordination. 
Before focusing on LGBT readings of Dickens’s David Copperfield and Little 
Dorrit , and of Pater’s “Winckelmann” and Wilde’s The Important of Being Earnest, I 
want to highlight the work interpretation has done in this chapter. We have established 
our current emphasis on the relationship between paranoid/depth and reparative/surface 
reading, and I will continue this emphasis in the chapters that follow; however, what we 
should glean from the critical legacy of The Subjection of Women is that marriage – or, 
most accurately, marriage reform – is at the center of these issues involving 
interpretation. These concerns migrate from Mill’s contemporaries to us, but it is only in 
retrospect that we have begun to understand this, for our critical fascination with the 
Victorian is by definition retrospective. If Mill and Taylor are heroes, it is because they 
were, in part, not of their time. They are the intellectual heroes of same-sex marriage. 
Moreover, the connections here made between Mill and Foucault, and between S&M and 





Chapter 2  
Dickens and the Marriage Paradox: David Copperfield and Little Dorrit 
 
In Queer Dickens (2009), Holly Furneaux calls the title of her book, along with its overall 
thesis, an “(apparent) oxymoron,” for what could be less “queer” than, say, David 
Copperfield, a novel so innocuous that, as Virginia Woolf claimed, no one can remember 
reading it for the first time. Of course, the brackets around apparent indicate that this 
only appears to be an oxymoron if we “place[] marriage and the biological family s 
central to thinking about the Victorian and the Dickensian” instead of 
“explor[ing]…other forms of intimacy, affinity, and family formation” (9-10). In other 
words, the near omnipresence of bachelor dads, male nursing, etc., demands that we see 
Dickens through a queer lens. Furneaux’s “queer optimism,” however, gets in the way of 
recognizing the mutually-dependent nature of paranoid and reparative readings.  
Queer theory’s emphasis on negative affects, argues Furneaux, has made it blin  
to positive affects. In “Queer Optimism,” Michael Snediker writes: “queer th ory, for all 
its contributions to our thinking about affect, has had far more to say about negative 
affects than positive ones” (6), so that what he calls queer optimism “insists on thinki g 
about personhood (as opposed to subjectivity) in terms of a durability not immediately or 
proleptically subject to structuralist or post-structuralist mistrust” (5). This dissertation, 
however, remains thoroughly invested in the subject; Snediker’s “personhood,” like 
Berlant’s “ordinariness,” remains inadequate to the task of competing with the power of 
subjectivity and sovereignty because the former are always already parasitic on the latter; 
they are never actual alternatives. By focusing on “an abundance of gentler, no  less 
erotic, same-sex encounters,” Furneaux says she is “strongly committed to demonstrating 





strongly…through violence” (16). As I argued in the introduction, however, 
reparative/surface readings cannot stand on their own, since their attachment to paranoia 
undergirds this “gentler” interpretative process; which is also to say that emphases on 
positive affect, surface readings, and alternative forms of intimacy, instead of side-
stepping the institution of marriage, remain bootstrapped to it.  
 For this reason, I engage r adings of Dickens – specifically readings of David 
Copperfield and Little Dorrit  – first to demonstrate more thoroughly the relationship 
reparative readings have with paranoia, and second – and more importantly – to 
demonstrate that this attachment is the key to understanding the function of what I have 
called the marriage paradox: the reformist desire to enter into a two-pers n partnership, 
an attachment in which both partners are equal but where both parties are free not to 
compromise, since they must exercise their individual autonomy. This chapter’s goal, 
therefore, is to show that the marriage paradox arises from a problem in interpreta ion 
itself, one that is particularly present in late modern readings of the Dick nsian. 
My first question, therefore, is: How did David Copperfield serve as the 
inspiration for one of the most important essays in gay/lesbian literary analysis nd, in an 
explicitly reparative reading, as an instruction manual on how to be a good Victrian 
husband? While I’m interested in a host of readings of Dickens’s novel, two stand out. In 
1985, Dickens Studies Annual published D.A. Miller’s reading of David Copperfield, 
“Secret Subjects, Open Secrets,” an “aegis-creating essay” (Eve Sedgwick’s words [67]) 
that inspired the writing of Epistemology of the Closet, and made Miller “the first 
addressee and the first reader of most of [its] chapters” (ix). Then in 2002, Rachel 





Annual, argued (contra Miller) that the novel functions as an ideal wife for its male 
reader. Both essays would go on to become important parts of critical studies on sexuality 
and Victorian fiction: The Novel and the Police (1988) and The Marriage of Minds: 
Reading Sympathy in the Victorian Marriage Plot (2007), respectively. But, rather than 
viewing these essays as simply contradictory (assuming, for instance, that great novels 
naturally give rise to disparate interpretations), I argue that these wo late modern literary 
analyses re-enact the marriage paradox, for this paradox is responsible for the coexistence 
of a paranoid focus on homosexuality and a reparative focus on marriage. 
My second question: Why David Copperfield? James Eli Adams argues that the 
novel “has become something of a locus classicus for the study of Dickens and sexuality, 
largely through the influence of D.A. Miller’s scintillating reading” (239), but this is only 
half the story. “We read,” Adams writes, “for the pleasure of scandalous exposure – a 
pleasure borne out in the titles of a number of important studies: ‘Caught in the Act,’ 
‘Secret Subjects, Open Secrets,’ ‘Sex Scandal’” (231). Adams is also referring to Joseph 
Litvak’s Caught in the Act: Theatricality in the Nineteen-century English Novel (1992) 
and William A. Cohen’s Sex Scandal: The Private Parts of Victorian Fiction (1996). (An 
example of paranoid reading appears in Sex Scandal, where Cohen, writing of Dickens, 
keenly observes that “the novel…had to find ways of managing the erotic reveries it was 
accused of arousing in its readers,” which meant that, most importantly, the novel 
managed its potential to arouse by “encrypt[ing] representations of sexuality” [27]). Yet, 
as we’ll see, Ablow’s reading does not fit this mold. Rather than exposing something 
(else) that has been submerged in the text, she remains on the surface. “The goal of the 





improvable, limitlessly lovable, and as capable of enormously virtuous yet profitable acts 
of generosity” (21). The wifely text, in this sense, is not about accuracy or realism; it is 
not a bildungsroman; it does not teach the reader to view the world in a more mature, 
complex way; and, finally, it does not repress, and we are not here to expose. Instead, the 
wifely text does just the opposite: it pampers, it soothes, it encourages, just as a Victori n 
wife was supposed to do, making Dickens “the paradigmatic wifely novelist of the
nineteenth century…and David Copperfield…the novel in which he explains and defends 
that characterization most clearly” (19).  
The wifely text, therefore, is reparative in that the reader need not be concerned 
about its motivation. Its accuracy is beside the point. Focusing on the psychological 
nuances concerning a maturing character is now irrelevant. Moreover, the reader is not 
suspicious, not worried that what is important is obscured, or hidden from view. By 
ignoring the text’s unconscious, the reparative/surface reading gives prid  of place not to 
knowledge (and all its complexities) but to comfort. Employing this distinction between 
paranoid/depth and reparative/surface readings, where Miller represents the former and 
Ablow the latter, I will demonstrate that Ablow’s reading could not exist without 
Miller’s, and that Miller’s focus on the homosexual subject prefigures Ablow’s focus on 
marriage. In addition, I want to make it clear that Miller’s reading is not a 
straightforward, paranoid reading, and this will help me demonstrate why Sedgwick’s 
distinction (outlined in the introduction) does not hold. 
Miller begins his essay with a breech of scholarly etiquette, or what Michael 
Warner would designate as an example of “uncritical reading.” (This, I think, would be 





overidentification – with the novel’s eponymous character. In short, this is personal. 
Early in the novel, David ventures out with Mr. Murdstone, his step-father-to-be, when 
another man asks, “So who’s this young shaver?” Mr. Murdstone replies, “That’s Davy,” 
to which the man again asks, “Davy who?” (35). Here, writes Miller, “the text raises the 
possibility that David might be any David; for a moment, it so happens, it invites me to 
imagine that he might be myself” (192). While Sedgwick drew much inspiration from 
this essay, she never mentions this moment of overidentification, which in her terms is 
the exact opposite of paranoia, for as Miller’s own words indicate the novel quite literally 
invites him to imagine this. We immediately find, however, Miller backing away from 
this pleasure of his childhood reading, not out of embarrassment or some similar emotion, 
but because in examining what led to his confession (being hailed by the text), Miller 
discovers what he calls “the double bind of a secrecy.” He identifies how the secret – and, 
in particular, the homosexual secret, if this is not already too redundant – constitutes the 
subject’s individuality: “The double bind is not at all the same thing as a dead end, and if 
I cannot speak of myself without losing myself in the process, I can keep myself secr t 
and…change the subject: convinced of my indeterminability in the safety of silence, as I 
speak of – and seek to determine – somebody or something else” (195). So Miller too 
“changes the subject.” 
 To accomplish this change, Miller turns to the preface of David Copperfield, 
where Dickens addresses the relationship between himself as author, his readers and his 
main character. That Dickens strongly identifies with his protagonist is a cr tical 
platitude; what usually isn’t observed, Miller observes, is how “Dickens nonetheless 





refrains from elaborating and says, in essence, that if the reader wishes for an elaboration, 
read my book, this pattern is repeated within the novel itself. Citing both the nighttime 
scene in Steerforth’s bedroom and David’s experience of working in Murdstone and 
Grinby’s warehouse, Miller stresses the importance of a three-part maneuver within the 
novel’s narrative. First, David alludes to the emotions stirred up by the particul r s ene. 
Then he elides them by stating that it is beyond his ability to accurately describe them: 
“No words can express the secret agony of my soul.” Finally, David compensates for thi
elision by regaling others with recitations of (novelistic) stories – that is, his escape into 
the world of fiction, as a storyteller.  
Moreover, this three-part maneuver mirrors David’s story as a whole, for this is 
the meta-pattern that structures his entire “autobiography”: allusion, elsion, and 
substitution are homologous to secrecy, sexuality, and marriage. David’s escapeinto 
storytelling “encrypts” himself in the text, but, Miller notes, “[w]riting the self, then, 
would be consistently ruled by the paradoxical proposition that the self is most itself at 
the moment when its defining inwardness is most secret, most withheld from writing – 
with the equally paradoxical consequence that autobiography is most successfl only 
where it has been abandoned for the Novel” (200). The paradox here is that the self who 
creates the text is also, at the same time, an effect of that text, making even Miller’s 
autobiographical pronouncement simply another textual effect. Rather than being a 
breach of scholarly etiquette, of an example of “uncritical reading,” Miller’s opening re-
performs the paradoxes highlighted by Dickens’s three-part maneuver. By highlig ting 
this maneuver, Miller exposes the intimate relationship between surface and depth, of the 





 Conversely, Ablow also begins her essay with uncritical readings, but at one 
remove. At the time of Dickens’s death, eulogies often read like uncritical readings of 
literature, for the eulogists identified with Dickens’s characters and gve them a life of 
their own. Warner, speaking of his undergraduates, says they “identify with 
character…[and] fall in love with authors” (13). Similarly, Ablow sees “ the ‘reality’ of 
the novelist’s characters is an effect of our attachment to them – an attachment t at 
results, too, in our sense of intimacy with their author” (18). Invoking Miller’s reading 
specifically, Ablow continues: “[U]nlike critics who have assumed that readers 
internalize this discipline through identification with David [i.e., that Dickens’s ovel 
follows a ‘disciplinary agenda’], I argue that [David Copperfield] attempts to mold 
readers by making the reader feel like both the subject and the object of an attachment 
able to supplement or even substitute for the relationship a husband might have with a 
wife” (19). Remarkable, here, is the similarity of Miller’s and Ablow’s argument – that 
is, novel-reading doesn’t simply create its reader/subject; rather, through treating the 
reader as an object of the text, it produces the subject. And yet, the undeniable difference 
between these arguments is that Ablow’s is couched in marital rhetoric. Why is the 
difference not greater? 
 Unsurprisingly, Ablow’s reading (unlike Miller’s) focuses on David’s marriages, 
first to Dora and then to Agnes, whom Ablow calls “the epitome of all legless angels” 
(38). More specifically, Ablow identifies a three-part maneuver that mirrors Miller’s, 
linking the homosexual subject to marriage. First, one must dispense with the need to 
reconcile the actual object and its ideal. Like allusion in Miller’s argument, in this 





figure that accommodates such a refusal – again, Agnes. Second, this apparently steadfast 
refusal to reconcile the differences between the actual and the ideal mirrors elision, for 
instead of reconciliation, David’s subjectivity is defined by an inability to become a 
better reader. David’s maturity doesn’t hinge on his ability to penetrate appear nc s in 
order to discover things as they really are (that is, “not by providing David with a new 
way to see” [38]); rather, it presents David with an object. Finally, substitution, that is, 
providing an alternative story: in Ablow’s words, “the sublime narrative of Agnes’s 
emergence as the object of David’s love constitut[es] a way to evoke that experience in 
us, the novel’s readers” (38). Instead of enlightenment, that is, instead of providing the 
reader with a better way to see, the novel serves as a narratological helpmate. Rather than 
resolving the epistemological problems that result from David’s poor (social) reading 
skills, the novel substitutes Agnes for resolution. The subject’s maturity is not the novel’s 
goal; rather, its goal is to become the subject’s better companion. 
 One example, David’s inability to read Steerforth, to discover his duplicity and to 
guess at his real intentions (to seduce Emily), is less an epistemological failure, according 
to Ablow, than it is a failure of attachment. This productive “stupidity” (Ablow’s word) is 
most evident, for Ablow, when we contrast Agnes with David’s first wife, Dora. If David 
ever actually experiences a moment of cognitive clarity, of seeing better, it is when he 
realizes that his marriage to Dora was “the first mistaken impulse of an undisciplined 
heart” (Ch. 45); but this realization is undermined not merely by the fact that as soon 
after it is pronounced Dora dies, but that, for Ablow, such realizations are of secondary 
importance. More important than David’s realization and, in turn, his decision to help 





affairs) is that, now, Agnes as ideal helpmate “is also…an ideal text, in relation to whom 
the goal is not understanding of some hidden interiority, but attachment to something like 
a directional signal or a narrative arc” (43). David describes Agnes’s influence as wholly 
supportive: “She gave me no advice; she urged no duty on me; she only told me, in her 
own fervent manner, what her trust in me was.” David continues:   
She knew (she said) how such a nature as mine would turn affliction to 
good. She knew how trial and emotion would exalt and strengthen it. She 
was sure that in my every purpose I should gain a firmer and a higher 
tendency, through the grief I had undergone. She, who so gloried in my 
fame, and so looked forward to its augmentation, well knew that I would 
labour on. She knew that in me, sorrow could not be weakness, but must 
be strength. As the endurance of my childish days had done its part to 
make me what I was, so greater calamities would nerve me on, to be yet 
better than I was; and so, as they had taught me, would I teach others. She 
commended me to God, who had taken my innocent darling to His rest; 
and in her sisterly affection cherished me always, and was always at my 
side go where I would; proud of what I had done, but infinitely prouder 
yet of what I was reserved to do. (Ch. 58) 
 
Like the stories David tells to Steerforth and to the workers at Murdstone and Grinby’s 
warehouse, the story he pens immediately after receiving Agnes’s inspiring letter doesn’t 
result from personal growth but from attachment to a new wife as an ideal text, on  that is 
not in need of interpretation, for being influenced (literally: being moved) is enough. 
Personal growth, the essence of a Bildungsroman, is here inessential.  
 The novel’s “essential drama,” writes Miller, “stems from David’s desperate 
attempt not to be boxed in” (211), but as Miller concludes his essay, he freely admits that 
“David is ultimately no different from the boxed-in characters he seeks to transcend” 
(220). For David to escape from the disciplinary (“carceral”) agenda, one is led to the 
phenomenon Miller calls the “open secret,” and it is with this that Ablow’s reading 





homosexuality, but especially when it does) would seem, by definition, to exclude the 
domestic rhetoric of marriage. As Sharon Marcus asserts in “At Home with the Other 
Victorians,” however, “Like domesticity, homosexuality is eminently Victorian” (119), 
by which she means that, while domesticity and homosexuality were and are considered 
mutually exclusive and diametrically opposed, their histories are deeply intertwi ed. 
 In the oft-cited passage from Miller’s essay (and the one that greatly influenced 
Sedgwick’s thinking), Miller focuses on how secrecy operates out in the open, on how it 
steers discourse and constructs subjects. Let us read the entire passage: 
Instead of the question “What does secrecy cover?” we had better ask 
“What covers secrecy?” What, that is, takes secrecy for its field of 
operation? In a world where explicit exposure of the subject would 
manifest how thoroughly he has been inscribed within a socially given 
totality, secrecy would be the spiritual exercise by which the subject is 
allowed to conceive himself as a resistance…Secrecy would thus be the 
subjective practice in which oppositions of private/public, inside/outside, 
subject/object are established…And the phenomenon of the “open secret” 
does not…bring about the collapse of these binarisms and their ideological 
effects, but rather attests to their fantasmatic recovery…[R]eminiscent of 
Freudian disavowal, we know perfectly well that the secret is known, but 
nonetheless we must persist, however ineptly, in guarding it. The paradox 
of the open secret registers the subject’s accommodation to a totalizing 
system that has obliterated the difference he would make -- the difference 
he does make, in the imaginary denial of this system “even so.” (207) 
 
This passage ties Ablow’s reading to Miller’s because, according to the marriage 
paradox, the subject is defined in terms of resistance, by its ability to transcend its social 
environment. At the same time, however, the “open secret” mitigates this resistance by 
attesting to its “fantasmatic” nature, to the fact that, rather than undermining that which 
constrains it, it perpetuates itself through Freudian disavowal, also known as “fetishistic 
disavowal.” Miller highlights: “we know perfectly well that the secret is know, but 





subject to couple without at the same time losing its defining characteristic (resistance), 
for it follows the perfect have-one’s-cake-and-eat-it-too logic: disavowal allows for 
autonomy and attachment to coexist, subtending the paradoxical nature of marriage.  
Ablow’s “wifely” reading furthers these claims by explaining the paradoxical 
phenomenon of the open secret qua fetishistic disavowal, but in marital terms. 
Concerning the novel’s form, Ablow argues (like Marcus) against deep interpretation, 
against analysis that seeks to find what the text represses; rather, as with “just reading,” 
Ablow sees the actual function of the text operating at its surface: the text is obviously 
not a wife (because “unlike real wives, the novel cannot conceal, disappoint, or be 
mistaken” [43]); but, as with fetishistic disavowal, the reader proceeds – that is, the 
reader reads – as if it were. Yet, if Ablow speaks of the reader being uncritical – that is, 
the reader (over)identifies with the text instead of maintaining the necessary critical 
distance – then we must reconcile this with the surprising fact that Sedgwick’s creation of 
“reparative reading” uses Miller’s The Novel and the Police as its foil, since it is 
fetishistic disavowal that links Miller’s and Ablow’s readings of David Copperfield. Why 
is Sedgwick now accusing Miller of being a paranoid reader, if the book’s final chapter 
had been such an integral part of her own critical enterprise? While Sedgwick has herself 
disavowed much of her past critical work – or at least its methodology – to focus on the 
last chapter of The Novel and the Police, specially when, as we have see above, it hardly 
conforms (lock, stock and barrel) to paranoia, is counterintuitive at best. Faith in 
exposure is certainly a problem, especially since (in Sedgwick’s words) “a hermeneutics 
of suspicion would appear so trusting about the effects of exposure” (138) and that it 





hidden violences in the genealogy of the modern liberal subject” (139). Our response, 
however, must not be “But Officer…” (as it is in The Novel and the Police’s forward), 
but with something like “guilty as charged,” as it is when, at the end of Miller’s book, 
David overidentifies with David. We must be proud of our paranoia. We must embrace it, 
for like it or not we are attached to it. When, in Epistemology of the Closet, Sedgwick 
declared that “all literary analyses are deficient if they do not contain a critical analysis of 
modern homo/heterosexual definition” (1), the precision of her words must be respected. 
Instead of placing David Copperfield within “the history of sexuality,” we are forced to 
take into account our own perspective, that is, one dominated by the modern 
homo/heterosexual definition. For better and for worse, this is our lens. 
This is why Oliver S. Buckton’s essay, the most prominent reading of David’s 
(latent) homosexuality, falls short. In a footnote to “‘The Reader Whom I Love’: 
Homoerotic Secrets in David Copperfield,” Buckton notes that “in literary terms, the 
relationship between David and Steerforth deserves to be recognized as one of the earliest 
examples of schoolboy romantic friendship in nineteenth-century English fiction,” and 
that few have noted this, the principal exception being Eve Sedgwick’s Between Men 
(220n41). For Sedgwick, David’s romantic attachment to the older Steerforth, to someone 
who affectionately calls him “Daisy,” is understood as “part of David’s education – 
though another, later part is the painful learning of how to triangulate from Steerforth, 
and finally, though incompletely, to hate Steerforth and grow at the expense of his deat ” 
(176-77). This triangulation, “two-stage progression from schoolboy desire to adult 
homophobia” (177), is the story Between Men tells; as already noted, however, it is one 





wrong per se, for she does not have to; her later essay is not a plea for stopping exposure 
and the pleasure it affords, but for greater awareness of it. Hence, the potency of Miller’s 
use of the phrase “open secret.” Deciphering “homoerotic secrets” is the beginning – if, 
that is, we must begin there – not the end.  
In his 1990 essay on Alfred Hitchcock’s 1948 film Rope, Miller provides the 
context in which homosexuality, his reading of David Copperfield, and Ablow’s “wifely” 
reading can be combined. It is assumed that the film’s two main characters, Brandon and 
Phillip, are homosexuals, but (Miller asks) how do we know? Taking this ostensibly 
naïve question seriously, Miller points to the fact that connotation and denotation are 
essential to understanding how the modern homo/heterosexual definition functions, and it 
is with this fact that we’ll see that the homosexuality and marriage are one. Ca  
homosexuality ever be verified empirically? “Every discourse that speak ,” writes Miller, 
“every representation that shows homosexuality by connotative means alone will thus be 
implicitly haunted by the phantasm of the thing itself, not just in the form of the name but 
also, more basically, as what the name conjures up: the spectacle of ‘gay sex’” (123). 
Miller might as well have said “the specter of ‘gay sex,’” however, because the haunting 
phantasm never actually appears (in Rope), and even if it did, it would not be – because it 
cannot be – the thing itself. In words Miller borrows from Roland Barthes, the opposite 
of connotation would be “something simple, literal primitive: something true” (118), but 
we never get this, even when we simply concentrate on the surface; instead, we get a way 
of knowing that often seems to find what it’s looking for only to find that, because we’r





This is what Miller calls “the problem with connotation”: the perfect example of 
paranoid reading, but one that we are condemned to reenact as subjects in the prison-
house of linguistic meaning; it is with denotative meaning, therefore, that homosexuality 
and marriage are linked. The question is: what if the thing itself actually did appear? 
Since it cannot, we find that if homosexuality is the hidden truth of marriage equality, it is 
(as noted by Žižek in regards to Freudian dream interpretation) a matter of interpretation. 
The paranoid/reparative relationship the reader has with the novel repeats, from a late 
modern perspective, the modern homo/heterosexual definition, so instead of excluding 
marriage, we find that marriage – understood as a paradox – is deeply implicated in this 
relationship. Marriage is not simply the social form of heterosexuality; it (plus 
homosexuality) constitutes the entirety of the colonizing hetero/homo binary.  
At the outset, I defined this paradox as the reformist desire to enter into a two-
person partnership in which both partners are equal but both parties are free not to 
compromise, since they must exercise their individual autonomy. The problem marriage 
confronts is how to maintain an egalitarian partnership without compromising each 
partner’s individuality. At first, it might appear that Ablow isn’t concerned with this 
problem, since her reading of David Copperfield depicts it vis-à-vis the (male) experience 
of reading as something that upholds the sex separatism of Victorian society. In other 
words, the novel is certainly not reformist, at least as far as marriage is concerned. And 
yet, like Hitchcock’s film, it engages in a game of connation and denotation that traps the 
reader. Again, writes Ablow, “unlike real wives, the novel cannot conceal, disappoint, or 
be mistaken.” This ideal, the partner who cannot conceal, disappoint, or be mistaken, is 





first decade in which David Copperfield was read (the 1850s) is also the decade in which 
England witnessed the first solid challenge to the marital practice of coverture, that is, the 
Divorce and Marital Causes Act (1857), which provided the backdrop for the last chapter 
of John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of Women. The disappearance of the wife upon 
marriage was contested as a legal absurdity, akin to the invocation of the ideal wife via 
the reading of a novel. 
Reading David Copperfield, in this sense, presented a challenge to marital 
sympathy. It provokes the reader at the same time that it makes obvious that what it 
invokes is just a chimera. This fetishistic disavowal, however, contributes to coverture’s 
solution. If one partner wasn’t to be subsumed beneath the other, then how should 
married couples relate to one another? This produces a paradox because every legal 
version, except what John Stuart Mill calls “perfect equality,” is just a different – albeit 
lesser – version of coverture. Same-sex marriage is the logical outcome, since this newest 
version of marriage reform removes anatomical sex from the equation.  
 To recapitulate, I said the marriage paradox – or, more precisely, “reciprocal 
superiority” – is responsible for the continuity between Victorian marriage reform and 
same-sex marriage campaigns, between marriage and homosexuality, and ultimately 
between Ablow and Miller. Let us take each one separately, and then tie them into a bow. 
Victorian marriage reform leads to same-sex marriage. For this reason, marriage nd 
homosexuality become linked by an ideal: the establishment of anti-hierarchical, 
egalitarian relationships. The impossibility of actualizing the ideals leds us to 
interpretation itself, to our ability to understand, to decipher these stumbling blocks. S in 





David Copperfield. The open secret of the wifely text is that, while the wifely text 
coddles its reader, it simultaneously undoes its own ability to produce the ideal partner, 
for the ideal partner vis-à-vis the text is everywhere and nowhere, nothing but a specter, a 
chimera, a fetish the reader must disavow. 
“What can you two be together? What can come of it?” asks Mr. Meagles, the 
(now) former employer of the domestic Tattycoram (349). Little Dorrit  contains an 
unimaginative, if inevitable answer: nothing can come of it. Miss Wade, the character 
alluded to, has garnered more critical attention than any other of Dickens’s memorable 
minor creations. While an abundance of critical energy has been spent on Miss Wade, my 
intention, however, is not to contribute more but to ask the question that has gone 
unasked: Why has so much critical energy been spent? Gesturing towards an answer, 
Holly Furneaux devotes the last five pages of the introduction of her Qu er Dickens 
(2009) to Miss Wade. Quickly reviewing the extant analysis of this minor character, 
Furneaux concludes that through a focus on negative affect Miss Wade “becomes legibl  
as a proto-lesbian through a familiar twist of the queer tragedy trope in which the 
homosexual, if not fatal, is bad, mad, and dangerous to know” (19). Unfortunately, 
Furneaux does not have the space to rectify the situation, since her focus, as her book’s 
subtitle makes clear, is on “erotics, families, masculinities.” I do not propose to complete 
this task; rather, I am interested in seeing if Miss Wade is in fact open to a repar tive 
reading. To anticipate a bit, my answer is that she is not; this, however, is not necessarily 
a bad thing. Miss Wade and the recent critical fascination with her presents us wih 
paranoia at its most acute. Rather than criticizing paranoia, however, we should embrac  





even though their alternative domesticity is the antithesis of what is imagined by a 
separate-spheres ideology, it also (because of its inflexibility) fails to conform to the 
egalitarian, anti-hierarchical relationships imagined by the late-twentieth century, 
particularly in the social imaginary of mainstream same-sex-marriage politics.  
Is Miss Wade a lesbian? This question has been eschewed in favor of more 
nuanced readings involving Victorian political economics, sociology and psychology, 
narrative theory, and LGBT studies – all in order to fight the presentist urge simply to 
label her a lesbian. To begin, I would like to present two brief, overlapping stories. The 
first is Annamarie Jagose’s. During the doldrums of dissertation writing, friends invited 
her to the movies to see Christine Edzard’s 1988 film adaptation of Little Dorrit . 
Edzard’s version omits the character of Miss Wade. According to Jagose, this was not 
immediately clear to her, since the novel’s famously complicated – if not convoluted – 
plot obscured this omission; the film, however, left Jagose with a feeling, as if “I had 
missed something, a niggling something that sent me back to the novel for what I was 
still thinking of as clarification” (423).  
 The second story occurs some twenty years later with another adaptation of Little 
Dorrit , this time by Andrew Davies and the BBC. If Edzard “forgot” Miss Wade, we 
might say that Davies overcompensates for this past oversight. “Dickens didn’t write her 
as a lesbian,” Davies tells the T legraph, “but she just is.” While Furneaux suggests that 
Davies is being especially naïve, falling back on “powerful stereotypes of Vict rian and 
Dickensian prudery” (20), it is worth our while to consider Davies’s (historical) 
simplicity along side Edzard’s erasure. Ontologically, we have either something or 





These late modern filmic interpretations of Little Dorrit , rather than contradicting each 
other, in fact become each other’s complement, at least as it concerns Miss Wade; that is, 
as it concerns the difficulty of reading Miss Wade. This difficulty can be categorized 
under four headings. First, there is denial. Second, that she may be spoken of as a lesbin, 
assuming the proper cultural and historical caveats are made. (How often caveats are to 
be made when speaking of Miss Wade, of course, becomes its own problem.) Third, there 
is the desire that we should, against the critical tide, “unsex” Miss Wade. Fourth, the e is 
historical inevitability: in Davies’s words, “she just is.” This bluntness defies the second 
category by doing away with nuance and caveats. 
 Despite these differences, all the articles acknowledge the central role p ayed by 
“the Woman question”: the figures of the domesticated woman (the bourgeois 
wife/mother or her daughter, that is, the bourgeois wife/mother-to-be) and the 
undomesticated or, rather, the undomesticatable woman (the prostitute) constitute binary 
opposites, but opposites that blend together, especially in the Victorian marketplace. (In 
addition, we have the governess, a profession Miss Wade once occupied, which is a 
socially awkward admixture of these binary opposites: a woman paid to be a mother.) In 
City of Dreadful Delight (1992), for instance, Judith Walkowitz writes, 
In the mid- and late-Victorian period, even as police cleared the streets 
and theaters of prostitutes to make room for respectable women, these two 
categories constantly overlapped and intersected at the juncture of 
commerce and femininity…In the elegant shopping districts around 
Regent Street, prostitutes, dressed in ‘meretricious finery,’ could and did 
pass as respectable, while virtuous ladies wandering in the streets, 
‘window gazing at their leisure,’ often found themselves accosted as 
streetwalkers. (50)   
 
As distressing as it may be not to be able to distinguish between a prostitute and an angel 





is something else entirely – and, interpretatively speaking, this is even worse. Thi  
“something else entirely,” while it is difficult to define, is best viewed within the confines 
of the marriage paradox – that is, again, the imperative to couple that is irrevocably 
linked to the ability, simultaneously, to preserve each partner’s autonomy. Miss Wade is 
more than one of lesbianism’s historical antecedents, more than one or two or three ofits 
literary or cultural tropes; instead, Little Dorrit  presents readers, especially its late 
modern ones, with a direct challenge to marriage and the couple, for as Sharon Marcus 
asserts, Dickens’s “image of a pathological female household anticipates” lt r Victorian 
fictions. Here in this pathological female household we find the marriage paradox at its 
most exposed, its contradictory impulses most apparent. I link this exposure to the 
transition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) from Lord and Bondsman to his 
concept of the unhappy consciousness. The unhappy consciousness is the subject stripped 
of its characteristics, reducing it to one of the opponents described by Barbara Johnson 
apropos of Lacan’s reading of Poe’s “The Purloined Letter.”  
 Before turning to the readings themselves, however, I want to rehearse Miss 
Wade’s situatedness in Little Dorrit  because, despite the popularity of this character 
within late modern Dickens studies (and unlike David Copperfield’s cultural 
omnipresence), it is important to rehearse the specifics. Alex Woloch suggests that “a 
minor character’s very importance, as an affective space within the novel, might work 
against his or her incorporation into the larger thematic or analogic structure [of the 
novel]” (127). This is especially true of Miss Wade. Three-fourths of the way into the 
novel, Dickens provides this minor character with an entire chapter in which she becomes 





person narration are limited to two letters written to the male protagonist, Arthur 
Clennam) is afforded such a prized character-space. The appearance of the Miss Wade 
chapter is unexpected and disruptive, for it calls unwarranted attention to itself; it i  for 
this reason, however, that it is emblematic of what Woloch calls “the fundamental 
achievement of Dickens’s depiction of minor characters: he dramatizes the écart ment 
between a minor character’s function and his or her own fictional being, showing how the 
very subordinated nature of minor characters catalyzes new kinds of affective presence” 
(127-28). 
 “Try this uncertainty and this not-putting of them together, as a new means of 
interest” (23), Dickens writes in his notes for the novel, referring specifically to the first 
three chapters (settings: prison, quarantine, Mrs. Clennam’s house), which despite some 
common motifs (such as claustrophobic confinement) appear at first blush to be 
disorientingly unrelated. The appearance of Miss Wade in the second chapter is  case in 
point. Dickens introduces a mysterious character, about whom even the narrator seems in 
doubt: “a handsome young Englishwoman, traveling quite alone, who had a proud 
observant face, and had either withdrawn from the rest or been avoided by the rest – 
nobody, herself excepted perhaps, could have quite decided which” (36). Apparently, the 
uncertainty with which the narrator ends his description, where only Miss Wade herself
could resolve this uncertainty, is the best that the narrator can give the reader, for he 
fashions his second, more detailed description of her in similar terms, beginning with “it
would have been difficult as to say, positively, whether she avoided the rest, or was 
avoided” (38). “Nobody, herself excepted perhaps” is, perhaps, the best way to describe 





the reader is instead offered two hints: first, a disturbing description of Miss Wade’s 
personality vis-à-vis her outward appearance; and second, an unnerving exchange 
between Miss Wade and Tattycoram, where the latter accuses the former of having an 
inexplicable power over her: “You seem to come like my own anger, my own malice, my 
own – whatever it is – I don’t know what it is” (42). Concerning this exchange, the read r 
relies on the narrator to describe Miss Wade’s manner of looking at Tattycoram, that is, 
in terms of her gazing on “an analogous case,” that she also must have suffered as th  
result of a “dependent position” (42). (Moreover, this is what unites the two: despite their 
age difference and despite Miss Wade’s dominant personality, they are analogues, even 
equals: “You seem to come like my own…whatever it is – I don’t know what it is.”) 
 This is enhanced, of course, by the aforementioned description. Expanding on 
what he had just called her “proud observant face,” the narrator indulges in a striking 
physiognomically-based reading of Miss Wade’s visage. According to the narrator, one 
could not look at her face “without wondering what its expression would be if a change 
came over it” (38). While sifting through possible meanings that the face mightconvey, 
there is something “it said plainly,” and it says it, surprisingly, in the first-person: “I am 
self-contained and self-reliant; your opinion is nothing to me; I have no interest in you, 
care nothing for you, and see and hear you with indifference” (38). Up to a point, this 
begins to elucidate the first conversation in which Miss Wade participates, wh re she 
strenuously disagrees with the consummate family man, Mr. Meagles, concerning the 
relationship between prison and prisoner. Mr. Meagles thinks that one ought to be able to 
forgive one’s prison, while Miss Wade replies, “If I had been shut up in any place to pine 





ground. I know no more” (37). This “strong” and “forceful” response links Tattycoram’s 
anger, malice or “I don’t know what it is” to Miss Wade, but Dickens keeps the details 
about this minor character from the reader, and this is Dickens’s “new means of interest.” 
 Now Dickens knew this “means” had its limits, since he had introduced this 
startlingly enigmatic female character he would have, at some point in the novel, to flesh 
her out, and that (because of the possibly unwarranted build-up) this fleshing out would 
necessarily need to be tethered to what Dickens will later call “the blood of the book” 
(Forster 162). As we know from his notes, Dickens had trouble deciding when and what 
to reveal. In preparation for the third installment of the novel, Dickens writes, “Mi s 
Wade. Her surroundings and antecedents?” after which appears an underlined “No.” 
Even more surprising (particularly in retrospect) is that Dickens writes, “Mi s Wade in 
the prison? Not yet. Her father? Not yet” (27). Of course, neither incarceration nor a 
paternal figure will be introduced to explain who or what Miss Wade is; we see instad 
Dickens struggling with his minor character. 
 Regardless, what is clear is that prison and father soon drop out of Dickens’s 
plans; instead, he continues to obscure. In chapter XVI of Book I we learn that 
Tattycoram has not only met with Miss Wade, but that Miss Wade has invited 
Tattycoram to live with her if she again feels that the Meagles family has mistreated her.  
And in Chapter XXVII we learn that Tattycoram has absconded, while at the same time 
we are finally presented with another encounter with Miss Wade, an encounter that only 
increases her obscure nature. When Mr. Clennam and Mr. Meagles find Miss Wade, it 
quickly becomes apparent that Tattycoram has no intention of returning to the Meagleses 





“mystery” and that “I don’t know what you are, but you don’t hide, can’t hide, what a 
dark spirit you have within you” (351). “What can you two be together? What can come 
of it?” he asks (349). These are questions, however, that go unanswered, at least 
explicitly. All the reader is given is Miss Wade’s retort: she and Tattycoram have 
“common cause,” they are both mistreated orphans and dependents, and she has “nothing 
more to say” (351). And yet, Mr. Meagles suspects that Miss Wade is “a woman, who, 
from whatever cause, has a perverted delight in making a sister-woman as wretched as 
she is” (351). Supposedly, Mr. Meagles is “old enough to have heard of such” (351), but 
here the narrator only further whets the reader’s appetite, meaning that once agai  
Dickens is putting increased pressure on himself to deliver something worth the wai. 
More importantly, however, this something, by sheer dint of its enigmatic position withi  
the narrative, begins to take on a fictional being that the narrator cannot control, for until 
Miss Wade is pinned down (by being burdened with a “fictional” past) she remains a 
narratological nuisance. Purposefully withholding information incites interest, but the 
longer Dickens withholds it the more difficult it is to integrate it into the narrative, that is, 
to put Miss Wade together.    
 As is well known, Dickens’s friend and biographer John Forster considered the 
attempt to flesh out Miss Wade’s character-space to be “anything but attrac ive,” since 
“The History of a Self-Tormentor” had “really little to do with the tale itself,” even 
though “the failure nevertheless had not been for want of care and study, as wellof his 
own design as of models by masters in his own art” (161). Before we consider the 
chapter’s narrative content, one that designates Miss Wade a self-tormentor, a brief 





process, Dickens decides to “change this to two chapters, getting the Self-Tormentor 
narrative by itself.” Mr. Clennam seeks out Miss Wade hoping that she might have 
information in regards to his past. While Miss Wade does clarify the details concerning 
her acquaintance with Rigaud, the foreign man who has had mysterious dealings with Mr. 
Clennam’s mother, Dickens’s notes again state: “No information – Clennam goes back” 
(50-51), but not before Miss Wade confesses, “I have for some time inclined to tell y u 
what my life has been – not to propitiate your opinion [of course!], for I set no value on 
it; but, that you may comprehend…what I mean by hating” (690). 
 “I don’t see the practicability of making the History of a Self-Tormentor, with 
which I took great pains, a written narrative,” writes Dickens. “But I do see the 
possibility of making it a chapter by itself, which might dispense with the necssity of the 
turned commas.” As insignificant as disposing of quotation marks or “turned commas” 
may sound, Dickens has something much more significant in mind, that is, “Henry 
Fielding’s reason for the introduced story.” The need for the “introduced story” is 
predicated on the physical constraints of novel writing: “it is sometimes really impossible 
to present, in a full book, the idea it contains…without supposing the reader to be 
possessed of almost as much romantic allowance as would put him on a level with the 
writer.” The introduced story, in other words, attempts to fill in an (impossible) gap 
between reader and writer, one produced by the writer’s romantic allowances (Di kens’s 
ostensible access to aspects of his characters to which his readers are not privy) that at 
times, and for reasons spelled out above, need to be minimized. Needless to say, Dickens 
had high hopes for the Miss Wade chapter: “In Miss Wade I had an idea, which I thought 





separation from the main story, as to make the blood of the book circulate through both” 
(161). Forster felt that he had “not exactly succeeded in this.” Dickens, Paul D. Herring 
suggests, “lost the opportunity of fully exploiting the dramatic irony of her narration,” 
despite the fact that “the reader realizes one of the main theses in Little Dorrit : that the 
individual himself is to some degree responsible for his position in the prison that Society 
has built around him” (51). While Dickens supposedly fails to exploit the “dramatic 
irony” of Miss Wade’s narration, it would appear that, regardless of the artifici lity of the 
narration’s introduction, Dickens thought that the “introduced story” was the best 
method, maybe not to make it circulate through the book’s vital arteries, but at least to 
provide the reader with her surroundings and antecedents. 
 As Herring’s statement implies, Dickens’s narration does not fully exploit the fact 
that Miss Wade shares some of the responsibility for her isolation, misery, and 
vindictiveness. Either way, she is “to some degree responsible,” but Dickens fails to
make full dramatic use of this fact. Why then did this master of the novel choose this 
tactic? The answer rests partly on the material constraints of the Victorian novel: due to 
serialization, earlier parts of the novel are published before later parts are even written (at 
least in Dickens’s case), which plays a significant role in the development of Miss Wade. 
It is clear that, for example, when Dickens scrawls “Miss Wade in the prison? N t yet. 
Her father? Not yet,” he has not yet decided on who/what Miss Wade is. More important, 
though, is the decision that is made. 
In “Master and Servant in Little Dorrit ,” Avrom Fleishman applies Hegel’s Lord 
and Bondsman to Dickens’s novel, but he does so with only minimal success, for 





because he is beholden to the servant for his ostensible independence; conversely, the 
servant achieves “self-existence” by laboring for his master, thereby acquiring a 
modicum of “freedom” vis-à-vis the “consciousness that he himself exists in his own 
right and on his own account” (576). In other words, “just where the master has 
effectively achieved lordship,” writes Hegel, “he really finds that something has come 
about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an independent, but a 
dependent consciousness that he has achieved” whereas the servant’s “self-existenc  
comes to be felt explicitly as his own proper being, and he attains that consciousess that 
he himself exists in its own right and on its own account” (§ 196). On Fleishman’s 
account, Miss Wade’s narrative demonstrates her inability to achieve independence or 
freedom, for as a servant desirous of being a master, she wars against the dialectical 
relationship described by Hegel. “The more Miss Wade rebels and asserts her 
independence…[and] the more she claims equality with masters by spurning them,” 
writes Fleishman, “the more she proves her inferiority, her inability to live a normal life 
around them.” “[H]ers is not a free choice of freedom,” Fleishman concludes, “but a 
compulsive drive to be free which only increases her bondage and her bitterness” (578). 
He misses, however, what Judith Butler has called “one of the least interrogated f 
Hegel’s philosophical movements,” that is, the transition from the “Lord and Bondsman” 
section to “The Freedom of Self-Consciousness: Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy 
Consciousness” (173). This transition greatly informs Miss Wade’s critical leg cy. 
 Our recourse to Hegel provides added nuance to our critique of Victorian marital 
sympathy. Recall the formula [established in chapter 1]: party 1 can provide X, party 2 





Hegel and for Victorian society, the parties are unequal, since for the formr the parties 
represent the master and servant and for latter husband and wife. Borrowing from Hegel’s 
above observation, we see that the husband’s independence (in the marketplace) is in fact 
dependent on the service his wife provides at home, while the wife, by producing her 
husband’s independence, acquires her own modicum of freedom vis-à-vis the production 
of the home. Fleishman’s argument is that Miss Wade cannot break free from the 
dialectic, since her desire is simply to become the master. Following Hegel (and Butler), I 
argue that Miss Wade sublates the dialectic and encounters what Hegel calls “the 
freedom of self-consciousness.” And, via Miss Wade, so does Tattycoram. 
 To put this into perspective: J. Hillis Miller refers to “the narrow circle of [Miss 
Wade’s] sadism toward others and her masochism toward herself” (230; qtd. in Jagose 
448n28). Miss Wade’s sadism, however, is very particular, for it is more precise than 
simply taking pleasure in causing pain in others. In fact, her sadism takes the form of a 
rabid skepticism obsessed with finding the contradictions inherent in others’ actions.  
According to Miss Wade, she had not only “the misfortune of not being a fool” but also 
the ability to “detect[] what those about me thought they hid from me” (693). Miss 
Wade’s treatment of her childhood friend, Charlotte, serves as the aptest example.  
Charlotte’s kindness, what others “called an amiable…affectionate temper,” Miss Wade 
saw as Charlotte’s “little perfidy” and would therefore “throw[] her [Charlotte] into tears 
by showing her that I read her heart” (694). Another such example comes from Miss 
Wade’s interaction with her first mistress, where she states, for instance, “If there 
happened to be anything choice at table, she always sent it to me: but, I always declined 





retort, and made me feel independent” (696). Apology equals condescension; kindness 
equals vanity; sympathy equals hatred. Self-tormentor is not an appellation Miss Wade 
chose for herself, of course, but the narrator’s title, which implies that Miss Wade 
misreads her surroundings and suffers the consequences of faulty interpretations. Yet, it 
is too simple to dismiss Miss Wade as neurotic or socially illiterate, which is not to say, 
for instance, that Charlotte actually was perfidious; rather, what makes Miss Wade 
intolerable is her refusal to consent to calling things by their socially accepted names. 
 It is when “the skeptic becomes self-conscious of the constitutive contradiction of 
his own negating activity,” Butler observes, “that the unhappy consciousness emerges as 
an explicit form of ethical reflexivity” (183). What Hillis Miller calls “her masochism 
toward herself” takes the form of (in Butler’s words) “berat[ing] itself constantly, setting 
up one part of itself as a pure judge aloof from contradiction, and disparaging its 
changeable part as that which is inessential, although ineluctably tied to it” (184). To 
make the leap from skeptic to unhappy consciousness, however, the skeptic must 
confront another skeptic, which is what she finds in Tattycoram, who, Miss Wade 
explains, is beginning to see “swollen patronage and selfishness” in what others call 
“kindness, protection, benevolence, and other fine names” (702). Here is the true 
meaning of Mr. Meagles’ questions: “What can you two be together? What can come of 
it?” Clennam imagines that Miss Wade and Tattycoram “must be constantly tearing the 
other to pieces” (691), and to a certain extent he is right: alternatives are difficult to 
imagine. Plus, the Miss Wade chapter hardly answers Mr. Meagles’s queries, and 
Tattycoram reinforces this image during the novel’s confused denouement. “‘Oh! I have 





repentant!” and notes that Miss Wade “find[s] no pleasure in anything but keeping me as 
miserable, suspicious, and tormenting as herself [my emphasis].’” She concludes, “I used 
to think…that people were all against me because of my first beginning” (844). 
 To clarify: like Fleishman, I am not asserting that Hegel’s philosophical treatise 
directly influenced Dickens (in the sense that he read it, which he did not), but rather th t 
the “Lord and Bondsman” section, because it is “a kind of master-key to the pattern of 
modern history from the French Revolution down,” is a template on which Dickens 
cannot help base his story (575). The problem, however, is that the transition that 
Fleishman misses and to which Butler draws our attention is not such a template, that 
outside early twentieth-century French intellectual circles (Butler names Jean Wahl, Jean 
Hyppolite, and Alexandre Kojève) the unhappy consciousness is precisely that which has 
been overlooked, and it is precisely that which links Miss Wade’s “introduced story” to 
“the central paradox of Hegel’s anthropology” (195n2). 
 Again, Sharon Marcus calls their relationship an “image of a pathological female 
household,” while Mr. Meagles (anticipating Marcus) asks the rhetorical question: “What 
can you two be together? What can come of it?” None of our late modern attempts to pin 
this down have succeeded; however, each contributes a crucial aspect of what Miss Wade 
and Tattycoram being together means, that is, the what of the “what can come of it.” As I 
noted above, the extant literature provides us with four possible responses. First, there’  
denial.  Representative here is by John Lucas: “I think it is a mistake that Miss Wade 
should be spoken of as a lesbian. Dickens’s daring does not lie in any suggestion of her 
sexual desire. Miss Wade hates society as a whole, not just men” (269). Lucas’s 





“Dickens’s daring.” Plus, Lucas is certainly correct: “Miss Wade hat s society as a 
whole, not just men”; however, Lucas errs both when he depicts lesbianism as hatred of 
men and when he depicts sexual desire as personal and, therefore, not relevant to “society 
as a whole.” In other words, Lucas’s denial highlights all our key terms (sexual desire, 
society in its entirety, male dominance, and hatred), but he wishes to keep them separate 
instead of seeing them as the warp and woof of the same imbricated fabric. 
 Second, we have those who think Miss Wade should be spoken of as a lesbian, 
assuming the proper cultural and historical caveats are made. This position is variou ly 
taken up by Annamarie Jagose, Sharon Marcus, Anna Wilson, Mary A. Armstrong, and 
Holly Furneaux. Representative here is Jagose, who claims that the reason why Miss 
Wade “seems legible within contemporary tropes of lesbianism follows from a 
retrospective misordering of cause and effect in which her as-if-nascent lesbianism is 
read as the origin of the modern category toward which it then seems unerringly to 
gesture” (424). “Retrospective misordering” is certainly the largest stumbling block when 
contending with the modern homo/heterosexual definition, for it cannibalizes a vast array 
of past social practices, thereby forcing these diverse social practices (and their remnants) 
to occupy one half of a binary prison: lesbian tropes or characteristics have disparate 
origins whose coalescence into a sexual identity that postdates Miss Wade’s app arance 
in Little Dorrit . Yet, in the same breath, Jagose reminds her readers that “one of the least 
productive aspects of the recent attention to the historicity of categories of s xual 
identification…[is] a scrupulous refusal to allow the possibility of any meaningful 





can, of course, be stultifying; however, it bespeaks the frustration late modern scholars 
experience when confronting the modern hetero/homo definition.   
 Third, there is Janet Retseck who argues, instead, that we should, against the 
critical tide, “unsex” Miss Wade. For Retseck, we share this burden with Miss Wade, 
whom she calls a  “delusion[al]…misreader.” While Retseck extirpates lesbiani m from 
Dickens’s pathologizing, she preserves the fact that Dickens locates “her anger and 
defiance…in her personality” (223). Her “personality” is central to understanding why 
Miss Wade is “something else,” but according to Deirdre David, whatever this 
“something else” is (Retseck calls it “political rebellion” [217]), it “is clearly resistance to 
normative heterosexual domesticity” (263n16), which is what brings us to Miss Wade’s 
inevitable lesbian status. So, sexed or unsexed, Miss Wade stands against the domestic, 
something that even Lucas’s anti-social pronouncement would support. For this to be 
true, however, we would have to conclude that in Miss Wade’s war against normative 
gender roles, against heterosexuality, and against domesticity, Tattycoram is simply a 
victim, simply collateral damage; but this view of Tattycoram only works if we disregard 
the reason why they became a couple in the first place: Miss Wade is not looking to 
master a dependent (as Fleishman implies); instead, she sees herself, her own “unhappy 
consciousness” in Tattycoram. If, therefore, we are in fact presented with a pat ological 
female household, then we must address the fact that even without normative 
heterosexuality, domesticity remains, even if it is being redefined. In other words, we 
witness, however briefly, the desire of unhappy consciousnesses to be a couple. 
 Fourth, there is inevitability. Most recently, Deirdre David concludes, “Inevitably, 





Andrew Davies’s “she just is [a lesbian],” though in context David’s are more nuanced, 
and more fitting. Jagose calls our late modern confusion “retrospective misorder ng,” 
which is similar to David’s “inevitability,” but not entirely the same. The bluntness of 
David’s must is undergirded not by a nuanced dissecting of historical misordering but 
rather something more akin to what in Female Masculinity (1998) Judith Halberstam 
calls “perverse presentism,” which she describes as “not only a denaturaliz ion of the 
present but also [as] an application of what we do not know about the present to what we 
do not know about the past” (53). Miss Wade is not a lesbian because Dickens thought 
she was, or because we think she is, but caught in the present, caught in the modern 
hetero/homo definition, that is, more better and more worse, that is how she “must be 
read.” Together, these late modern responses are the evidence we must sift through, since 
this is quite literally the material instantiations of the Victorian afterli e. Mr. Meagles 
says that “I am old enough to have heard of such,” implying that who Miss Wade is nd 
what she and Tattycoram cannot be together is an open secret, but are we late moderns
old enough to know this secret? With time, has it gotten more obscure or less? 
 That Miss Wade and Tattycoram’s relationship proves unsuccessful (with the 
latter returning to the Meagleses and blaming Miss Wade) doesn’t mean that we succumb 
to a tragic reading of it. Furneaux (following Armstrong) argues, albeit regretfully, that 
“Miss Wade becomes legible as proto-lesbian through a familiar twist of the queer 
tragedy trope in which the homosexual, if not fatal, is bad, mad, and dangerous to know” 
(19). This is only true for Miss Wade, however, if we believe Tattycoram without 
question. The structure of their relationship, writes Armstrong, “nontraditionally 





class life and female subservience…requires the definition of a new female homo rotic 
subject” (71-72). It is more productive, therefore, to introduce reciprocal superiority and 
the marriage paradox, along with Hegel’s unhappy consciousness, into the equation 
because, if only for a brief instance, we may be glimpsing what Mill is describing. 
 2 is the oddest number: Miss Wade and Tattycoram’s proto-same-sex marriage 
and the late modern critical responses to it is proof of this essential oddness because, in 
essence, the response of Dickens’s characters, especially Mr. Meagles and Arthur 
Clennam, are reduplicated by late modern critics. Again, Clennam can only imagine these 
two “constantly tearing the other to pieces.” This ferocity, Furneaux and Armstrong both 
surmise, has brought undo attention to Miss Wade. Interest in negative affect has, for
instance, blinded scholars to Esther Summerson’s erotic desire for Ada Clare in Bleak 
House because it is not seen as pathological (Armstrong 62-69). Even Marcus’s Between 
Women, observes Furneaux, devotes its most extended reading of Dickens to the 
“imbalanced sadomasochistic relationship” between Estella and Miss Havisham in Great 
Expectations. This focus, Furneaux concludes, “unhelpfully passes forward the 
widespread belief that same-sex desire is most legible as violence and pathology in 
Dickens’s work” (19n52). And yet, Miss Wade and Tattycoram’s alternative domesticity 
is the antithesis of what is imagined by a separate-spheres ideology, but it also ( n its 
inflexibility) fails to conform to the egalitarian, anti-hierarchical relationships imagined 
by the late-twentieth century, particularly in the social imaginary of mainstream same-
sex-marriage politics. That the relationship fails does not mean that the egalitarian, anti-
hierarchical relationship is by definition doomed; rather, it means that the latter 





of marriage described at the conclusion of The Subjection of Women, then we should be 
less squeamish when we encounter the result. What we have here are two unhappy 
consciousnesses, two individuals possessed by the desire to enter into a two-person 
partnership, an attachment in which both partners are equal but where both parties are 
free not to compromise, since they must exercise their individual autonomy. The pressure 
is clearly too intense for Tattycoram, but who can blame her? Earlier, Tattycoram said, 
“You [Miss Wade] seem to come like my own anger, my own malice, my own – 
whatever it is – I don’t know what it is.” Ultimately, Tattycoram flees from the intensity 






“Omissions Are Not Accidents”: Pater and Pederasty 
 
There is nothing more hierarchical than (Greek) pederasty, right? Well, not exactly. In 
Victorian Oxford, pederasty (figurative, metaphoric, philosophical, or physical) 
undergirded many discussions concerning relations between men because Benjamin 
Jowett placed particular emphasis in the mid-century on both Plato and one-on-one 
tutoring, where a don and an undergraduate would spend time alone reading (in the 
original Greek) such erotic dialogues as the Symposium and the Phaedrus. In 
Homosexuality and Hellenism in Victorian Oxford (1994), Linda Dowling contrasts the 
effectiveness of the Blackwood’s attack on the Cockney School of Poetry with the 
ineffectiveness of Robert Buchanan’s attack on the Fleshly School. Both attacks focused 
on “vain, luxurious, and selfish effeminacy,” but two things had changed between 1817 
and 1872 to the point that, observes Dowling, “[b]y the time Buchanan mounted his 
attack…he would speak as a lonely, isolated, no longer intelligible voice” (25).  
One was Jowett’s curricular reform, while the other involved economic 
liberalization. Concerning the latter, the basic premise is that the republican rhetoric of 
“positive liberty” is based on a closed, zero-sum, cyclical metaphor, emphasizing the 
constant need to return to origins. Therefore, all exuberance must be contained, for excess 
means anarchy, it means destroying tradition and, worst of all, it means sending society 
careening off course on a non-zero-sum venture of no return, an odyssey without 
destination. By 1872, political rhetoric had by necessity accommodated itself to the fact 
that excess (the unbridling of human wants) is endemic to laissez-faire capitalism, and 
that instead of fighting this excess society should take it for granted. In short, excess went 





– liberty was now embraced. In Isaiah Berlin’s classic 1958 lecture, “Two Concepts of 
Liberty,” he defines “liberty in the negative sense” as “the area within which t e subject – 
a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, 
without interference by other persons” (34). In this sense, negative liberty concerns 
freedom from interference, while positive liberty concerns one’s ability to do something, 
and this shift places pederasty in a different light because we are no longer c c rned 
with an individual’s ability but with an individual’s freedom. 
 Against this backdrop, Walter Pater began describing love between men by 
combining the hierarchy endemic to pederasty with the egalitarianism implicit in 
marriage reform. As we will see, this was accomplished – if it was accomplished at all – 
only with great difficulty. “Virtually every representation of love between men in Pater,” 
Ellis Hanson claims, “is haunted by the grave – and the stronger the suggestion of 
homoerotic desire, the more eagerly Pater seems to want to see one of the two men dead” 
(184). While this accounts for almost every representation in Pater’s oeuvre, it does not 
fit the first, “haunted” homoerotic representation Pater publishes, that is, Paer’s 
representation of Winckelmann and his murderer, Arcangeli. Simply put, Pater is not 
eager to see Winckelmann die, despite the fact that often he depicts love between men in 
a hierarchical rather than egalitarian fashion. Why is he not eager? What makes this first 
relationship different? The answer, for us, resides in the Victorian afterlife, but this time 
in a crucial omission within this late modern phenomenon: that is, Pater’s omission of 
Winckelmann’s stabbing and the concominant appearance of a child have gone unnoticed 
by late modern interpreters both because our paranoid optic has focused too much 





Pater provides us with the child, a reparative move that has been “invisible or illegible.” 
To be clear, this is not a reparative reading of Pater; rather, inspired by the concept of 
reciprocal superiority I seek out the reparative but not at the expense of the paranoid. The 
poet Marianne Moore claims that “omissions are not accidents.” As we will see below, 
however, omissions are either conscious or unconscious, and it is the latter kind that 
interests us because emphasis shifts from the author’s intent to the relationship between 
language and interpretation. If what appears – or, in fact, does not appear – to lte 
modern scholars as the absence of Winckelmann’s fatal stabbing, if it tells intrpreters 
something of import, it is that Pater’s descriptions of love between men are haunted by 
the concealment of this stabbing. Language fails Pater as he struggles with the essential 
oddness of the number 2. Late modern scholars miss this omission because either we are 
not paranoid enough, or we were too paranoid and, therefore, we miss both what is 
conspicuously absent and what is actually present.  
 When Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, writing of Oscar Wilde, observes that “[his] ero  
was most closely tuned to the note of the pederastic love in the process of being 
superceded ” (57), this is even truer of Pater’s “eros.” By examining Pater’s first 
depiction of love between men, that is, his anonymously published 1867 essay on the 
eighteenth-century German art historian Johann Winckelmann, we find a text attempting 
to establish a modicum of egalitarianism. This modicum only becomes visible or legible 
when we pay particular attention to the absence of the art historian’s stabbing and the
concomitant appearance of a child, which demonstrates that “pederastic love” is not as 
hierarchical as Sedgwick suspects. This stabbing does eventually appear, however, 





Gray (1890/91), making Pater’s review of Wilde’s novel an important supplement to the 
murder scene in Pater’s “Winckelmann” because it becomes a text that can be read as a 
return to the relationship between death and the love between men.  
 Before turning to the omission and late modern criticism, it is important to keep in 
mind the broad strokes of Pater’s aesthetic itinerary. “Winckelmann” is Pater’s strongest 
endorsement of what Linda Dowling calls “spiritual procreancy,” that is, a form of 
metaphysical, intergenerational reproductivism à la Plato that toes the line between 
hierarchy and equality. The eighteenth-century German art historian of Greek sculpture, 
writes Pater, is “the last fruit of the Renaissance,” despite the fact that usu lly “the 
Renaissance is represented as a fashion which set in at a definite period.” Winckelma n’s 
status as the “last fruit,” as Pater himself admits in the final sentence of “The Preface” to 
The Renaissance (1873) “explains in a striking way [the Renaissance’s] motive and 
tendencies” (xxxiii). Pater explicitly links this “striking way” to what he calls 
Winckelmann’s “temperament,” which he “nurtured and invigorated by friendships 
which kept him in direct contact with the spirit of youth” (123). Such a temperament and 
such “friendships” gain Winckelmann special access to an aspect of Greek culture that 
later cultures, despite their numbness to it, are unable to suppress: “moral sexlessn ss, a 
kind of ineffectual wholeness of nature, yet with a true beauty and significance of its 
own,” which denotes a human perfection devoid of “shame” or “intoxication,” making it 
a healthy, reproductive expression of love between men. This is a delicate maneuver, 
since Winckelmann “fingers those pagan marbles with unsinged hands, with no sense of 





To emphasize this fact, Pater stresses that Winckelmann ignores philosophy, 
although Plato “is excepted from Winckelmann’s proscription of the philosophers” 
because, as opposed to a carnal lust for young flesh, the spiritual procreancy describe  by 
Socrates in his speech in Plato’s Symposium appeals to Winckelmann, and to Pater. In 
Plato’s dialogue on the nature of love (between men), Socrates asks his listeners: 
What if man had eyes to see the true beauty…the divine beauty…pure and 
clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all 
the colors and vanities of human life – thither looking, and holding 
converse with the true beauty simple and divine?  Remember how in that 
communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be 
enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities…and bringing 
forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and to be 
immortal, if mortal man may. (582)   
 
The crucial distinction here is between beauty’s particularity, “this or that special 
manifestation of it” (xxix), and beauty’s “sexlessness.” By stressing beauty’s sexlessness 
rather than its androgyny, Pater associates beauty with “a kind of impotence,” a phrase 
that he omits from the publication of “Winckelmann.” The phrase originally appears in 
“Diaphaneitè,” Pater’s earliest known piece of writing, and it reads: “a morl sexlessness, 
a kind of impotence” (253). While attempting not to abstract from “this or that,” Pater’s 
reading of the Symposium keeps beauty at arm’s length because it is introduced through 
the mind’s eye and through de-emphasis “on the pollutions of mortality and all the colors 
and vanities of human life.” As Christopher Craft has argued, this aesthetic itinerary is 
exceptionally arduous. Craft paraphrases: 
Start with your purblind passion for the radiant beauty of that golden boy; 
realize next that nothing gold can stay and that your favorite can radiate so 
seductively only because he has already been irradiated by a lucent source 
as yet invisible to your enchanted eye; now proceed toward the precluded 
source by transferring your ardor for golden youth to airier, more abstract 
forms and in this way continue your strident climb upward through 





enough to recast that now abstracted beauty in perduring forms of art, 
thought, or law; then resume your ascent, mounting higher still, until you 
bathe at last in the cool radiance of pure Idea. (117) 
 
I have quoted Craft’s long paraphrase for in one sentence he captures, rather humorously, 
the true difficulty of detaching beauty from the flesh.  
Winckelmann follows these instructions. When he touches Greek sculpture, he 
must remain calm, sober, and unpolluted. Echoing Plato’s Symposium, Pater elsewhere 
writes: “The end of life is not action but contemplation – being as distinct from doing – a 
certain disposition of the mind: is, in some shape or other, the principle of all the higher 
morality. In poetry, in art, if you enter into their true spirit at all; you touch this principle, 
in a measure: these, by their very sterility [my emphasis], are a type of beholding for the 
mere joy of beholding” (“Wordsworth” 62). Like Plato, Pater stresses being over doing, 
Being that is only to be beholden for its own sake, for the mere joy of beholding. While 
pleasure is the central concern of the aesthetic critic, who “regards all the objects with 
which he has to do, all works of art, and the fairer forms of nature and human life, as 
powers or forces producing pleasurable sensations,” Pater then adds that “What is 
important…is not that the critic should possess a correct abstract definition of beauty for 
the intellect, but a certain kind of temperament, the power of being deeply moved by the 
presence of beautiful objects” (“The Preface,” xxx).  
This is what the Hellenic ideal teaches us. For, although every culture contributes 
to its successors by being absorbed and hidden beneath their surfaces, the Hellenic spirit 
and culture, its manner, because “the standard of taste...was fixed in Greece” (140), 
refuses to lie dormant. Therefore, the Greeks are not simply one culture among others, 





historicity. Before the mind began to entertain the idea of its own freedom and agency, 
“to boast its independence of the flesh,” the Greeks were the fortunate receives of “some 
supreme good luck”: an elegant pause, where action is limited, passion plays flirt tiously 
with the rigid surface, and all that is “common,” “accidental,” “grotesque,” and “earthly” 
is “purge[d] away.” The underlying message of “Winckelmann” is that man’s sex is no 
longer nature’s tool, no longer clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colors 
and vanities of human life. By putting aside excremental odors, unseemly fluids, and the 
animal need to procreate, man in his “moral sexlessness,” which is not to be confused 
with infertility per se, disregards baser practices. True fecundity (spiritual procreancy) 
follows from an elevated impotency. Man must worship himself as the thing-in-itself: 
“motion in stillness,” which “begins and ends with the finite image, yet loses no part f 
the spiritual motive” (131). In “The School of Giorgione” (a late addition to The
Renaissance), Pater famously asserts that all art aspires to “the condition of music”; 
however, it is fair to say that, ten years earlier, art, for Pater (and for Winckelmann before 
him), aspires to the condition of sculpture (“the Greek ideal expressed itself preeminently 
in sculpture”), which Pater later reiterates in his sparkling 1889 essay, “Style”: “For in 
truth all art does but consist in the removal of surplusage, from the last finish of the gem-
engraver blowing away the last particle of invisible dust, back to the earliest divination of 
the finished work to be, lying somewhere, according to Michelangelo’s fancy, in the
rough-hewn block of stone” (19-20). “The tact of omission,” as Pater later calls it, means 
that all great artists know when, where, and what to omit, for certain omissions at certain
times have maximum effect. This “removal of surplusage” is always an incomplete 





importantly, because the aesthetic process itself is initiated by a surplusage that, while it 
cannot be eliminated, also cannot be made present.   
 Such “tact” plays a key role in the composition of “Winckelmann,” both because 
it whitewashes the unseemly, anti-Platonic quality of Winckelmann’s death and because 
it omits the means by which Winckelmann seeks to foment the rebirth of Greek society; 
that is, to reproduce the conditions wherein a great and highly-developed culture not only 
tolerated male homosexual passions, but deemed them of spiritual value and attempted to 
employ such passions for the benefit of society as a whole. Arcangeli, Winckelmann’s 
murderer, has no place in this narrative. This surplusage initiates the essay, forcing it to 
take the shape that it did. Winckelmann’s biography fails to conform, and Pater’s essay 
attempts to remedy this failure – or, at least, that is what the Winckelmann myth is 
designed to accomplish.  
 In the first paragraph of the essay, Pater mentions the “strange pregnancy” 
contained in Goethe’s references to Winckelmann, where Goethe “speaks of the teacher
who had made his career possible, but whom he had never seen, as of an abstract type of 
culture, consummate, tranquil, withdrawn already into the region of ideals, yet retaining 
colour from the incidents of a passionate intellectual life.” Pater then quotes Heg l: 
“Winckelmann, by the contemplation of the ideal works of the ancients, received a sort of 
inspiration, through which he has a sense for the study of art. He is to be regarded as one 
of those who, in the sphere of art, have known how to initiate a new organ for the human 
spirit.” Finally, Pater concludes this opening paragraph: “That it has given a new sense, 
that it has laid open a new organ, is the highest that can be said of any critical effort. It is 





what conditions was that effected?” (114; emphasis added). From the first paragraph on, 
Winckelmann becomes “a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood,” even 
though, unlike the jurists and psychologists to whom Pater’s contemporary, John 
Addington Symonds, wanted to explain Greek (and Victorian) homosexuality, Pater is 
obviously a sympathetic ear. The “indefinitely active principle” motivating Winckelmann 
is not something Pater wants to eradicate; he wants to analyze and understand it because
this man “laid open a new organ” for other men. These phrases, of course, come from the 
famous passage in Michel Foucault’s Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality, where he 
declares that “the sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a 
species” (43). As noted at the outset, Pater’s writings exist at this turning-po nt, 
functioning (one might say) as the semi-colon in Foucault’s assertion. While deeply 
influenced by the hierarchical thinking of Greek pederasty, Pater was also inveted in 
individual temperament and biographical details. Again, Pater’s endorsement of spiritual 
procreancy is him toeing the line between hierarchy and equality. 
 What kind of new organ does Pater have in mind? This new organ is a metaphor 
for how, under the right “conditions,” men might find new ways of relating to one 
another. While “German literary history seems to have lost the chance of one of those 
famous friendships [between Winckelmann and Goethe], the very tradition of which 
becomes a stimulus to culture, and exercises an imperishable influence,” Pater cert inly 
feels that his essay is another attempt –a lineage that connects Pater to Winckelmann, 
Goethe and Hegel – to lay open this “new organ.” In fact, when it was initially composed, 
Pater was much more explicit about how new organs are laid open. In 1867, the 





author, Walter Pater, included it in the first edition of The Renaissance (1873), he omitted 
the following passage: “[T]he Hellenic manner is the blossom of the Hellenic spirit and 
culture, that spirit and culture depend on certain conditions, and those conditions are 
peculiar to a certain age.” While Pater later wrote that meeting the people of another age 
face to face “is as impossible as to become a little child, or enter again the womb and be 
born” (196), he initially asserts that “the blossom of the Hellenic spirit and culture” could 
be fully re-experienced, and not just “throw[n]…into [historical] relief,” for the passage 
concludes: “Reproduce those conditions, attain the actual root, and blossoms may again 
be produced of a triumphant color” (107). 
 Why did Pater omit this passage? Scholars such as Linda Dowling and Richard 
Dellamora ask this question, but their answers are not entirely satisfying. Reproducing 
the Hellenic “spirit and culture” meant one thing more than any other in Victorian 
Oxford: code for Greek pederasty, which is, observes Regius Professor of Greek Ingram
Bywater, Pater’s “certain sympathy with a certain aspect of Greek lif ” (qtd. Dowling 95; 
Dellamora 61). The ostensible subtlety of Bywater’s remark shouldn’t be construed as 
evasiveness; that is, he said all he needed to say, for his remark is meant to be perfectly
legible. Following Frank Turner and Richard Jenkyns, Linda Dowling stresses that, while 
J. S. Mill, Matthew Arnold, and Benjamin Jowett made the Greeks (especially Plato)
central to a liberal arts education at Oxford, it was the students of this new curriculum 
(Pater, Symonds, Wilde, etc.) that highlighted the male-male eroticism (the Platonic eros) 
endemic to Greek thought, making “a certain sympathy with a certain aspect of Greek 
life” emblematic, as it indeed was, of Greek thinking in its entirety. In this sense, Oxford 





Renaissance Hellenism moving out from underneath the cover of technical anonymity, 
but, even worse, it now dons explicit institutional affiliation: “Fellow of Brasenos 
College, Oxford.” Dowling cites Pater’s colleague, John Wordsworth, who stresses the 
fact that since “you [Pater] had reprinted it with your own name,” Pater explicitly 
connects Oxford to his statements (99), while Dellamora asserts, rather optimistically, 
that even though it is no longer explicit, “the utopian intent and the implicit relation in 
1867 to the need for legislative reform remain” (114). This omission, in other words, can 
clearly be interpreted as an act of conscious self-censorship, of remaining “in the closet,” 
of burying the explicit intention, despite the fact that, as we will see, Pater apparently 
didn’t omit enough. With this, there is perhaps little to argue, for anonymity, omissions, 
and defensiveness describe Pater’s intent. For this reason, Heather Love (follwing 
Jacques Khalip) “links Pater’s embrace of anonymity to his experience bearing a 
marginalized sexual subjectivity” (69). Finally, Will Fisher also establishes, with great 
precision, the relationship between the Victorian interest in the Renaissance (even, to a 
large extent, its creation of this historical and artistic period qua concept) and the creation 
of the homosexual subject, inviting the reader to understand homosexuality in terms of 
birth, rebirth, and generativity. Fisher, however, does not include Winckelmann and 
Greek pederasty as part of this equation. 
 This conspicuous omission, this lack of transparency and this embrace of 
anonymity, however, has allowed these scholars – in fact, all scholars – to overlook what 
is apparently an inconspicuous, though not an accidental, omission:  
With characteristic openness, Winckelmann had confided his [travel] 
plans to a fellow-traveler, a man named Arcangeli, and had shown him the 
gold medals received at Vienna. One morning he entered Winckelmann’s 





‘memoranda for the future editor of the History of Art,’ still seeking the 
perfection of his great work. Arcangeli begged to see the medals once 
more. As Winckelmann stooped down to take them from the chest, a cord 
was thrown round his neck. Some time afterwards, a child with whose 
companionship Winckelmann had beguiled his delay, knocked at the door, 
and receiving no answer, gave the alarm.  Winckelmann was found 
dangerously wounded, and died a few hours later, after receiving the last 
sacraments. It seemed as if the gods, in reward for his devotion to them, 
had given him a death which, for its swiftness and its opportunity, he 
might well have desired. (126; emphasis added)    
 
Between 1867 and 1873, this passage remains the same: Winckelmann stoops down; 
Arcangeli approaches him from behind; he places a cord around Winckelmann’s neck; 
and then, full stop. Pater continues: “Some time afterwards, a child,” omitting the 
stabbing. Like Goethe, Pater could not know the facts of the murder, for as Hans 
Mayer asserts “the court [i.e. public] records of Arcangeli’s murder trial report in ample 
detail Winckelmann’s slow hemorrhaging from the puncture wounds, the vigorous man’s 
struggle with his murderer, the ugly death in a public inn surrounded by stupid and 
indifferent waiters and cleaning girls” (168). Additionally, while Pater says of 
Winckelmann’s death that “it seemed as if the gods, in reward for his devotion to them, 
had given him a death which, for its swiftness and its opportunity, he might well have 
desired,” he is surely echoing Goethe’s own description: “[I]n a sense we can count him 
happy, that he rose up to the blessed from the topmost point of human existence, that a 
short horror, a speedy pain took him from the living. The frailties of age, diminution of 
the intellect were spared him…He lived as a man and went forth from this world as a 
man in his fullness” (qtd. in Mayer 168). Pater’s reader, however, finds in its place the 
“beguiling” child. Is Winckelmann’s death scene capable of being translated into Pater’s 





 The absence of the stabbing in Pater’s description of Winckelmann’s death 
provides us with an opportunity to rethink the relationship between birth, rebirth, and the 
Victorian origins of male homosexuality. Pater expunges the horrific violence of 
Winckelmann’s murder by instead presenting the reader with the child, pointing to he 
fact that this might be the residue of the primal scene of Pater’s nascent homosexuality. 
Freud’s establishes the concept of the “primal scene” in “From the History of an In antile 
Neurosis” (SE 17: 1-122). In his definitive study of the relationship between Freud’s 
concept and its relation to literature and philosophy, Ned Lukacher characterizes the 
primal scene as “an ontologically undecidable intertextual event that is situated in the 
differential space between historical memory and imaginative construction, between 
archival verification and interpretative free play” (24). Specifically, the “sc ne” consists 
of the child’s witnessing parental coitus a tergo, which causes (castration) anxiety in the 
witness because he believes violence is being committed on the person “taking it from 
behind.” When the child initially “witnessed the coitus a tergo,” writes Slavoj Žižek, 
“nothing traumatic marked this scene; the scene acquired features only in retrospect, with 
the later development of the child’s infantile sexual theories, when it became impossible 
to integrate the scene within the newly emerged horizon of narrativization-histricization-
symbolization” (31). We do not then have access to the exact moment when Pater bore 
witness to this scene; that is, when he learned that Winckelmann had been violently 
murdered. We have no need for such access, however, because trauma acquires meaning 
“only in retrospect” (tethered to “later development”). We must focus on what is sid, on 





 So the reader is presented with two types of omission. The first type we might 
classify as conscious self-censorship. The second type, however, is more difficult to 
classify. If Winckelmann, as Pater saw him, were to be anointed the Victorian patro
saint of all things Greek, then describing his murder in lurid, forensic detail would 
certainly sully Pater’s hagiography – and would be strikingly incongruous with Pater’s 
prose style. In this respect, Pater knows that such a description would connote something 
akin to a pervert’s comeuppance. “[W]ithin a specifically Victorian context,” writes 
Dellamora, “Winckelmann’s death appears to be an outcome nearly predictable in a 
society hostile to sexual difference” (114). Textually speaking, it is unwarranted to assert 
that Pater consciously removed anything from this passage, not only because there is no 
alternate draft (the passage remains the same in all subsequent editions), but also because 
there is in fact nothing missing, for there is simply the child. It is clear, moreove , that 
Pater provides the reader with a precise explanation for why this opportunity, and “its 
[ostensible] swiftness,” presented itself to his assailant: because the child delayed the 
departure of the art historian “still seeking the perfection of his great work.” 
 So why include the scene at all? If describing Winckelmann’s murder in lurid, 
forensic detail is antithetical to Pater’s florid prose style, we could conclude that any 
mention of the murder is remarkable “within a specifically Victorian context.” But the 
appearance of the child is not corroborated by the evidence and testimony collected for 
Arcangeli’s trial. Furthermore, this reference to the child, as Billie Andrew Inman notes, 
does not even appear in Otto Jahn’s biography of Winckelmann – and Pater’s 1867 essay 
is, in part, a review of Jahn’s biography. While there is a possible source for the child’s 





Werke), the significant fact remains, Inman continues, that Pater’s description of 
Winckelmann’s murder is “almost a translation” of Jahn’s (111). It would, therefor, be 
reasonable to conclude that the child’s appearance is a stylistic revision, particularly 
noteworthy because Pater’s essay provides its reader with the appearance of the child and 
without even a cursory reference to the nature of the assault; that is, there is no 
penetration, no blood, no torn flesh. If the outcome of Winckelmann’s life is as legible as 
Dellamora claims why not simply omit the scene entirely? The first, much-discussed 
omission of the “Hellenic manner” passage was necessary (its meaning too le ible, 
lacking requisite subtlety, etc.); but the second, of the stabbing, is qualitatively diff rent. 
The nature of this “ugly death” – the street hustler’s brutish, pockmarked complexion; 
Winckelmann’s moaning, panting, and cursing; his right lung filling with blood; the 
stupid, gawking bystanders – remains in stark contrast to the future-oriented pederastic 
eros expressed in “the Hellenic manner” passage. Moreover, the study most attuned to 
these issues, Kevin Ohi’s Innocence and Rapture: The Erotic Child in Pater, Wilde, 
James, and Nabokov (2005), does not discuss the child’s appearance. In his first chapter, 
“‘Doomed Creatures of Immature Radiance’: Renaissance, Death, and Rapture in Walter 
Pater,” Ohi pays particular attention to the importance of Winckelmann for Pater’s 
conceptualization of the Renaissance, and in doing so he focuses on the “dead, dying, 
indifferent, or precociously melancholic children” (13) that populate Pater’s t xts. 
However, the “child with whose companionship Winckelmann had beguiled his delay” 
goes mysteriously unremarked. It is possible that this child goes unnoticed by Ohi 
because he really isn’t of the same order as Pater’s other dead, dying, indiffere t, or 





interested, and if he has beguiled the art historian, one imagines it would have been with 
a vibrant rather a melancholic disposition.  
 We cannot simply assert that Pater consciously removed this “ugly death” in favor 
of the enthralling child. Goethe’s intellectual pregnancy takes precedence over 
Winckelmann’s untimely death because it effectively gives meaning to it; but something 
more complicated undergirds this precedence-taking. Biographically speaking, it was not 
until the 1874 disclosure of Pater’s relationship with William M. Hardinge that Pater, in 
Inman’s word, “recogni[zed]…the circumscribed boundaries within which he would be 
constrained to live if he were to remain acceptable to polite society” (19). Pater’s first, 
full-blown encounter with institutional “homophobia,” which Inman describes in great
detail in “Estrangement and Connection,” led to Benjamin Jowett passing Pater over for a 
University Proctorship. All of this, however, post-dates both the original scripting of 
“Winckelmann” and its inclusion in Studies in the History of Renaissance, which is to say 
that, according to this timeline, Pater’s knowledge of Winckelmann’s murder had yet to 
crush his optimism, for it is with Hardinge that Pater violates Oxford’s unwritten rules 
about conduct between men.  
 We cannot, then, explain the omission of the stabbing and the appearance of the 
child with reference to Pater’s biography. Years before Th  Renaissance made him the 
most notorious don of Victorian Oxford, we find Pater revising Winckelmann’s death 
scene. The difference between the two omissions is that caution motivates the firt, while 
something beyond Pater’s control, something that resists symbolization, causes the 
second. If we are to understand Pater’s essay in terms of a primal scene, this scene is not 





Winckelmann’s stabbing into the newly emerged horizon of Pater’s nascent “sexual 
theories.” This failure calls for a strengthening of said sexual theories, a strengthening 
centering in Pater’s essay on certain mythical objects: new organs, male pregnancy, and 
unsinged hands. As with Goethe, Winckelmann “made his [Pater’s] career possible” 
(Davis, 275-76), but if this is the case, then the condition of possibility for Pater’s 
writings is locked in this essay. 
 According to Pater, Winckelmann desired his own death, for he was afforded one 
that, as Pater writes, “he might well have desired.” Pater’s non-description of 
Winckelmann’s stabbing, however, is an attempt to neutralize his desire, to safeguard 
Pater and his likeminded readers from the self-destructive quality of his desire, hi  
apparent desire to be brutally murdered by an avaricious miscreant. Again, this doesn’t 
mean the historical Winckelmann actually wanted to be murdered by a male hustler; it 
only means that Pater is unable to reconcile the myth of Winckelmann with the 
“historical” man. If Winckelmann’s desire – constituted by Pater’s relation to it – were to 
emerge, it would ruin the essay’s central goal of “narrativizing-historicizing-
symbolizing” Winckelmann’s agalma, his innermost dignity and essence, turning it 
instead into stinking offal. In order to depict Winckelmann’s agalma, Pater discovers – in 
writing his essay – that, if he is going to maintain the myth of Winckelmann’s unsigned 
hands, that je ne sais quoi “temperament” that allowed Winckelmann to touch youth in 
ways others could not, Winckelmann’s desire must be contained.   
 Moreover, his desire simultaneously causes Pater to worry about what 
Winckelmann desires from him, which is again why Pater creates a mythic portrait f 





relationship between Winckelmann and Arcangeli. Hence, the appearance of the child is a 
stopgap. While the Greeks expressed, in a free and open manner, the moral uprightness – 
as well as the ethical superiority – of male-male sexual relations, this fact i  far from 
straightforward, especially because, as Foucault observes in The Use of Pleasure (1984), 
pederasty hinged on the “allowance for the other’s freedom, his ability to refuse, and his 
required consent” (199). The male citizen (rastes) dominated the polis, along with its 
women and slaves, but he could not dominate the (male) child (eromenos), since the boy 
was himself a male citizen in training and that playing “hard to get” was crucial to his 
transition to adulthood. Therefore, we have a situation that resembles what I have called 
the marriage paradox: if he gave in too easily, he would be prostituting himself, and this 
would disqualify him from citizen status. For, maintaining the boy’s freedom – a 
responsibility that, while it concerned both parties, constituted the citizen’s main concern 
because he was libel to be persecuted if the boy’s family caught wind of any impropriety 
– safeguarded the boy’s personal integrity and autonomy. 
All these social conventions surrounding pederasty, which effectively dictate 
whether the boy was acting honorably, also concealed the secret that made such 
conventions necessary in the first place: the body is never enough, or put differently, th  
body is always too much, too recalcitrant, always ready to encourage desir. Unl ke 
dietetics (the maintenance of equilibrium, regulation of inside and outside) and 
economics (the maintenance of hierarchy, regulation of man’s domination over woman), 
erotics required additional modification because it called attention to the fact that the 
same body needed to serve as both the object of another man’s sexual affections and as 





whether the boy’s body in-itself provides enough stability for the transferenc  of 
authority, especially after it has been physically penetrated. Unlike initiatory rituals, 
where participation is obligatory, Greek pederasty constitutes for the lesser party a 
voluntary relationship, “the other’s freedom.” The uneasy compromise is an ontology of 
love à la Plato, since the major concern is “the extent that he [the citizen] is able to resist 
their seduction; which does not mean that he feels no love or desire from them, but that 
he is moved by the force of true love, and he knows how truly to love the truth that must 
be loved” (241). The process of doubt is now enmeshed in the experience of the male 
body. Through resisting the boy, the citizen takes the place of the boy, since ascesis is 
now the citizen’s concern.  
 With ascesis being the citizen’s concern, the aesthetic itinerary, as Christopher 
Craft humorously outlined it, is his path. Winckelmann, however, seems to have deviated 
from this path, since “with characteristic openness” his murderer “had given him a death 
which, for its swiftness and its opportunity, he might well have desired.” Openness? 
Desire for death? And, in this context, what is the appearance of the child? Pater – in 
search for his spiritual father (Davis 261-85), for the one who fuses philosophy and Eros, 
as he phrases it in “Diaphaneitè” – discovers Winckelmann, a man who shows to him, 
through his biography as well as through his writings, the rebirth of the Greek spirit. And 
yet, in the process of being nourished and nurtured by Winckelmann, Pater, still in his 
academic infancy, discovers the hideous details of Winckelmann’s death. The thirty-one-
year-old Arcangeli is the antithesis of the young men Pater’s newfound spiritual mentor 
had previously described (Winckelmann “has known…many young men more beautiful 





his research, Winckelmann willingly – at his own request – spent his final days 
conversing, dining, and strolling around the city with an ugly commoner. If there is 
something to be repulsed, it is the intense explosion of Winckelmann’s ability to 
articulate his desire, to enjoy himself with an ugly, pockmarked male prostitute nowhere 
accounted for in his aesthetics. Hence, the logic: if Winckelmann is left to do as he 
pleases, he, who is ineluctably attracted to dangerous men who will rob and murder him, 
will destroy himself, along with many others who might follow his example, so 
Winckelmann must be kept in check for his own good and for the good of those he 
inspires. Pater’s devotion to Winckelmann, to his masculine eroticism, is preciely a 
devotion that says, “I’m ready to celebrate all your virtues, from your unsinged hands to 
your fiery friendships, just in order to prevent this explosion of desire.” One assume, 
with Dellamora, that Pater removes the “Hellenic manner” passage because it drew 
explicit attention to those Victorian men (Pater being particularly suspect) who believed 
that they, with the aid of spiritual forefathers like Winckelmann, could reproduce 
triumphant-colored blossoms. The reason why Pater’s description of Winckelmann’s 
murder remains the same in both versions, however, should by now be clear: it needs no 
revising, no omitting, because it was already a successful safeguard against this explosion 
of Winckelmann’s desire.  
 The child, rather than promising a beneficent, reproductive future, represents 
instead the contradictions of Greek pederasty, the odd alignment of hierarchy and 
equality, desire and ascesis, body and mind, activity and passivity. Inman speaks of “the 
effects of the trauma of 1874 upon Pater’s works” as the best way to discover what Pater 





disclosure of the Hardinge affair, an affair (between an ascetic don and a precocious 
undergraduate) based on rumors, hearsay, erotic sonnets, and letters signed “yours 
lovingly,” Pater did not just discover the circumscribed boundaries within which he 
would be constrained to live if he were to remain acceptable to polite society. Instead, he 
rediscovered the contradictions of Greek pederasty. Not until 1874 and Pater’s 
(unofficial) censure, however, did Winckelmann’s murder and Pater’s inability to 
describe it explicitly become Pater’s (homosexual) primal scene. 
I would be remiss, however, if this examination of the Victorian afterlife 
sidestepped the late modern interest in the invention of the child. How does Pater’s child 
(the we have missed) fit into what Michael Cobb calls “queer theory and its children”? 
Cobb writes: “It would be a mistake…to call the current moment ‘queer theory’s turn to 
the child.’ Nevertheless, some exciting books [he is reviewing] have been devoting much 
ink to the linking of children and queerness” (119). Certainly, interest in the child’s 
“queerness” predates queer theory, which is the mistake Cobb warns of; however, there 
has been a noticeable uptick, one that could certainly be described as a “turn,” especially 
when so much of it has a common inspirational source: late modern interest in the 
Victorian period created this focus on the child, and its principal source is Jame 
Kincaid’s Child-Loving: The Erotic Child and Victorian Culture (1992). If this is the 
case, then why have scholars, all of whom are adept paranoid readers, missed Pater’s 
omission of Winckelmann’s stabbing and the concominant appearance of a child? Is mine
simply the most paranoid yet, which according to Eve Sedgwick is not an especially gre t 
achievement, or is it that the future is always already heteronormative? While these are 





feature is its faith in exposure, but it is also “anticipatory” in that, in Sedgwick’s words, 
“there must be no bad surprises.” Therefore, “bad news must always already be known,” 
which is what constitutes paranoid reading’s “future-oriented vigilance” (130). This 
vigilance reaches its apex in Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death 
Drive (2004), where Edelman declares that all news about the future is bad, 
heteronormative news and that we should drop all outlooks that are future-oriented and 
embrace the death drive. Two prominent queer theorists have attempted to challenge 
Edelman, but with only partial success because they are both paranoid readings of what 
Edelman calls “the image of the Child.”  
 In Cruising Utopia (2009), José Esteban Muñoz acknowledges the seductive 
quality of Edelman’s thesis (“I agree with and feel hailed by much of No Future” [91]), 
yet he insists, “as strongly as I reject reproductive futurity, I nonethel ss refuse to give up 
concepts such as politics, hope, and a future that is not kid stuff” (92). For Muñoz, 
Edelman concedes too much, if not everything that is worth fighting for; however, his 
book’s epigraph highlights the paradoxical situation in which paranoia places the critical
reader. Borrowed from Oscar Wilde’s “The Soul of Man under Socialism,” Cruising 
Utopia begins, “A map of the world that does not include utopia is not worth [even] 
glancing at.” While rejecting each and every instance of political futurity, Muñoz holds 
out hope, for “queerness is the not yet here.” Queerness’s not-yet-here, in other words, 
has no place in the present. Moreover, Muñoz does not wish to give up on the child, for 
despite anticipating this criticism Edelman’s child “is indeed always already white.” 





crypto-identity politics…is besides the point,” he makes it clear that we are “not to hand 
futurity over to normative white reproductive futurity” (95). 
 If Muñoz refuses to give up hope, especially when it concerns disenfranchised 
children of color, Tim Dean refuses to give up on Freud’s death drive. Unlike Muñoz, 
Dean does not feel hailed by Edelman’s book and so instead sets out to show “how 
Edelman’s use of the notion of the death drive might be reframed for a different – one 
might say queerer – vision of futurity” (123). Yet, Dean too cannot resist particulizing 
Edelman’s “Child.” Even though Edelman insists “the image of the Child not be confused 
with the lived experiences of any historical children” (11), it is precisely these lived 
experiences, according to Dean, that make children queer. Referencing Steven Bruhm 
and Natasha Hurley’s collection Curiouser: On the Queerness of Children (2004), Dean 
accuses Edelman of “overlook[ing] all those ways in which, far from being the an ithesis 
of queerness, children may be regarded as the original queers” (128). Edelman, however, 
does not disagree that “the lived experiences of any historical children” are at odds with 
our fetishistic investment in “the image of the child” (like Tiny Tim), an investm nt that 
has its roots in late-modern studies of Victorian England. In this sense, even if we accept 
the strongest social constructionist assertion, that the child is a Victorian cre tion, this is 
not a Victorian assertion, but rather one about the Victorian; this is a late-modern fetish. 
More to the point, what does Edelman’s emphasis on “the image of the Child” and 
Muñoz’s and Dean’s criticisms of it mean for Pater’s child? 
 As I have already said, the child in “Winckelmann” is lively and interested, an  if 
he has beguiled the art historian, one imagines it would have been with a vibrant rather 





Edelman (but for a different reason), Pater is only interested, at least here, in “the image 
of the Child”? Pater’s child can only be enjoyed through the dictates of Plato’s 
Symposium, so instead of representing the future, it represents the difficulty of imagining 
egalitarian love between men. Otherwise, he (like the stabbing) disappears. Looking 
back, we see that the child has never been more of a construct, that the late modern 
scholars who focus on Pater are in fact too paranoid and, paradoxically, have missed 
Pater’s reparative move. Once again, it is a matter of interpretation. On one level, we 
have what the text ostensibly represses: (sexual) trauma. On the other, we have the text. 
And once again, we have a choice, and our choice is not to choose, but to accept the late 
modern interpretations and their shortcomings, the paranoid along with the reparative. If 
there is a secret, it is an open one: as we look back at Winckelmann and Arcangeli, at 
pederasty and Pater, we see that (structurally speaking) egalitarian relations presume 
homosexuality, that marriage reform calls attention to the sex of each partner only to find 
it of no importance, and that this fact has deadly consequences.   
 Some twenty years later in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, the vicious 
stabbing finally appears, however, allowing Pater to return, we might say, to the scene of 
the crime. The passage reads as follows: 
Dorian Gray glanced at the picture, and suddenly an uncontrollable feeling 
of hatred for Basil Hallward came over him, as though it had been 
suggested to him by the image on the canvas, whispered into his ear by 
those grinning lips. The mad passions of a hunted animal stirred within 
him, and he loathed the man who was seated at the table, more than in his 
whole life he had ever loathed anything. He glanced wildly around. 
Something glimmered on the top of the painted chest that faced him. His 
eye fell on it. He knew what it was. It was a knife that he had brought up, 
some days before, to cut a piece of cord, and had forgotten to take away 
with him. He moved slowly towards it, passing Hallward as he did so. As 
soon as he got behind him, he seized it and turned round. Hallward stirred 





into the great vein that is behind the ear, crushing the man’s head down 
on the table and stabbing again and again.  
There was a stifled groan and the horrible sound of some one 
choking with blood. Three times the outstretched arms shot up 
convulsively, waving grotesquely, stiff-fingered hands in the air. He 
stabbed him twice more, but the man did not move. Something began to 
trickle on the floor. He waited for a moment, still pressing the head down. 
Then he threw the knife on the table, and listened. (278; emphasis added) 
 
Dorian maneuvers around Basil, for (like Arcangeli) Dorian approaches his victim from 
behind. But then Wilde’s corrections: the appearance of the knife, and the scene’s horrific 
violence. His melodramatic prose is in full force. Such descriptions are precisely what 
does not appear in Pater’s essay. Why here in Wilde, but not in Pater? Craft suggests that 
in the opening chapters of Wilde’s novel desire comes in two different forms and from 
two different characters: “Basil’s [desire] by idealizing Platonism that disdains the call of 
the flesh and calls instead for its sublimation into art, thought, and prayer; Lord Hen y’s 
[desire] by the counterposed ‘new hedonism’ that repudiates this Platonic disdain an  
promises instead a renascent being-in-the-flesh, one that refuses to all limit tions as it 
seeks ‘to give new form to every feeling, expression to every thought, reality to every 
dream’” (122). The picture in The Picture of Dorian Gray and Dorian’s relationship to it 
are created out of this struggle, these forces warring (between spirit and flesh) inside 
Wilde, as he himself summed up in an 1894 letter to Ralph Payne: “Basil Hallward is 
what I think I am: Lord Henry what the world thinks me” (Letters 352). Wilde closes this 
summary with: “Dorian is what I would like to be – in other ages, perhaps.” Wilde’s 
caveat is telling. In his novel, Dorian momentarily transcends the Basil-Henry deadlock, 
but only momentarily. This transcendence is of another age, be it antique or of the distant 





ultimately, we are left with only two options: Basil’s Platonic sublimations r Henry’s 
disdainful refusals of this oblique method. 
It should not surprise us then that in Pater’s review, “A Novel by Mr. Oscar 
Wilde,” the central focus is neither Dorian nor Lord Henry, but Basil. As Pater observes,  
In contrast with Hallward, the artist, whose sensibilities idealise the world 
around him, the personality of Dorian Gray, above all, into something 
magnificent and strange, we might say that Lord Henry, and even more 
the, from the first, suicidal hero, loses too much in life to be a true 
Epicurean – loses so much in the way of impressions, of the pleasant 
memories, and subsequent hopes, which Hallward, by a really Epicurean 
economy, manages to secure. (130) 
 
While Pater is quick to point out that Wilde “seems not to have identified himself entirely 
with any one of his characters” (130), this cannot be said so easily of the reviewer, for 
Pater proceeds to quote a lengthy portion of the text (here truncated): “He [Dorian] is 
much more to me than a model or a sitter…his beauty is such that art cannot express 
it…the work I have done, since I met Dorian Gray, is good work, is the best work of my 
life. But in some curious way his personality has suggested to me an entirely new ma ner 
in art, an entirely new mode of style. I see things differently, I think of them differently. I 
can now recreate life in a way that was hidden from me before”  (131). This is the only 
quotation in this brief, four-page review, and it is worth drawing the reader’s attention to 
it because these words are, of course, Basil Hallward’s. While it is Lord Henry who 
speaks explicitly of “the Hellenic ideal” (19), it is Basil who actually embraces the erotic 
“economy” that Winckelmann (along with Pater) helped Europeans rediscover. Here, 
Pater’s sympathy for Basil is quite palpable, a sympathy based on male homosexuality’s 
fraught relationship to representation and physicality, settling somewhere betw en art and 





Following in the footsteps of Pater’s reading of Winckelmann, Basil stresses the 
fact that at the heart of Dorian’s portrait lies a “terror” that may or may not be legible to 
others. Basil fears that it is legible, that it is a repetition of his first encounter with 
Dorian: “When our eyes met, I felt that I was growing pale. A curious sensatio  of terror 
came over me. I knew that I had come face to face with some one whose mere personality 
was so fascinating that, if I allowed it to do so, it would absorb my whole nature, my 
whole soul, my very art itself” (189). We, however, receive only the symbolic residues of 
this encounter, the artistic attempts to allude to what ultimately cannot be realiz d: the 
terror around which “Winckelmann” and The Picture of Dorian Gray revolve, the terror 
that equality is impossible, that hierarchy is all there is. The Wildean twist, of course, is 
that it is Basil, the Platonic sublimizer, the real Epicurean, who is brutally murdered, not 
the hedonistic Henry. This twist, though, belies the appearance of a child; that is, it bel es 
the need – one that Pater recognized – to maintain the difference between hierarchy and 
equality, physicality and representation, sex and art, but also the need to keep this 
difference in play, to flirt with it without collapsing it. This maintenance continues to be 
this dissertation’s goal. The differences in play are ultimately those of interpre ation, of 
paranoid/depth and reparative/surface readings, differences that inform the essential 






“Two Is None”: The Importance of Being Earnest 
 
In Oscar Wilde’s most successful play, both commercially and artistically, Algernon 
explains to Jack, “You don’t seem to realize that in married life three is company and two 
is none” (302). What does “two is none” mean (here)? This is the question this final 
chapter answers. In short, Algernon wants Jack to understand that, if a couple does not 
look outside itself for – at the very least – sexual titillation (if not for actual sexual 
affairs), then they are not worthy of our attention. For Algernon, there’s nothing more 
distasteful than married people who flirt – with each other. “It’s like washing your clean 
linen in public,” he says. However, what if we take Algernon’s statement more literally; 
that is, what if, without the introduction of the third, two really is none because the 
couple in-itself is nothing, is unrepresentable, unthinkable? If this is the case, the 
historical linkage between Wilde’s farcical portrayal of bourgeois (heterosexual) 
marriage and his trials for “gross indecency” make explicit what has remain d implicit in 
other nineteenth-century texts (but explicit in late modern criticism of them): that while 
the imperative to couple is irrevocably linked to the ability to preserve each partner’s 
autonomy, the problem with the number 2 is its unrepresentability. 
 W.H. Auden, himself no stranger to the intricacies of (male) homosexuality at the 
turn of the century, once wrote of Wilde’s last play: 
Like all works of art, it drew its sustenance from life, and, speaking for 
myself, whenever I see or read the play I always wish I did not know what 
I do about Wilde’s life at the time he was writing -- that when, for 
instance, John Worthing talks of going Bunburying, I do not immediately 
visualize Alfred Taylor’s establishment. On rereading it after his releas , 
Wilde said, ‘It was extraordinary reading the play over. How I used to toy 
with that Tiger Life.’ At its conclusion, I find myself imagining a sort f 
nightmare Pantomime Transformation Scene in which, at the touch of the 





country house in a never-never Herfordshire turns into the Old Bailey, the 
features of Lady Bracknell into those Mr. Justice Wills. Still, it is a 
masterpiece, and on account of it Wilde will always enjoy the impersonal 
fame of an artist as well as the notoriety of his personal legend. (323)   
 
If, as Christopher Craft observes, Wilde’s play is “a withering critique of the political 
idea, exigent in the 1890s, that anyone’s sexuality, inverted or otherwise, could be natural 
or unnatural at all” (112), then it becomes easier to understand the conundrum Auden 
encounters as it is captured by his wish “not [to] know what I do about Wilde’s life at th
time he was writing [the play].” In retrospect, Auden asserts, it is impossible to 
disassociate Bunburying from acts of gross indecency and a “confirmed Bunburyist” 
from a (male) homosexual. The play, however, is not about deciphering a code in Wilde’s 
text, in determining, for instance, how closely Wilde toyed with that Tiger Lif when he 
wrote Earnest; instead, it is about marriage. It can easily be said (and it has been) that 
Wilde denaturalizes hetero marriage by equating it with farce, although one might say 
(yet more anachronistically) that so do most Restoration comedies. The differnce, 
however, between Wilde’s play and, say, William Wycherley’s The Country Wife (1675) 
is its timing. The Country Wife is a farce about cuckoldry (which, as Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick observes, “is by definition a sexual act, performed on a man, by another man” 
[Between Men 49]), whereas Earnest is a farce about marriage p r se, about the couple. 
Wilde’s play (it was on stage when his trials commenced) intimately links the institution 
of marriage with “that Tiger Life,” placing this life at its center, something that Auden 
wishes he had not done. 
 I invoke here three seminal, LGBT-studies readings of the play: Joel Fineman’s 
1980 “The Significance of Literature: The Importance of Being Earnest”; Craft’s 1990 





Sedgwick’s 1993 “Tales of the Avunculate: Queer Tutelage in The Importance of Being 
Earnest.” I invoke these readings of because Earnest is both a play about marriage and 
about “that Tiger Life,” but all three readings predate LGBT activism’s (“neoliberal”) 
turn towards same-sex marriage, so all three articles engage Wilde’s marriage farce 
without the presumption that same-sex marriage will soon take LGBT politics’ center-
stage. (For each, marriage and homosexuality are diametrically opposed.) Just as Wilde 
said after his release from prison that “it was extraordinary reading [Earnest] over,” it is 
similarly extraordinary to reread this play – along with late modern critics Craft, 
Fineman, Sedgwick and a few others such as Jeff Nunokawa, Jonathan Dollimore, Kevin 
Ohi and Shelton Waldrep – in conjunction with the debate over same-sex marriage. 
Therefore, I bring these three late modern critics together in order to place the central 
issue raised by this dissertation – the problem of the number 2 – by demonstrating that 2 
is, in fact, none; that is, that 2 is, in the end, an unthinkable number. S dgwick’s reading 
is the most germane for this dissertation because it resists the temptation to turn Wilde 
into a queer theorist content with exposing (in a paranoid fashion) the hidden elements in 
Wilde’s text. Instead, Sedgwick remains content with its surface, where the uncles and 
aunts reside, thereby introducing us to what I call Wilde’s reparative avunculate.  
In “Tales of the Avunculate,” Sedgwick’s goal is to resist the temptation to view 
the equation (hetero/homo equals difference/sameness) as the secret of Wilde’s play. For 
instance, writing first of Tennyson’s In Memoriam (1849), Craft asserts: “Since the homo 
is lost or banished only to be rediscovered in and as the hetero (which is itself thus 
constituted as a memorial of a former undifferentiated sameness), all longing remains for 





a desire for sameness – speaks, like the poet, in memoriam” (98). The poem’s earlier, 
more youthful homoeroticism is radically abandoned in Tennyson’s “evolutionary 
narrative,” and this abandonment allows Craft to “identif[y]…the homosexual with the 
general category of sameness, and, correlatively, of the heterosexual with the general 
category of difference,” which is “compactly performed in Craft’s [“hetero”/“homo”] 
abbreviations” (Nunokawa “Extinction” 473n8). Thus, in “Alias Bunbury,” Craft can 
write: “So decisive is the descent of the father’s name, so swift its powers f compulsion 
and organization, that (at least seemingly) it subdues the oscillations of identity, 
straightens the byways of desire, and completes – voilà – the marital teleology of the 
comic text” (131). Sedgwick criticizes Craft, Fineman (who sees the play as n nalysis 
of the working of the signifier), and Dollimore (who, more generally, sees Wilde 
perversely, queerly inverting all binarisms) by emphasizing the fact that Wilde does not 
structure his play around a hetero/homo binary based simply on sameness and difference; 
according to Sedgwick, we are not “to admire Wilde for being Derrida or Lacan avant la 
lettre…[where] ‘inversion’ and the ‘homosexual’ are hailed as magically exact preursor-
supplements to a line of modernist/postmodern phantasmatic” (55).  
At the outset of this dissertation, I called reparative reading supplemental: in 
Sedgwick’s case, she ostensibly supplements Craft et al. “I find these deconstru tive 
readings of Wilde,” writes Sedgwick, “indispensably interesting and, to an almost 
tautological degree, ‘true’”; however, she stresses, “it also seems urgent as it is difficult 
to find some alternative approaches” (55). Her alternative approach (what I have called 
the reparative avunculate) attempts to sidestep the fact that “two is none,” that the 





relate to one another. Again, the concept of reciprocal superiority encourages us to seek 
out the reparative, to embrace same-sex marriage’s promise of perfect equality, b t it 
simultaneously reminds us not to dispense with the paranoid, since this promise is (and 
will always be) pure fantasy. In this sense, the reparative is a response to a “true”
situation: the seductive yet illusionary promise of same-sex marriage. Sedgwick, 
therefore, embraces the avunculate as an escape from these binary prisons, from these 
stultifying pairings, but as we will find, a letter always arrives at its destination. 
Sedgwick begins her alternative approach by emphasizing that Wilde remains 
rather securely within the realm of nineteenth-century sexuality, for his pronouncements 
and his actions coincide with male-male sexual relations that are based explicitly on 
hierarchies, ones attached to the ancient Greece formulated by Victorian Helle ism. In 
words already cited in the previous chapter, Sedgwick claims, “Wilde’s own eros was 
most closely tuned to the note of pederastic love in process of being superseded – and, we 
may as well as say, radically misrepresented – by the homo/hetero imposit on” (57-58). 
These hierarchies – be they of age, class, race/ethnicity, nationality, or of sheer 
experience or “initiatedness” (57) – define these “same-sex” relations in terms of 
difference rather than, after the homo/hetero imposition, in terms of sameness. By 
focusing so heavily on the last moments of the play (“let’s begin – but only because 
everyone else does – with the Name of the Father,” writes Sedgwick [52]), or, in other 
words, with the psychoanalytic fascination with “the Name of the Father!” (58; 
Sedgwick’s exclamation point), these other essays overlook the erotic role (whether 
actual or euphemistic) that uncles and aunts play, overlook the fact that the play does not 





readings to this imposition. It is for this reason that in Tame Passions of Wilde (2003) 
Nunokawa coins the term “Earnestosexual” (43). This term invokes what Nunokawa calls 
“desire-lite,” that is, Wilde’s “tame passions,” a reference to the ninth episode of James 
Joyce’s Ulysses (1922), where one character states that “the very essence of Wilde” is 
“the light touch” (163). For this reason, Nunokawa argues for a middle ground: 
Wilde’s brand of desire-lite will be both familiar and unfamiliar to those 
schooled in contemporary theories of dissident sexualities: familiar 
because of its egregious artificiality – cutting itself off from Nature where 
passions eccentric to the marriage-plot…have found their grass-roots 
support…unfamiliar, though, when we consider that this performance of 
desire works not to subvert heterosexual normativity, but rather to 
cooperate with it. (44-45) 
 
And yet, Sedgwick can hardly agree, for this reconciliation would be at the expense of 
her criticism of psychoanalysis. Desire-lite’s flexibility brings together “egregious 
artificiality” and “heterosexual normativity,” allowing them to exist in a symbiotic 
relation too similar to the equation that Sedgwick rejects and, according to her, that 
psychoanalysis supports. For instance, in her criticism of Kaja Silverman’s 
psychoanalytic reading of Henry James, she begins by quoting Silverman: “The Jamesian 
phantasmatic can…be said to enclose homosexuality within heterosexuality, and 
heterosexuality within homosexuality” (73; Sedgwick’s ellipsis). For Sedgwick, there 
must be alternative approaches to engaging with sexual difference. 
Sedgwick spends much energy not to destroy the Oedipal triangle, but to provide 
a viable alternative to it. (Derrida’s critique of Lacan also targets the triangle.) Hence, 
tales of the avunculate, an anthropological term used to denote a patrilineal relationship 
between a man and the sons of his sister, which Sedgwick eventually employs to include 





with an enigmatic quotation from E.M. Forster (“There have always been aunts in my 
family, and Uncle Willie also had his aunts” [52]) that provides the basis for thinking 
outside the triangle. “Forget the Name of the Father!” (58), Sedgwick demands, for only 
then can we see what is in plain sight, that is, what a “deconstructive” reading of the play 
misses. “Uncle” and “aunt,” common nineteenth-century sexual slang where the former 
could mean “patron, friend, literal uncle, godfather, adoptive father, sugar daddy” and the 
latter “a passive sodomite” (as in Marcel Proust’s “La Race des tantes”), “don’t add up to 
two complementary male roles, as for instance a ‘masculine’ and a ‘feminine.’” “Even if 
you wanted to,” Sedgwick concludes, “you couldn’t pair an uncle up with auntie and 
bundle them off for a happy, heterosexually intelligible honeymoon” (59). Sedgwick here 
has two express goals. One is to show how uncles and aunts, literal and figurative ones, 
disrupt the psychoanalytic triad, while the other is to show how disrupting the triad 
unsettles the modern hetero/homo definition. Uncles and aunts disrupt the holy trinity of 
the father-mother-child family “[b]ecause aunts and uncles…are adults whose intimate 
access to children needn’t depend on their own pairing or procreation, it’s very common, 
of course, for some of them to have the office of representing nonconforming or 
nonreproductive sexualities to children.” Sedgwick continues: “The space for 
nonconformity carved out by the avunculate goes beyond the important provision of role 
models for proto-gay kids….[I]f having grandparents means perceiving your parents s 
somebody’s children, then having aunts and uncles…means perceiving your parents as 
somebody’s sibs – not, that is, as alternately abject and omnipotent links in a chaiof 
compulsion and replication that leads inevitably to ou; but rather as elements in a varied, 





subtitle of Sedgwick’s essay, and a highly personal one at that, with Sedgwick’s own 
beloved aunts becoming part of the lesson: “Aunt Estelle and Aunt Frances [‘the best 
loved people in my family’], sisters who slept in the same room for most of their eight 
decades” (63). Through such passages, we come to understand Forster’s observatin that 
“there have always been aunts in my family.” Queerness starts at home, and it st rts 
specifically with the extended family rather than with the father-mother-c ild triad. 
Uncles and aunts disrupt this triad that constructs one’s parents as the source that “leads 
inevitability to you”; instead, the influences are exceedingly variable, fungible.  
 In Wilde’s play, these queer possibilities are there for everyone to see, that is if 
psychoanalysis does not rush us to its final line. Sedgwick’s demand that we forget 
means not losing sight of what is right in front of our eyes. Two of her examples should 
suffice. The first is Algernon’s interrogation of Jack concerning the inscription in his 
cigarette case. The inscription reads: “From little Cecily, with her fondest love to her dear 
Uncle Jack” (299); and thus ensues a hilarious exchange (based on Jack’s blundering 
subterfuge that Cecily is his aunt) about how “some aunts are tall, some aunts are not t ll. 
That is a matter that surely an aunt may be allowed to decide for herself” (299). Plus, as 
Sedgwick notes, in the original four-act version, Jack continues: “There is a great vari ty 
of aunts. You can have aunts of any shape or size you like. My aunt is a small aunt” 
(360n10). The clincher, however, and the remark that explains Sedgwick’s observation 
that “you couldn’t pair an uncle up with auntie and bundle them off for a happy, 
heterosexually intelligible honeymoon” is Algernon’s exquisite response: “There is no 
objection, I admit, to an aunt being a small aunt, but why an aunt, no matter what her size 





forgetting the Name of the Father, we are allowed to embrace this wonderful confusion, 
for here the child is not the telos of the heterosexual couple, but rather the creation of 
multi-directional collisions.  
 The second example involves the practice of Bunburying: 
ALGERNON: A man who marries without knowing Bunbury has a very 
tedious time of it. 
JACK: That is nonsense. If I marry a charming girl like Gwendolen, and 
she is the only girl I ever saw in my life that I would marry, I certainly 
won’t want to know Bunbury. 
ALGERNON: Then your wife will. (302) 
 
When Sedgwick cites these lines, her purpose is to show that Bunburying hardly 
conforms to male homosexuality, at least as Algernon is describing it here, sinc  here he 
ascribes the same desire (“to know Bunbury”) to his cousin Gwendolen. Here, as with the 
first example, Sedgwick is stressing the fluidity that the play endorses, arguing against 
Fineman, where he concludes that “we may rechristen the autological as the autosexual, 
or rather, the homosexual, and we may equally revalue the heterological as the 
heterosexual. This leaves us with the psychoanalytic conclusion that the fundamental 
desire of the reader of literature is the desire of the homosexual for the heterosexual, or 
rather, substituting the appropriate figurative embodiments of these abstractions, the 
desire of the man to be sodomized by the woman” (88-89; 66n20). Sedgwick is arguing 
against such psychoanalytic fixity, as when (in a passage cited at the beginning of this 
dissertation) she states that “it is startling to realize that the aspect of ‘homosexuality’ that 
now seems in many ways most immutable…[is] its dependence on defining sameness 
between partner” (57). Her challenge to us is to find alternative ways of engaging in 
relations not defined by sameness, not defined by the psychoanalytic triad that in a 





 Sedgwick proposes, therefore, an alternative reading of the play’s dénouement, 
one based on her “tales of the avunculate,” but one that in good reparative fashion, she is 
not eager to endorse as a “strong theory”: 
Supposing we wanted to ask whether the play, as a play, narrows or 
extends, “stabilizes” or “destabilizes,” the holy name of the family as our 
culture hands it to us: we would have to ask conclusively, at this point, a 
difficult question: what it means that the play's central marriage, the one 
between Jack and Gwendolen, can't take place until Jack is demonstrated 
to be, not only Algernon’s “true” brother, but (as Ernest) his own “true” 
brother; Aunt Augusta’s “true” nephew; at once Algernon’s big nephew 
and big uncle (as Algernon is also marrying his “little aunt” cum “little” 
niece” Cecily) – and, finally, his own wife’s first cousin, mediator 
between the sibship and the avunculate, in the chiasmic, diagonal relation 
that in most cultures even now forms the immediate defining demarcation, 
from one side or the other, of the boundary legally called “incest”: that 
between inside and outside the family. (70) 
 
What worries Sedgwick is that this alternative reading really is not one, that it “fr mes 
the play yet again in terms of its conclusion” (70). Rather, Sedgwick wishes to argue for a 
notion of family that is “elastic enough to do justice to the depth and sometimes 
durability of nonmarital and/or nonprocreative bonds, same-sex bonds, nondyadic bonds, 
bonds not defined by genitality, ‘step’-bonds, adult sibling bonds, nonbiological bonds 
across generations, etc.” (71). In other words, she adds on a personal note, “the people I 
like to spend Thanksgiving with” (71). For Sedgwick, this adds an “avunculate angle” to 
the psychoanalytic triad, showing that this “heterosexist” triangle is “always already 
awash” with queer potential. Moreover, she does this not by being more paranoid than, 
say, Craft, not by anticipating Craft’s response before he or anyone else can respond, but 
by being generous to Wilde’s play. 
Yet, this generosity has its limits, and we encounter these limits when we attempt 





does not incorporate into her analysis, which she in fact (intentionally?) excises from it. 
Sedgwick stops the block quote with Algernon saying “Then your wife will [want to 
know Bunbury],” but he continues: “You don’t seem to realize that in married life three is 
company and two is none.” When Algernon says that “three is company,” it is difficult 
not to be reminded of Sedgwick’s earlier argument in Between Men (1985), where desire 
is, in essence, always triangulated, always bifurcated outwards, extended in more than 
one direction in order to soften its blow; that is, where men’s desire for one another is 
tempered by the presence of a woman as a necessary third party. Two alone (of whatever 
sex) is more difficult to imagine. The importance of being married means exactly this: the 
imperative to couple despite – or, more accurately, because of – marriage’s irresistible 
(and fantasmatic) promise of perfect equality.  
Why does everyone begin with the Name of the Father? While Sedgwick is more 
interested in the creation of siblings at the end of the play, she admits that “the 
glitteringly implausible cross-gender marriages…dramatically, inevitably arrive to 
cement the glitteringly implausible cross-gender courtships” (68; emphasis added). 
Generically, a comedy must end in marriage, but the inevitability that cements this play’s 
ending (its last line) remains unexplained. “Let’s begin – but only because everyone else 
does – with the Name of the Father,” says Sedgwick, but is this caveat (“but only because 
everyone else does”) an innocent one? Sedgwick’s principal criticism of psychoanalysis 
is that it endorses a developmental narrative of the individual that “tacitly installs the 
procreative monogamous heterosexual couple as the origin, telos, and norm of sexuality 
as a whole” (“Rectum” 74). Worse yet, Sedgwick regrets, “psychoanalysis, profoundly as 





nevertheless not become dispensable as an interpretative tool for any project involving 
sexual representation” (73-74). Sedgwick’s tortured grammar (“neverthel ss not become 
dispensable”) accentuates her difficulty – and, I would add, her desire – in thinking sex 
outside of psychoanalysis, even if (as she herself seems to admit) the letter always arrives 
at its destination. Despite this (ostensible) admission, Sedgwick clearly – nd, I think, 
purposefully – ignores the role the unconscious plays in psychoanalysis, an elision 
highlighted in Tim Dean’s vitriolic review of Tendencies (1993), Sedgwick’s collection 
where “Tales of the Avunculate” originally appeared. 
I will not belabor the point that Sedgwick views Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis 
as being “shaped by homophobic and heterosexist assumptions and histories,” nor do I 
wish to contest this portrayal; rather, I will focus on one aspect of Dean’s review: the 
assertion that Sedgwick’s view of sexuality is itself developmental. In Epistemology of 
the Closet, Sedgwick asks (rhetorically): “where would the whole, astonishing and 
metamorphic Western romance tradition (I include psychoanalysis) be if people’s sexual 
desire, of all things, were even momentarily assumed to be transparent to themselves?” 
(26). From this, we can conclude fours things: first, Sedgwick believes that, if only
“momentarily,” individuals should have the ability to understand their “sexual desire”; 
second, that robbing an individual of this ability is possibly “the most intimate violence 
possible,” that it is “a terribly consequential seizure” (26); third, psychoanalysis (and its 
formulation of the unconscious) “alienate[s] conclusively, definitionally” the self from its 
desire; and fourth, while (in this adumbration) I have neutered the individual subject with 
a gender-neutral pronoun, this is a sacrifice Sedgwick is not willing to make, for (she 





all men – on the fostering of our ability to arrive at an understanding of sexuality th t will 
respect a certain irreducibility in it to the terms and relations of gender” (16). As Dean 
rightly observes, Sedgwick “pictures psychoanalytic interpretations of people’s ‘own’ 
desire as felonious, tantamount to kidnap or rape” (122), for it not only impedes 
individuals’ access to their sexual desires and dismisses gender’s “irreduc bility,” but 
more consequentially, it also violently impedes, it mercilessly seizes hold of individuals, 
marring their access to their own sexual desire. So the problem is that Sedgwick asserts 
that one has – or, at least, can have – a direct relationship to desire, as if (as Dean 
indicates) one’s desire were actually one’s own. Yet, “without the psychoanalytic concept 
of the unconscious,” Dean concludes, “Sedgwick reinstates the kind of normative, ego-
based model of subjectivity – the self – that led to the pathologizing of perverse desir  in 
the first place” (122). 
Moreover, Sedgwick collapses the history and theory of psychoanalysis with the 
crystallization of the modern hetero/homo definition. The best counterarguments are 
Henry Abelove’s “Freud, Male Homosexuality, and the Americans” and Arnold 
Davidson’s “How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis.” (Both essays predate Sedgwick’s 
and she would have doubtlessly been familiar with both, especially Abelove’s.) From the 
beginning, Sedgwick contends that psychoanalysis is tainted, and if “from the beginning” 
means Freud, then things look quite different and inevitability should be something that 
psychoanalysis might be able to explain rather than be blamed for. Starting with the 
latter, Davidson’s concern is to differentiate Freud from other turn-of-the-century 
sexologists. While their terminology may have been similar, Freud’s “conceptual space” 





that affected the sexual instinct was precisely the sexual perversions” (258). Late-
nineteenth-century psychiatry conceptualized that “the sexual instinct,” which (it 
metaleptically asserts) fell under its purview, could be negatively affected (diseased), and 
the result were “the sexual perversions.” Coming from within this discourse, Freud
begins Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality w h the following sentence: “The fact of 
the existence of sexual needs in human beings and animals is expressed in biology by the 
assumption of a ‘sexual instinct,’ on the analogy of the instinct of nutrition, that is of 
hunger.” This is the position of late-nineteenth-century psychiatry: the sexual instinct was 
like a “sixth sense,” and operated like the other five. When it came to the sexual instinct, 
its unquestioned end was propagation so that a normally operating sexual instinct’s objec 
(the opposite sex) and its aim (coitus) were inextricably linked. When writing about
“inversion,” Freud calls this entire assumption, which is the basis of the definition of the 
sexual instinct, into question: 
It has been brought to our notice that we have been in the habit of 
regarding the connection between the sexual instinct and the sexual object 
as more intimate than it in fact is. Experience of the cases that are 
considered abnormal has shown us that in them the sexual instinct and the 
sexual object are merely soldered together – a fact which we have been in 
danger of overlooking in consequence of the uniformity of the normal 
picture, where the object appears to form part and parcel of the instinct. 
We are thus warned to loosen the bond that exists in our thought between 
instinct and object. It seems probable that the sexual instinct is in the first 
instance independent of its object; nor is its origin likely to be due to its 
object's attractions. (qtd. in Davidson 264)  
 
This observation (that “the sexual instinct and the sexual object are merely soldered 
together”) leads us to Abelove’s article, which usefully highlights Freud’s mo t 
homophile assertions. For brevity’s sake, I will only quote the most profound one: “All 





one in their unconscious.” When Dean speaks of “the kind of normative, ego-based 
model of subjectivity – the self – that led to the pathologizing of perverse desir in the 
first place,” this is what he is speaking of: essentially, there is, for Freud, no such thing as 
perverse desire because desire can only be perverse if its aim is consciously understood. 
Freud is not responsible for crystallizing the modern hetero/homo definition. In fact, this 
definition thwarts some of his most radical assertions.  
Freud implicitly explains why the marriage paradox (the reformist desire to enter 
into a two-person partnership, an attachment in which both partners are equal but where 
both parties are free not to compromise, since each must exercise its individual 
autonomy) is so vexing: marriage equality à la reciprocal superiority requires soldering, 
but the joint or seam will never hold. The delicious, punning absurdity of the play’s 
ending has less to do with the superiority of the Name of the Father than it does with it
undoing. Along with Sedgwick, we take comfort in the company three affords (where the 
number three only means “more than two”), but it is also the same reason that “two is 
none.” When Jack finally says “I’ve now realized for the first time in my life the vital 
Importance of Being Earnest” (358), we see that now, in the twenty-first century, the joke 
is on us. Marriage reform is at its most absurd (in the sense of the Latin phrase reductio 
ad absurdum) when earnestness of purpose loses all sense of proportion, and this is why 
Wilde’s play is so well suited for the same-sex marriage movement. It is no that 
Bunburying is code for anal sex (between men), as Auden feared; rather, it is that 
marriage thrives on Bunburying, thrives on the company of three, thrives (we should add) 
on the avunculate – and not on egalitarian, anti-hierarchical twosomes. The role of 





is the reductio ad absurdum of marriage, and why the modern hetero/homo definition 
operates in the nefarious ways it does. In addition, while psychoanalysis (like Sedgwick) 
can provide an alternative to these terrible twosomes (a different alternativ , of course, 
one relating to the protean nature of the drive [Trieb]), it too is shackled by this number. 
One final word on Sedgwick and psychoanalysis. The best evidence that 
Sedgwick is fully aware of Freud’s assertions concerning objectless desire (and 
Davidson, Abelove, and others) is that protean is her word, though in Epistemology of the 
Closet it is not without qualification: “the supposed protean mobility of sexual desire,” 
Sedgwick writes, “where Freud’s antiminoritizing account only gained…in influence by 
being articulated through a developmental narrative in which heterosexist and masculinist 
ethical sanctions found ready camouflage” (84; my emphasis). Not only is Sedgwick 
skeptical about Freud’s account of sexual desire’s “protean mobility,” it is unclear who is 
to blame, and what they are to be blamed for. It seems as if Sedgwick’s real enemies are 
those who found cover there, but as Abelove demonstrates, Freud argued vociferously 
against the pathologization of homosexuality, and spent great energy (much of it wasted) 
in trying to convince American psychoanalysts and psychiatrists to do the same, with one 
of his conclusions being, in part, that “sexual morality as society – and at its mos  
extreme, American society – defines it, seems very despicable to me. I stand for a freer 
sexual life” (qtd. in Abelove 11). In the end, however, Freud is to blame, but that is 
because his name is, for Sedgwick’s “consumerist” account of psychoanalysis,  
synecdoche for a vast array of “homophobic,” “heterosexist,” “masculinist” writings that 
are only tangentially related to psychoanalysis. As Dean summarizes: 
[S]he treats psychoanalysis as if it were woven from a single cloth, 





part…Treating psychoanalytic theory as essentially continuous, her 
implicit epistemology of science is – like her implicit ontology of 
subjectivity – developmental. That is, what she calls “origins damaged by 
homophobia” produce outcomes that are, necessarily, likewise damaged. 
Sedgwick’s rhetoric of “damage” implies that the cultural biases infectg 
Freud’s theory of sexuality haunt all psychoanalytic accounts of sexuality 
to the present day. (125) 
 
For Sedgwick, the exception to this rule is Melanie Klein, the psychoanalyst not 
irreparably damaged by Freud’s legacy. In one of her last publications, “Melanie Klein 
and the Difference Affect Makes” and, more generally, in her 2003 collection Touching 
Feeling, Sedgwick demonstrates how focusing on affect helps us to see the alternative 
relations on the surface (of Wilde’s play), bringing (we might say) all those people and 
their myriad ways of relating to one another together for Thanksgiving dinner. 
Particularly attractive are Klein’s use of positions rather than stages, for “Klein [that is, 
unlike Freud] wanted to convey, with the idea of position, a much more flexible to-and-
fro process” (Hinshelwood 394). In “The Difference Affect Makes,” she stat , “that’s 
the way I now am about ideas. I like them pretty chunky. Not dramatic or caricatural, 
certainly not dualistic (never dualistic), but big, big and palpable; big enough so there’s
no swallowing risk, and also so I won’t forget them, which hasn’t become any less of a 
danger as I’ve gotten older” (628). Flexible, palpable, chunky – descriptors of alternativ  
relations, ones that compelled Sedgwick to rethink a mainstay of LGBT history and 
theory: Foucault’s “repressive hypothesis.” 
 Foucault, writes Sedgwick, “seems to me to be far more persuasive in analyzing 
this massive intellectual blockage than in finding ways to obviate it” (635). As for 
Volume 1 of his History of Sexuality, this is true (though it ignores his subsequent 





of the repressive hypothesis – and of Foucault’s analysis of it – that Sedgwick too seeks 
to obviate. (Interestingly, the same can be of Sedgwick’s analysis of paranoid ead ng, 
that it “seems to me to be far more persuasive in analyzing this massive intellectual 
blockage than in finding ways to obviate it.”) Sedgwick’s argument is not again “this 
massive intellectual blockage”; rather, it is that full-frontal attacks are wholly ineffective. 
(Foucault, I think, would agree.) Because LGBT paranoid reading’s heyday was in many 
ways a response to the HIV/AIDS crisis, Sedgwick says, “I found myself at this point [in 
the mid-1990s] increasingly discontented with the predominance of the self-perpetuating 
kinds of thought that I increasingly seemed to be recognizing under the rubric of 
paranoia” (640). Sedgwick’s use of the avunculate is her early attempt to break free of 
this vicious circle. “Two is none,” however, remains untouched. Sedgwick’s search for 
alternatives begets a paranoid reading that concludes that this search revolves around the 
unacknowledged fact that these alternatives are merely farcical. They tickl  us, we laugh, 
but ultimately we are left with the bond of marriage, and nothing more.  
What does this assessment do for our image of Oscar Wilde? What, in other 
words, is Wilde’s Victorian afterlife? The scholastic (and wholly appropriate) nswer: 
there are two Oscar Wildes. Kevin Ohi argues that “the subversive Wilde grounds his 
social critique in the undermining of linguistic conventions, while the sentimental Wilde 
teaches by example, earnestly testifying to or symptomatizing a spirit crushed by sexual 
oppression…or to art’s exorbitant failure to compensate for the miseries of the fles ” 
(310). While Ohi’s article is a wonderful reading of Wilde’s nearly unclassifiable text, De 
Profundis, it does not solve the problem it highlights at its beginning; that is, late modern 





favoring one and dismissing, denigrating, or ignoring the other. Ohi suggests that this 
opposition should not exist, but the problem is that it does, and Ohi’s article perpetuates it 
even while it scolds us for having maintained it. Appropriately enough, Shelton 
Waldrep’s contribution to the Victorian Afterlife collection, “The Uses and Misuses of 
Oscar Wilde,” provides the perfect response, complete with the ambiguity between, given 
two options, what is the proper way to use Wilde. Waldrep’s options – ones he does not 
embrace, but instead sees as part of our current understanding of Wilde – are simil  to 
the ones Ohi describes: “Wilde as both a flamboyant rogue and, p radoxically, a tragic 
figure” (56; my emphasis), though Waldrep sees these opposing images as not only 
incongruent (as Ohi does), but irreconcilable. Neil Barlett surmises that it has something 
to do with marriage: not only Wilde’s own, but that The Importance of Being Earnest, 
“his best and most successful play,” “celebrates the triumph of marriage over adversity, 
brings down its curtain on a trio of engagements, and was deliberately premiered on St. 
Valentine’s day.” This leads Barlett to ask, “If I read this story in a certain light…in what 
sense of the word was this most famous of homosexuals actually a homosexual?” (34; 
qtd. in Waldrep 59). The Wilde paradox, that is, the coexistence of the subversive and the 
sentimental, of the flamboyant and the tragic, reflects the interpretative problems 
concerning marriage and homosexuality. Their close proximity is disconcerting, and calls 
out for reconciliation; instead of reconciliation, however, one perpetuates the paradox, 
asserting one half only to imply the other. Wilde, in this sense of our late modern 
struggles to define him, is a synecdoche for the marriage paradox, which is on greatest 
display not in De Profundis, but in The Importance of Being Earnest and Sedgwick’s 





play demonstrates that its perversity is more perverse than others (even LGBT others) 
had thought. At the same time, however, the alternative queer possibilities that Sedgwick 
describes revolves around two things: first, the sentimental, fantastic marriage esolutions 
and, second, the grimmer fact that these possibilities add up to nothing.      
 Let us turn then to The Picture of Dorian Gray, and, specifically, to Sedgwick’s 
reading of the novel – or, rather, to her summary in “Tales of the Avunculate” of her 
argument in Epistemology of the Closet:  
The novel takes a plot that is distinctively one of male-male Desire – the 
competition between Basil Hallward and Lord Henry Wotton for Dorian 
Gray’s love – and condenses it into the plot of the mysterious bond of 
figural likeness and figural expiation between Dorian Gray and his own 
portrait. The suppression of the original defining differences between 
Dorian and his male admirers – differences of age and initiatedness, in the 
first place – in favor of the problematic of Dorian’s similarity to the 
painted male image that is and isn’t himself, seems to reenact the 
discursive eclipse in this period, by the “homo”-sexual model, of the 
Classically based pederastic assumption that male-male bonds of any 
duration must be structured around some diacritical difference – 
old/young, for example, initiator/initiate, or insertive/receptive – whose 
binarizing cultural power would be at least comparable to that of gender. 
(57; Sedgwick’s emphasis) 
 
It only “seems to reenact the discursive eclipse in this period,” however, since Sedgwick 
will then go on to say that this is not the case, which is what allows her to engage Wilde’s 
later play in a reparative fashion. In “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,” she 
admits that her own past work has been deeply paranoid (126). Her above paraphrase is 
an interesting example of this admission because in Ep stemology this hetero/homo 
reading is paranoid, while the avunculate-angle reading, which puts the hetero/homo 
reading to the side, is not. More importantly, we perceive a certain alignment: th  
paranoid reading perpetuates the crystallization of the modern hetero/homo definition; the 





more for that would return the reading to paranoid exposure. However, if one wishes to 
see how closely these two reading styles are related to one another, how one is always 
already implying the other, the proof is in Sedgwick’s paraphrase: it all depen s on 
seems, that is, the uneasy coexistence of the paranoid and the reparative. 
 It is worth our while finally to return to Wilde’s statement regarding the thre 
main characters of The Portrait of Dorian Gray: “Basil Hallward is what I think I am: 
Lord Henry what the world thinks me. Dorian is what I would like to be – in other ages, 
perhaps.” As I said in the last chapter, Pater clearly identifies with Basil Hallward, but 
Wilde makes it much more difficult for us to know whom he identifies with. I suggest 
that this enignmatic observation is written on the seam, between the paranoid and the 
reparative, for Wilde appears to be embracing all three of characters. Alan Sinfield says 
that desire-for and desire-to-be is endemic in sex-same relations, but he also says that 
narcissism, much maligned by LGBT studies, deserves another look: 
On Freud’s account, narcissistic love is far less limited than the name 
suggests. Like anaclictic [other directed] love, it requires two people, and 
only in one variant are they supposed to be the same; otherwise there is a 
significant difference. In practice, a relationship with an individual who 
represents the person you have been, or might become, is likely to involve 
ceaseless negotiation. You are faced continually with both the 
distinctiveness of the other person (the extent to which s/he doeds not 
embody your ideal self) and the contradictions and failures in your own 
yearning (your ideal self is not as likeable, coherent, or attainable as you 
might wish to suppose.) In fact “anaclitic” doesn’t mean independent, but 
attached; specifically, “leaning-on”…Narcissism, then, may operate in an 
anaclitic way. (14) 
 
Is Dorian “your ideal self…not as likeable, coherent, or attainable as you might wish o 
suppose”? Is Basil the “one variant [where]…they [are] supposed to be the same”? 
“Ceaseless negotiation” – is this why others identify Wilde with Lord Henry? I have 





“it all depends on seems.” Under the spell of paranoia, Sedgwick describes the novel’s 
“problematic of Dorian’s similarity to the painted male image that is and isn’t himself” as 
its central feature, brushing aside Basil and Lord Henry’s influence. There is, however, 
much truth in this condensation. For in one reading, the novel is ultimately about 
Dorian’s relationship to his portrait. In another, one suggested by Wilde’s remarks and by 
Sinfield’s emphasis on the capacious nature of narcissism, we should keep the first 
alongside a more reparative reading, soldering them together if necessary. 
 Plus, these options should come as no surprise to us late modern readers who see 
Wilde as a bifurcated figure. Ohi observes that parts of Dorian Gray contribute to our 
vision of the subversive Wilde, while others contribute to our vision of the sentimental 
one – or, for Waldrep, the flamboyant rogue and the tragic figure. The point, I think, is 
not that the opposition should not exist, but that it should be embraced. Returning to the 
beginning of this dissertation, once scholars embraced the idea that “the sodomite had 
been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species” (43), they quickly 
embraced this dictum, then became dissatisfied with its ostensible simplicity, and finally 
dedicated their time to complicating, criticizing, or overturning what had becom 
received wisdom. The dismissal has been too quick. In many ways, large portions of 
second-generation queer scholars are working in a reparative mode, thanks in large part 
to Sedgwick; however, by doing so we miss the reasons why we are operating in this 
mode in the first place: the modern hetero/homo definition begets paranoia, and it is a 
paranoia that we cannot wish away, for no matter how capacious LGBTQQIA inquiry 






Barebacking and the Victorian Afterlife 
 
The Victorian afterlife, I have argued, merges the paranoid optic with the reparative in 
that it seeks to unearth the perverse concealed within the ostensibly prudish and, at the 
same time, it hopes to sympathize with Victorian literary material, to touch it without 
paranoia, without the belief that what is most important about this material is repre s d or 
hidden inside. This is how we have read 1850s marriage reform and the same-sex-
marriage politics of the early twenty-first century; it is also how, looking to the future, we 
should read the subculture of barebacking. 
If queer theory, Tom Boellstroff argues, offers “a critique of marriage that draws 
on concerns with its politics of recognition (and disrecognition of the unmarried), th  
place of marriage in capitalist production, and the inequalities and violences so often 
found within marriage and so often linked to hierarchies of gender, race, and class,” then 
queer theory is in a “tricky” position in regards to same-sex marriage becaus  proponents 
of same-sex marriage often argue that marriage “will ‘civilize’ gay and lesbian persons 
into upholding ‘traditional’ norms of monogamy and propriety” (227). In this afterword, 
instead of proposing that queer theory is not necessarily opposed to marriage (as 
Boellstroff argues), I propose that marriage (in terms of reciprocal superiority) can 
directly benefit queer theory. 
 One conspicuous place where HIV/AIDS and paranoid reading retain their 
relevance in LGBT studies and politics is in recent discussions of “barebacking.” For 
instance, at the Gay Shame conference in 2003, Leo Bersani noted the absence of 
HIV/AIDS and barebacking as topics of conversation, which seemed conspicuous given 





Bersani, “I was dismissed as having bought into the homophobic media propaganda, 
which, I was told, has transformed a few isolated incidents into a general practice” 
(Intimacies 34). In other words, Bersani was dismissed for being paranoid and for 
perpetuating homophobia. Citing Tim Dean’s research, Bersani sees this response as 
willfully naïve, for the question remains: Why, despite sex education programs spear-
headed by gay men, are gay men still having risky sex? And the answers remain singular, 
simplistic, and all too familiar, which is to say that, regardless of who one talks to, the 
reason why is always “pathology,” for what causes gay men to make pathological 
decisions is internalized homophobia. This presupposition, according to Tim Dean, has 
been detrimental to our understanding of the phenomenon of bareback sex because it 
colors every conclusion, for every question presupposes the configuration of its answer. 
Asking “what do gay men want?” (as David Halperin does) tends to elicit answers that 
turn gay male subjectivity into a false consciousness that closely resembl  the 
homophobic and anti-gay sentiments that prompt people to ask this question in the first 
place. We conclude, once again, that gay men are, in the words of an infamous 2003 
Rolling Stones article, “in search of death.” 
This conclusion is derived not simply from the fact that gay men are engaging in 
bareback sex – that is, unprotected anal intercourse – but that some gay men are 
intentionally doing this. Moreover, the intent does not derive from lack of education or 
the fact that condoms reduce physical sensation and a sense of intimacy or from 
substance abuse or from simple social awkwardness; rather, it is indicative of a d sire to 
receive HIV+ semen (bug chasing) from a “gift-giver.” Gregory Tomso asks, “Can we 





homophobic violence?” For Tomso, the answer is “no,” but he adds that “this ‘no’ is not 
the endpoint of ethical inquiry” (92). Dean responds to this dilemma by outlining what he 
calls an “impersonal ethics,” which criticizes the need to identify with someone in order 
to treat that person ethically. For Dean, identification itself is the problem. Since each one 
of us experiences the imperative to live up to an ideal and to identify with it, the problem 
is not with the shortcomings of a particular ideal, even though history is littered with 
racist, homophobic, misogynistic, and xenophobic ideals. “No solution,” writes Dean, “is 
to be found in new imaginaries or less exclusionary identificatory images” (23); rather, 
we must resist this imperative. This means that barebacking – and, in particular, bug 
chasing – are porous phenomena that should not be separated from one another, which is 
why what Dean calls “unlimited intimacy” is of global import; that is, it affects, not 
infects, much more than a few (ostensibly aberrant) individuals.  
This impersonal ethics comes into focus when we think of bareback sex as a 
political right, as a choice. Warner opens The Trouble with Normal with the following 
observation: “Sooner or later, happily or unhappily, almost everyone fails to control his 
or her sex life. Perhaps as compensation, almost everyone sooner or later also succumbs 
to the temptation to control someone else’s sex life. Most people cannot quite rid 
themselves of the sense that controlling the sex of others, far from being unethical, is 
where morality begins” (1). John Stuart Mill would regretfully acknowledge the accur cy 
of this observation. For Mill, individual autonomy is sacrosanct; however, it is not 
without limits. He did not think one should be absolutely free from interference, for the 
law must protect (when necessary) others from the exercise of one’s own individual 





on a very limited basis. Our question: Does bareback sex and bug chasing justify 
interference? My answer will lead me back to the subject on this dissertation: same-sex 
marriage, its relation to the Victorian afterlife, and to the quasi-reparative quality of 
Dean’s impersonal ethics. 
According to many state laws, the answer to this question is clearly “yes.”
According to the Lambda Legal website, in 2008 one-third of the lower forty-eight states 
consider it a felony for a person who knows he is HIV+ to have sex with another person 
without disclosing this information. (While each state law has its own peculiarities, it is 
important that, as Dean notes, if the other person willingly consents, then the first p rson 
can legally use an affirmative defense; however, such a case, if brought to trial, would 
mean the burden of proof is on the defendant.) What these statutes highlight, however 
unwittingly, is, again, the matter of intention. The impetus behind most of the available 
scientific – that is, quantifiable – research is, unsurprisingly, HIV containment. In other 
words, it asks why gay men are having risky sex not because we might learn something 
about how intimacy functions in the twenty-first century, not because it might be 
illustrative of how institutional homophobia operates thirty years after the virus’s 
outbreak, but rather in order simply to find ways of stopping these risky acts. But by what 
right? Public safety? Imminent death? Entrenched homophobia? From the public’s point 
of view, are not all these interrelated, if not variations on the same theme? 
In Principles of Political Economy (1848), Mill excludes what he calls “merely 
constructive or presumptive injury” from those acts that justify interferenc; meaning that 
merely imagining that, if present to witness the act, one believes that interference is 





necessary, but how far is tolerance, legal or otherwise, supposed to extend? As Martha 
Nussbaum argues, it is far beyond the home, so it is important not to think of tolerance of 
an individual’s autonomy in terms of public vs. private. Dean’s challenge “represents an 
attempt to think publicly about bareback sex without resorting to the moralism of trying 
to legislate others’ sex lives” (26), that is, without succumbing to the temptation to 
control others’ behavior. Missing from Mill’s argument is any reference to abstract 
concepts like “public decency,” something that can only be concretized if one somehow 
imagines what the “average citizen” finds objectionable, that is, worthy of inter erence. 
Sensationalist popular depictions of bareback sex, like with the Rolling Stones article, 
would lead one to believe that, with doubt, the average citizen is horrified, and rightly so; 
however, the reason Mill avoids discussion of public decency is because it is simply a 
way to make the “merely constructive” seem more substantive. Now HIV/AIDS, 
barebacking and bug-chasing might seem to be of a different order, since we are talking 
about actual viral transmission, and not something that is merely imagined; but this 
distinction is less secure than it might at first appear. Public safety, while seemingly more 
quantifiable than public decency, is often buttressed by the same sensationalism. The 
cleansing of the public sphere – of, for instance, New York City’s Times Square – is 
analogous to the way in which information about this subculture has been transmitted. 
Fear begets hyperbole, but instead of revulsion, disgust, and knee-jerk condemnations, 
we must approach the issue publicly and personally in order to de-pathologize it. 
While the issue cannot be ignored, it is, as Bersani rightly observes, “politically 
messy”: “Since the political credo of the gay men likely to participate in an ac demic 





uncomfortable publicly investigating, first, homophobic shame associated with being 
HIV-positive, and, second, the involuntary misogynistic shame of being exposed to 
others (gay and, even worse, straight others) as having succumbed to, or actively sought, 
the sexual “position traditionally associated with female sexuality” (33). If there is a 
phenomenon that troubles the apparent historical shift from the paranoid readings of a 
burgeoning queer theory in the 1980s and 90s to queer theory’s more recent interest in 
the reparative as an attempt to find relevance alongside the supposedly non-paranoid, 
utopic celebrations surrounding the phenomenon of same-sex marriage (the historical 
shift on which I have based this dissertation), it is barebacking. If there is a phenomenon 
that begs us to revisit the relationship between paranoid and reparative readings, it is 
barebacking. While to my knowledge none of the practitioners of reparative reading have 
grappled with barebacking, it is worth noting that HIV/AIDS was, quite literally, there at 
the beginning. In the opening paragraph of “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,” 
Sedgwick recounts a conversation she had with Cindy Patton about the conspiracy 
theories then circulating about the origins of HIV/AIDS. Curious to know Patton’s 
thoughts on the subject, she asks her directly and receives the following reply: 
Any of the early steps in its spread could have been either 
accidental or deliberate, but I just have trouble getting interested in that. I
mean, supposed we were sure of every element of a conspiracy: that the 
lives of Africans and African Americans are worthless in the eyes of the 
United States; that gay men and drug users are held cheap where they 
aren’t actively hated; that the military deliberately researches way  to kill 
noncombatants whom it sees as enemies; that people in power look calmly 
on the likelihood of catastrophic environmental and population changes. 
Supposing we were ever so sure of all those things – what would we know 
then that we don’t already know? (123)  
 
After ruminating for many years on Patton’s response, Sedgwick comes to see a central 





previously thought. The hermeneutics of suspicion, what Sedgwick will from then on 
describe in details as “paranoid reading,” promises much more than it can deliver, for  
“hav[ing] an unmystified, angry view of large and genuinely systemic oppressions does 
not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to any specific train of epistemological 
or narrative consequences” (124). This is true enough; however, HIV/AIDS then drops 
completely from the rest of the essay. Surely, this is a curious fact given that it was its 
impetus. This move, I think, leads Sedgwick to present these two reading styles as 
incompatible; for Sedgwick, they are not even strictly antagonistic, since, for her, they 
operate on completely different planes. Throughout this dissertation I have suggested that 
reparative readings supplement paranoid readings, that taken together they are stronger 
than each is individually, and that (despite Sedgwick’s lambasting of paranoid reading) it 
remains an invaluable style of analysis.  
For this reason, I conclude with Dean’s “impersonal ethics,” which I see as 
threading the needle or stitching the seam between these two styles of readings. While 
Dean’s emphasis on impersonality might seem like the antithesis of the personal nature of 
reparative reading, his emphasis actually widens our ability to relate to others in that 
rather than empathizing with other people, that is, simply reducing them to beings like 
myself, we “bas[e] ethics on the failure to identify others as persons” (25). Dean here 
identifies the paradox at the center of reciprocal superiority. Dean does not deny the fact 
that we yearn for “alternative imaginaries” that will help us to love and respect one 
another; such a quest, however, “is doomed from the start” because “as soon as there’s an 
ideal, no matter how progressive, there’s an aperture into which the superego insinuates 





marriage: if one does not recognize that it is an ideal founded on the impossibility of its 
own realization, then one is doomed to a endless, miserable quest.  
Mill and Dean, however, also recognize that highlighting this possibility is not the 
end but the beginning. Dean emphatically states that every ideal will fail to measure up, 
while Sedgwick might have said that this dooms us to the vicious circle of paranoia; but, 
like Sedgwick, Dean is open to alternatives, although ones that are differently formulated. 
Sedgwick criticizes the paranoid optic for missing alternative queer relations because it is 
focused on the nefarious underpinnings of the homonormativity of same-sex-marriage 
politics. Conversely, Dean’s focus on barebacking queerly aligns it to the utopic promises 
of same-sex marriage, for “unlimited intimacy” is another way of saying “I am superior 
to you at the same time that you are superior to me”: again, “the emergence of a 
subculture of bareback sex is not merely coincident with but directly related to he 
campaign for same-sex marriage that has occupied so much attention in recent years.” 
Rather than sidestepping the paranoid optic, Dean looks right through it in order to see 
what queer alternatives await us, for how different, really, is exchanging bodily fluids and 
exchanging wedding bands? Queer alternatives based on viral transmission are important 
manifestations of the desire for reciprocal superiority, but attempts to comprehend such 
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